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One-party Mozambican assemblies were weak institutions limited to ratifying executive 
decisions. However their multiparty successors are increasingly becoming institutions that 
matter in politics assigned with responsibilities of law-making, oversight, representation and 
constituency service. Nevertheless, theoretical and comparative work on the development of 
the Mozambican legislature has been limited. This study contributes to comparative legislative 
studies by assessing and comparing the process of legislative development and performance in 
Mozambique’s first three multiparty assemblies – Fourth (1995-1999), Fifth (2000-2004) and 
Sixth (2005-2009). It examines the extent to which the Mozambican legislature developed and 
performed its main responsibilities using institutional level data from legislative standing 
orders, legal provisions and archives, and the African Legislatures Project over a 15-year period 
from 1995 to 2009. 
 
It reveals that the Mozambican legislature improved by recruiting legislators with political 
capital, reforming rules of procedure, structure and working conditions, creating capacity for 
legislators and the legislature, undergoing institutionalization as a way to increase its ability to 
make laws, conduct oversight and represent voters. However the levels of institutional 
development and performance in the legislature are still shallow. Mozambican political context 
factors including the electoral system and party system appear to have had a negative effect on 
institutionalizing the legislature and also affected negatively legislative performance. In 
addition, the legislature adopted rules of procedure that have enabled the president to avoid 
legislative oversight and reduced law-making power of the legislature. The electoral choice 
reduced both the retention of legislators and autonomy from the party outside the legislature.   
 
This study also contributes to legislative studies by analysing the type of support for the 
legislature that Mozambicans attach, using the 2008 Afrobarometer public opinion survey. It 
finds that Mozambicans are less likely to attach a long-term commitment to the legislature than 
a short-term commitment to their legislators. Specific support for legislators (the short term 
commitment) results from satisfaction with the performance and trust of the president while 
diffuse support for the legislature (long term commitment) is a function of an attachment to the 
legislature for its own sake.   
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Chapter 1: The Political Context of Legislative Development and 




After independence from Portugal on 25 June 1975, under leadership from Frelimo, 
Mozambique adopted a Marxist-Leninist1 one-party government and fused the party with the 
state – the Frelimo party-state. As the government did not grant civil liberties and political rights 
to its citizens, some Mozambicans, with initial support from Rhodesia and then apartheid South 
Africa, organized themselves and formed the Mozambican Resistance Movement (Renamo) to 
fight the government.2 From 1976 to 1992, Mozambique experienced a brutal civil war that 
destroyed social and economic infrastructure and killed at least one million people. Both 
external factors (including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War) and internal 
factors (civil war) led the government to change course and adopt a democratic constitution in 
1990 that legalized political parties, separated the party from the state and granted civil liberties 
and political rights to Mozambican citizens.  
 
To put the constitution into practice, the government negotiated the end of the war with 
Renamo, beginning in 1988–19893 and culminating in a peace agreement signed on 4 October 
1992, and demobilization of government and Renamo forces. It adopted a party-list electoral 
system to be awarded legislative seats by proportional representation (PR)4 in a province-wide 
multi-member district (constituency) with very high magnitude ranging from 11 to 54 seats 
(Table 1.1).5 
                                                 
1Marxism-Leninism was adopted in 1977, http://africanhistory.about.com/od/mozambique/l/bl-Mozambique-
Timeline-4.htm 
2 Rhodesian assistance to Renamo ended in 1980 when it became independent and changed its name to Zimbabwe. 
The support of South Africa ended in 1984 when the Mozambican and South African governments signed a 
nonaggression pact the aim of which was to stop the Mozambican government from supporting the African 
National Congress in its fight against the apartheid regime and to stop the South African government from 
supporting Renamo in its fight against the Mozambican regime.  
3 In 1988 secret contacts were reported between religious leaders and Renamo representatives on the possibility 
of holding direct meetings with the government to end the civil war. On 9 March 1989 in Washington, D.C., 
President Joaquim Chissano announced the desire to negotiate with Renamo. See ‘Cronologia: 20 anos do 
Acordo Geral de Paz em Moçambique’, 3 October 2012, http://noticias.sapo.mz/lusa/artigo/15060184.html.  
4 Law no. 13/92 of 14 October.  
5In 1994 the district magnitude ranged from 11 to 54 seats; in 1999 it ranged from 13 to 50 seats; in 2004 from 11 




Table 1.1: Multi-Member District Magnitude by Legislative Election 










Niassa 11 4% 13 5% 11 4% 14 6% 
Cabo Delgado 22 9% 22 9% 22 9% 22 10% 
Nampula 54 22% 50 20% 51 20% 45 18% 
Tete 15 6% 18 7% 17 7% 20 8% 
Zambézia 49 20% 49 20% 48 19% 45 18% 
Manica 13 5% 15 6% 15 6% 16 7% 
Sofala 21 8% 21 8% 22 9% 20 8% 
Inhambane 18 7% 17 7% 16 6% 16 7% 
Gaza  16 6% 16 6% 17 7% 16 7% 
Maputo Province 13 5% 13 5% 13 5% 16 7% 
Maputo City 18 7% 16 6% 16 6% 18 7% 
Total  250 250 248 248 
Note: Two single-member districts (Africa and Europe) were established for the 2004 and 2009 elections to 
represent Mozambicans living abroad in Africa and Europe. 
 
Two years later, in 1994, Mozambique conducted founding multiparty presidential and 
legislative elections. The latter formed the country’s Fourth Assembly (1995–1999). Frelimo’s 
candidate won the presidential election and Frelimo won 129 (52 percent) legislative seats out 
of 250. Subsequent, regular multiparty elections were held in 1999, 2004, and 2009, leading to 
the Fifth (2000–2004), Sixth (2005–2009) and Seventh (2010–2014) assemblies. In each of 
these elections, Frelimo candidates won the presidential elections and Frelimo increased its 
dominance of the legislature making ‘the relatively enduring features of party competition’ in 
Mozambique of a dominant party system. Frelimo increased the number of parliamentary seats 
in 1999 to 133 (53 percent), in 2004 to 160 (64 percent) and in 2009 to 191 (76 percent). 
Renamo, the second strongest party, has been reducing its influence over time (Table 1.2). 
 
In all elections Frelimo dominated the Southern constituencies plus the Northern constituency 
of Cabo Delgado while Renamo (and/or Renamo-Electoral Union) won mainly the Northern 
and Central constituencies. Due to a gender quota on its party-list, Frelimo recruited more 







Table 1.2: Legislative Election Results, 1994-2009 

















Party/coalition         
Frelimo 44.33% 129 48.54% 133 62.03% 160 74.66% 191 
Renamo/Renamo-EU 37.78% 112 38.81% 117 29.73% 90 17.69% 51 
Democratic Union 5.15% 9 0% 0 0% 0 NA NA 
MDM NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.93% 8 
Total number of seats 250 250 250 250 
Note: The results of parties that did not obtain a seat were not reported. NA means that the party did not 
participate.  
Source: African Election Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/mz.html 
 
After almost two decades of multiparty elections, the country has yet to improve to a liberal 
democracy. Based on the 2001 Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score of 3.5 – 
partly free, Diamond (2002) classified Mozambique as an ambiguous regime. The 2013 
Freedom House score reveals that that score has not improved.6 At its best Mozambique can be 
described as an electoral democracy that holds regular multiparty elections but fails to hold the 
executive president to account. Although legislative assemblies “try to assert independence, 
parliamentarians usually perform as docile handmaidens of the executive branch. And as the 
ruling [party increased its] parliamentary majorities in second and subsequent elections, 
executive and legislative powers become further fused” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 
2005:16-18).  
 
Holding regular multiparty elections is a necessary condition for democracy but elections need 
to be complemented by the development of strong institutions of countervailing power, such as 
the judiciary, legislature, anti-corruption units, ombudsman and strong civil society. Among 
these institutions, this study argues that the development of legislative institutions is most 
important for democracy. This is because legislatures strengthen democracy in many different 
ways by making policies that govern the society, reviewing and evaluating the extent to which 
policies are implemented effectively and efficiently, representing the societal diversity and 
contacting or engaging with constituents in their constituencies. Legislatures countervail power 
by allowing horizontal accountability among state institutions and vertical accountability 
between the State and the rest of society: “They are mechanisms for achieving both vertical and 
horizontal accountability of the rulers to the ruled” (Barkan 2009:1).  
                                                 




Legislatures are key institutions of democracy. They are: “the sine qua non of modern, 
representative democracy” (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011). Legislatures are “vital to the creation 
and maintenance of democratic governments; [they are] among the first institutions abolished 
or subverted when democratic regimes are overturned, and among the first created or revived 
when democracies are instituted or restored” (Mishler and Rose 1994:5-6). Legislatures make 
a symbolic contribution to political support and system stability (Loewenberg and Patterson, 
1979). By providing an institutional forum for criticism of the executive, oversight of 
bureaucracy, representation of societal diversity and expression of political dissent, legislatures 
contribute to the integration of society and the legitimation of the regime (Loewenberg and 
Patterson 1979, Mezey 1985). Legislatures are “engines of democracy” (Rosenthal 2009); the 
legislature is “where democracy happens” (Aldrich 2006). 
 
 
Mozambican Legislature: From One-Party to Multiparty 
 
Mozambique’s first three assemblies, the so-called Assembleia Popular (Popular Assembly) in 
1977, 1977–1986 and 1987–1994 respectively, were elected by people gathered in 
neighbourhood and workplace meetings (Assembleia Popular 1977) in a one-party 
environment. Multiparty assemblies known as Assembleia da República (Assembly of the 
Republic) were directly elected by the people under more liberal and competitive conditions 
with more than one political party and information available through independent and private 
media as well as non-governmental organizations (Constituição 1990, 2004).  
 
The one-party assemblies had much less power than multiparty assemblies. Law-making was 
the only function performed by the one-party assemblies among the four legislative 
responsibilities of law-making, oversight, representation and constituency service. The 
functioning of the Mozambican assemblies in the one-party era was characterized by two 
moments: first, the committee stage where bills were discussed and second, plenary phase 
where bills were approved in unanimity (Assembleia da República 2003:3). Members of one-
party assemblies were merely expected to ratify bills exclusively initiated by the executive. 
After meeting twice a year in ordinary sessions7 of eight days each (Assembleia da República 
                                                 
7 Extraordinary sessions were rare (Assembleia da República 2003:3). 
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2003), members would leave to perform extra-parliamentary duties - such as those of governor, 
minister, deputy-minister as they were not paid a salary, with the exception of steering 
(housekeeping) committee members who began receiving a salary only from the Third 
Assembly (1987–1994) (Assembleia da República 2009). The steering committee had the 
authority to pass bills during the time the plenary was in recess (Constituição 1975, Assembleia 
da República 2009:8-9). The head of state was also the speaker of the legislature until 1986. 
 
The responsibility for oversight, which requires members to hold bureaucrats to account did not 
exist neither were the principles of the rule of law or transparency of procedures.8 One-party 
assemblies were also not assigned the responsibilities of constituency service and 
representation. 
 
One-party assemblies were therefore weak institutions. In contrast, the multiparty assemblies 
were assigned law-making, oversight, representation and constituency service responsibilities.9 
According to its standing orders and other legal provisions, the legislature has the 
responsibilities to review and scrutinize bills, hold the executive accountable, represent the 
public interest and conduct constituency service. With the new 1990 democratic constitution, 
the legislature emerged as an independent body of government, separated from the executive 
president and judiciary and with more powers than previously. Multiparty assemblies are 
therefore increasingly becoming institutions that matter in politics. They “have begun to assert 
their independence as players in the policy making process, as watchdog of the executive, (…) 
as organizations that respond to demands by civil society” (Barkan 2009:1, Barkan 2008) and 
contact their constituents. 
 
Research Questions, Hypotheses and Arguments 
 
This study assesses and compares the process of legislative development and performance of 
the first three multiparty Mozambican assemblies (referred to as the Assembly of the Republic 
or the legislature).   
 
                                                 
8 For instance, in 1986 the government closed the Faculty of Law at Eduardo Mondlane University because jurists 
were monitoring the government’s behavior-enforcing laws. The faculty reopened in 1991, after the adoption of 
the 1990 democratic constitution. 
9 See Standing Order of the Assembly of the Republic: Law no. 1/95 of 8 May, Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April and 
Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July.  
7 
It analyses: 
 The extent to which the legislature has recruited legislators with better qualifications;
 The extent to which the legislature reformed rules of procedure, structures and working
conditions;
 The extent to which the legislature created capacity for legislators and the legislature;
 The extent to which the legislature has institutionalized; and
 The extent to which the legislature has performed its main responsibilities of law-making,
oversight and representation.
This study also probes whether Mozambicans support their legislature and the factors that drive 
support. 
This is a study of how well the Mozambican legislature has been recruiting legislators with 
better qualifications and developing institutionally as a way to perform relatively well in law-
making, oversight and representation functions.  
It hypothesises that legislative performance depends, in part, on legislative development – that 
is, the association between the institutional development of the legislature and recruitment of 
legislators with political capital. By political capital I mean the resources necessary for 
legislative institutional development and performance that politicians bring to the process of 
legislative recruitment before they acquire a legislative seat. They include educational 
achievement, occupational status, legislative experience, government experience and party 
experience.  
If the legislature develops institutionally relatively well but fails to improve on the quality of 
its members then it is likely to perform its main responsibilities of law-making, oversight and 
representation relatively poorly. This is based on the theory that recruitment matters (Seligman 
1964, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Norris 1997a) and that political capital is the cutting edge 
of change (Seligman 1964, Norris 1997a). Conversely, if the legislature performs well on 
recruitment but badly on institutional development it is likely to perform relatively poorly its 
functions. This supports the theory that institutions matter (Rosenthal 1973, Rosenthal 1974, 
Pzrworsky 2004, Shipan 2005). However, the political context from where the legislature 
8 
 
operates also has a considerable effect on legislative performance. Context matters (Rule 1992, 
Norris 1997, Trounstine and Valadini 2008, Carsey 2005). 
 
My model of legislative development and performance is outlined in Figure 1.1.  To perform 
its functions well, legislatures need to firstly transform from simple organizations to 
institutions. They need to undergo institutionalization. By institutionalization I mean a process 
of organization differentiating or separating from its environment – that is, developing 
autonomy, adhering to norms that constitute an unwritten understanding of what conduct is 
proper or improper (Eulau 1994) and its members differentiating from non-members. This 
involves retaining members within the legislature, recruiting leaders from within the legislature 
who have substantial tenure in office, adopting universal criteria for selection of members to 
internal positions of power, and increasing autonomy from both the executive and political party 
outside the legislature.  
 




But in order to institutionalize, legislatures need to develop appropriate internal incentives a) 
creating capacity for legislators and the legislature; b) reforming rules of procedure, structures 




Legislatures also need d) an appropriate political context to institutionalize. They need an 
electoral system and party system that increase autonomy of the legislature from outside 
intruders such as the executive and political parties. 
 
To achieve its function well, legislatures secondly need an enabling political context. They need 
an electoral system and party system that can increase the representation of female and minority 




The literature indicates that political context, legislative development (political capital, reform, 
capacity and institutionalization) and performance are connected. Political capital affects 
legislative reform, capacity, institutionalization and performance. This is based on the theory 
that political capital is “the cutting age of change” (Seligman 1964). Political capital is 
understood to be the resources politicians bring to the process of legislative recruitment (Norris 
1997) necessary for legislative institutional development and performance.  
 
Legislative reform leads to the development of capacity (professionalization) of the legislature. 
Squire (1992) reveals that the reform undertaken in the California Assembly produced a 
professional legislature. It increased staff resources and raised member remuneration (Squire 
1992:1030). Along the same line, Rosenthal stressed that legislative reforms led to 
professionalization of state legislatures by making legislators spending more time on the job, 
and improving institutional capacity of the state legislatures (Rosenthal 1996:171). 
 
Legislative rules of procedure reform have “effects on the menu of choices (which bills are 
considered on the floor? Which amendments are allowed?), on voting behaviour and effects on 
the final legislative outcome (which bills pass?)” (Cox 2002:263). Legislative internal structure 
reform has an impact on legislative professionalization (or capacity). The clearest and most 
enduring consequence of reforming internal structures of legislatures in the 1960s and 1970s 
“was strengthening the institutional capacity of state legislatures, which helped the legislature 
generally but also helped legislators individually to do their jobs. Legislative working 
conditions reform also has an impact on professionalization of legislatures. The renovation of 
capitol buildings and the construction of legislative office provided space for standing 
committees, legislative staff and members [and] legislators began spending more time on the 
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job” (Rosenthal 1996:171, also see Squire 1992). Legislative reform is a vehicle to increase 
capacity. By changing organizational rules of procedure, institutions may demand more 
capacity to perform their responsibilities. They may require more and qualified supporting staff, 
resources etc.  
 
Professionalization leads to institutionalization. Professionalization leads to institutionalization 
at least on those measures that are directly connected with the institution such as professional 
staff, session length and legislative resources (Squire 1992; Rosenthal 1996). The implication 
of increasing salary and benefits for the legislature leads members to longer tenures, creating a 
more experienced body (Squire and Moncrief 2010:76).  
 
However it is not always that professionalization leads to institutionalization. Squire found that 
the California Assembly was already institutionalizing well before becoming professionalized 
(Squire 1992:1046). Hibing (2002) argues that if money is available professionalization may 
take place but institutionalization may be limited by factors of political context.10 Party-list 
electoral systems encourage a strong party to intrude into the legislature thereby reducing 
autonomy of the legislature influencing law-making. This type of electoral system “generates 
full [legislator’s] accountability to the party because candidate selection generally depends 
solely on the selection criteria of the party” (Webels 2007:838). Dominant party systems also 
constrain legislative autonomy as they encourage strong parties to intrude into legislatures 
(Kreppel 2012). Thus they reduce law-making influence of the legislature (Kreppel 2012) and 
legislative oversight. 
 
Institutionalization affects performance. Squire found that legislative autonomy increased law-
making in the California Assembly (Squire 2002:1045). As Shipan put it: “One reason to study 
institutional development is the belief that institutions affect member behaviour” (Shipan 
2005:58). 
 
Electoral systems also affect legislative performance. Party-list electoral systems with large 
magnitude districts promote women’s representation in legislatures (Rule 1987, Norris 1985, 
1996, 1997, 2004:187, Cook and Nechemias 2009). Party systems also have significant impact: 
                                                 
10 Parliamentary systems encourages that a strong executive intrudes into the legislature and thereby diminishing 
its autonomy as legislative and executive powers are fused in parliamentary systems (Hibbing 2002:35). 
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party systems with strength of left parties are better in representing women in legislatures 
(Norris 1997:217). 
 
Legislative Studies in Africa and Comparative Legislative Studies in 
Mozambique 
 
The majority of legislative studies in the well-respected peer-reviewed journals in the world11 
focus on the United States Congress (Gamm and Huber 2002, Loewenberg, Squire and Kiewiet 
2002) or theories derived from the study of the US experience in another political systems 
(Shepsle 2002, Kiewiet, Loewenberg and Squire 2002). Very little is known about African 
legislatures (Barkan 2009). Some of what is known about African legislatures include studies 
conducted by Barkan (2005, 2008, 2009), Burnell (2001), Schrire (2008), Hughes (2005), 
Nijzink, Mozaffar and Azevedo (2006), Nijzink and Piombo (2004), Salih (2005) and Bauer 
and Britton (2006). Of these studies, there has only been one comparative effort at theorizing 
about the process of legislative development on the continent by Barkan (2009).  
 
The theoretical and comparative work on legislative development in Mozambique has also been 
limited. Some of what is known on Mozambique includes studies by Macuane (2000), Azevedo 
(2009), Pereira and Shenga (2005) and Shenga (2002). The first study assessed legislative 
organization covering the years of the Fourth Assembly. The second analysed perceptions of 
Mozambican citizens and legislators toward their legislature in a single point of time and 
compared legislator’s attitudes to other Africans. The third examined parliamentary structures 
and channels for disseminating information and civil society engagement with parliament. The 
fourth assessed the role of the legislature representing civil society interests from 1995 to 2001. 
Although these studies analysed the Mozambican legislature, none of them compared 
assemblies within the Mozambican legislature.  
 
This study contributes to the scientific legislative literature by comparing a 15-year period of 
legislative development and performance in Mozambique, corresponding to the first three 
multiparty assemblies: the Fourth (1995-1999), Fifth (2000-2004) and Sixth (2005-2009) 
assemblies. The Seventh Assembly (2010-2014) is not included in this comparison because its 
                                                 
11American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Journal of 
Legislative Studies and Legislative Studies Quarterly. 
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mandate has not yet completed. It also contributes to legislative studies by analysing support 
for legislature and testing the factors that may account for legislative support.  
 
Research Design and Levels of Analysis 
 
This study employs longitudinal research design. It compares three multiparty assemblies 
longitudinally within a single-political system - the Mozambican political system. But also it 
uses cross-sectional research design, which means “people of many ages, behaviours, and 
opinions are represented within the study population” (Lewis-Beck, Bryaman and Liao, 
2004:299-230). In one chapter (Chapter 9: support for legislature) it assess attitudes of ordinary 
Mozambicans toward the legislature cross-sectionally. It uses macro (the assembly and 




In this study I use both individual (micro) and institutional (macro) level data coming from 
different sources. The individual level data comes from the African Legislatures Project (ALP) 
legislators’ opinion survey and the Afrobarometer public opinion survey while the institutional 
level data comes from parliamentary archives. The ALP legislators’ opinion survey of the 
members of the Mozambican legislature was conducted in 2008 based on a random selected 
stratified probability representative sample. The sample of 50 legislators was stratified 
according to caucus membership, gender and other legislators’ characteristics. The 
questionnaire asked through face-to-face interviews, structured and open-ended questions about 
legislators’ social and political background, their views about the legislature, role as legislators, 
assessments of legislative performance, resources the legislature make available to them, their 
work in constituencies and parliament’s link with civil society, views about parliamentary 
committees and the budget process, and views about parliamentary reform.12 
 
The Afrobarometer public opinion survey was conducted in 2008 in Mozambique. It asked a 
set of questions on attitudes towards the quality of democracy and governance including public 
orientations toward the legislature and legislators. The survey was based on randomly selected 
                                                 
12 The ALP dataset on legislators’ opinion surveys will soon be accessible to the public from the ALP website: 
www.africanlegislaturesproject.org. 
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multi-stratified probabilistic representative samples of adult citizens (Little and Logan 2009). 
Interviews were face-to-face in the language of the respondent’s choice with structured 
questionnaires. Only a few were open-ended questions.  
With respect to institutional level data, I gathered key information from biographical directories 
Who is Who in the Assembly of the Republic (Assembleia da República and AWEPA 1996, 
2001, 2006). I produced an original dataset of the full population of the Mozambican legislature 
for all three multiparty assemblies. Each completed assembly had 250 legislators so this study 
focuses on a total of 750 legislators. The biographical directories provided legislators’ names, 
data on their social and political background and political capital. With these indicators, this 
study was able to find out the number of terms legislators have served in the legislature. As the 
Who’s who data is based on the entire legislative population rather than its sample, there is no 
need for statistical inference or generalization; its findings correspond to the exact picture of 
the phenomenon in the country.  
This study also gathered relevant institutional level data about legislative development and 
legislative performance in the Mozambican legislature. Bills were tracked over a period of 15-
years, corresponding to the Fourth (1995-1999), Fifth (2000-2004) and Sixth (2005-2009) 
assemblies, resulting in a bill tracker dataset. Initially a 5-year period (2003-2007) dataset was 
created for the African Legislatures Project and then a 10-year period (1995-2002, 2008-2009) 
was added for the comparative purpose of this study. The bill tracker questionnaire presents 
structured questions that track bills from their first reading to the passage of bills and 
publication of enacted bill in the government gazette. The bill tracker data was gathered from 
different parliamentary archival sources, including bill registration records13 and committee 
reports.14 In addition to the bill tracker, which contains mainly information about law-making; 
I also collected from official archives, standing orders and legal provisions and relevant 
information on legislative institutional development and legislative behaviour in oversight and 
representation.      
13 Assembleia da República. Livro de Registo de Proposições Legislativas. VI Legislatura, 2005-2009. Direcção 
Geral Legislativa, Departamento de Apoio ao Plenário. Assembleia da República. Livro de Registo de Parecer 
Especializado. VI Legislatura, 2005-2009. Direcção Geral Legislativa, Departamento de Apoio ao Plenário. 
Assembleia da República. Livro de Registo de Proposições Legislativas. V Legislatura, 2000-2004. Secretariado 
Geral. Departamento Legislativo. Assembleia da República. Livro de Registo de Parecer Especializado. V 
Legislatura, 2000-2004. Secretarido Geral, Departamento Legislativo. 
14 The ALP Bill Tracker dataset will be accessible to the public from the ALP website: 





This study data is complemented to some extent by direct in-country observations, which 
“draws on the direct evidence of the eye to witness events first hand” (Descombe 2007:206). 
These observations took place during my study field visits as well as from my own 
experiences/observations as a parliamentary staff supporting technically the Committee of 
Planning and Budget and Division of Parliamentary Documentation and Information of the 




Almost all of the study observations are numerically amenable to statistical testing and analysis. 
I used basic (uni-variate and bi-variate) and advanced (multi-variate) statistical analyses at 
different stages of this study. Uni-variate descriptive analysis is used to represent the patterns 
of legislative recruitment, development, performance and legitimacy. Bivariate descriptive 
analysis is employed to establish the strength of relationship between assemblies and legislative 
recruitment, development or performance.  
 
Explanatory analysis moves beyond ‘what’ questions to ‘why’ questions. I carry out 
explanatory analysis by multivariate analysis. I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple 
regression analysis to explain and test the operational procedure for the distribution of positions 
of power, which is one of the measures of legislative institutionalization. I also use OLS 
multiple regression analysis to explain and test why some Mozambicans support the legislature 
while others do not.  
  
Research Ethical Considerations 
 
The identities and interests of those involved in this research are protected and kept confidential. 
For the Afrobarometer survey, the names of the interviewees were not captured in the 
Afrobarometer dataset. The same applies for the African Legislatures Project legislators’ 
surveys. In the legislators’ surveys, the names of legislators did not appear at all in the 
questionnaires as they were coded in the form of legislators’ identification number. The same 
applies to the Who’s Who data. Both in the Afrobarometer and African Legislatures Project 
15 
 
surveys interviewees were not forced to participate in the interviews; they would either decline 
or participate freely; and there were no penalties for not participating.  
 
The identities of those who helped to supply some of the official documentary data have also 
been protected. The information in this study does not match at all with any identity. In addition, 
in dealing with the research subjects the study’s author tried to avoid any deception or 
misinterpretation. The rights and feelings of those affected by this research are protected and 
kept confidential.   
 
Potential Use of This Study’s Results 
 
This study’s results have potential use for scientific literature. The longitudinal comparison of 
assemblies in a single political system on legislative recruitment, development and performance 
help to provide a broad-based understanding of the factors predicting legislative achievement. 
It contributes to fill gaps in the literature of comparative legislative studies in Africa in general 
and Mozambique in particular. 
 
This study also provides policy advice for those interested in strengthening legislative 
institutions. It informs legislative policy-makers about the process of legislative development 
by indicating what aspect of legislative recruitment, reform, professionalization and 
institutionalization are most important for performance. All these together may help the 
legislature to strengthen their power in a political system to limit the executive president 
authority by countervailing power and ensure that such authority is exercised in a transparent 
and accountable manner.  
 
It will also inform the donor community to identify areas to strengthen parliamentary 
democracy in developing legislatures. The results are vital to enable donors involved in 
legislative reform to raise the quality and impact of their legislative strengthening programmes. 
The lessons drawn from this study provide a deeper understanding of why some legislatures 
develop and others do not, and a “toolkit” that can be used to inform the design of legislative 
programmes in other countries. This study also helps to improve and systematize monitoring 
and evaluation components of parliamentary reform projects to understand better which 





This study commences by analysing the recruitment of Members of Parliament to the 
Mozambican legislature. Chapter 2 compares the patterns of legislative recruitment in 
Mozambique multiparty assemblies by focusing on legislators’ political capital. It does so by 
using a 15-year period of individual level data from Who’s who. It compares the extent to which 
political capital has changed from assembly to assembly. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the extent to which the legislature has reformed rules of procedure, 
legislative structures and legislative working conditions that are necessary for the legislature 
and legislators to do their job. It also compares how these reforms have changed over assembly. 
It does so by employing standing orders, legal provisions and archival data. 
 
Chapter 4 also uses data gathered from standing orders, legal provisions and legislative archival 
data. It compares legislative professionalization in terms of legislative expenditure, legislative 
support staff, legislator’s time demands for service, and legislator’s remuneration. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the process of legislative institutionalization. It combines Who’s Who and 
other official data to assess and compare the extent to which legislators continued serving in 
legislature after their first term; parliamentary leaders are selected after having substantive 
tenure in office as a legislative leader; the legislature employed universal criteria for selection 
to internal positions of power; and gained autonomy from both the executive and political 
parties outside the legislature. 
 
Chapter 6 employs bill tracker data to focus on legislative performance in law-making. As law-
making is a process, rather than an output that requires counting the total number of bills 
produced by assemblies, it compares legislative performance in law-making at the committee 
level. It analyses the extent to which the legislature established a structure for law-making; 
referred bills to committee; committees screened legislation they receive; committees amended 
legislation substantively; and committee amendments passed intact in plenary. 
 
Chapter 7 deals with legislative performance in oversight at committee level, as legislative 
“functions cannot be performed except by [committee] structures” (Riggs 1973:39). It employs 
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data collected from institutional and individual levels to assess: the extent to which the 
legislature developed structure for oversight; conducted oversight visits checking bureaucracy; 
developed information necessary for oversight; and conducted executive hearings. 
 
Chapter 8 compares legislative representation at committee level. It combines several types of 
data. It employs African Legislatures Project legislator’s survey, bill tracker data, 
Afrobarometer public opinion survey, standing orders and legal provisions, and Who’s Who 
data. It examines the extent to which legislator’s characteristics reflected the demographic 
features of the nation; the extent to which legislator’s policy preferences reflected those of the 
public; whether the legislature developed a structure for representation; committees conducted 
public hearings; civil society organizations effectiveness during public hearings, including the 
likelihood that their inputs are incorporated into legislation; and the effectiveness of  citizens 
and organized groups in making the legislature responding their petitions. 
 
Chapter 9 uses Afrobarometer public opinion survey data to analyse the extent to which 
Mozambicans support the legislature. It also examines the factors that may account for this 
legislative support. 
 
Chapter 10 summarises the conclusions from the previous eight chapters. It draws implications 
for recruitment, reform, professionalization, institutionalization, law-making, oversight, 
representation and legislative support. It also identifies limits of legislative reform in the 






























Chapter 2: Legislative Recruitment in the Multiparty Era 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on legislative recruitment and in particular political capital – the resources 
necessary for legislative institutional development and performance that politicians bring to the 
process of legislative recruitment before they acquire a legislative seat. Instead of political 
capital, Seligman uses the term political skill to refer to the techniques that creates a 
“community of skills” that transcends partisanship (Seligman 1964:620). These skills include 
oratorical ability, organizational capacity and education, technical and expert skills such as 
economist, public administrator, sociologist and entrepreneur. As in this study, professional 
occupations were categorized into occupational status – that is, a socio-economic category 
rather than skill, and party experience was also brought in; I have called this ‘political capital’ 
– “the resources aspirants bring to the process [of legislative recruitment]” (see Norris 1997:13).
I indicate political capital by educational achievement, occupational status, and experience
working in government, legislature and political party.
In this chapter I examine the extent to which political capital has changed from assembly to 
assembly by employing a 15-year period of data about Mozambique’s first three multiparty 
assemblies gathered from Who’s Who in the Assembly of the Republic entailing all 750 
legislators. I also analyse political capital by party membership as political parties are the main 
gatekeepers of the process of legislative recruitment and by gender as this is a transversal 
important aspect of legislative development. The data of the breakdown by parties and gender 
is presented in Appendix to Chapter 2. 
I hypothesise that political capital has changed positively over assemblies. As Mozambique 
made positive changes reforming its economy towards a free market in 1987/90 and the political 
system toward democracy with the adoption of the democratic constitution in 1990 and regular 
implementation of elections, the new legislative roles demand that they are performed by better-
qualified legislators. In order to monitor government efforts implementing the economy and 
multiparty politics, legislators need political capital. Studies have shown that political, 
economic and social changes were found to be influential factors affecting legislative 
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recruitment in Great Britain, Germany and Soviet Union (Matthews 1954) and in French 
Speaking West Africa (Le Vine 1968). I consider positive changes in political capital as those 
that would increase institutional development and performance of the legislature. 
 
But the proportion of legislators with better qualifications is likely to be low. In comparative 
terms although legislatures elsewhere comprise those individuals who rank high in society 
(Matthews 1985, Norris 1997), Mozambique suffers from extremely low levels of formal 
education. The adult literacy rate is 46 percent, compared to an average of 61 percent across all 
low income countries.15 
 
Legislative recruitment is relevant because it determines the supply of individuals who are able 
to carry out the functions of the legislature. It is also important as it supplies people who are 
likely to want to make the legislature an important and influential institution.  
 
Approaches for Studying Legislative Recruitment 
 
There are at least three main approaches to studying legislative recruitment: background, 
process and rational-actor. The background approach is one of the earliest approaches of 
legislative recruitment and asks questions about who is recruited or what types of people are 
elected to the legislative office (Moncrief 2002). These early studies tended to provide 
descriptive characteristics of individual legislators, like their level of education, occupation, 
gender etc., rather than examining “whether legislative recruitment really mattered” (Matthews 
1985:42). 
 
However, some of these studies tried to link background characteristics of legislators and their 
attitudes and behaviours in office (Matthews 1985; Moncrief 2002). Matthews (1960) found 
that the background of U.S. senators affected their areas of specialization, their committee 
performance and their chances of achieving leadership positions. Thomas (1991) suggested that 
women made a difference in law-making or they were “more likely than men to introduce and 
successful steer legislation through the political process that address issues of women, children 
and the family” (Thomas 1991:974). Githens and Prestage (1978) found that female state 
                                                 




legislators tend to be more active than their male counterparts in stereotypical areas of female 
concerns like health, education and welfare issues.  
 
The process of recruitment approach focuses on how people become legislators. It “emphasizes 
the political role of gatekeepers such as political parties and interests groups as well as the 
mechanisms of selection (nomination and selection)” (Moncrief 2002:49). Throughout the 
world, except for the United States which uses popular primaries, political parties are the main 
gatekeepers of the selection of candidates. In the United States, where parties have weak mass-
branch organizations, the interest groups, media and financial donors play a major role (Norris 
1997b). By using a candidate survey, Seligman et al. (1974) found that recruitment patterns 
included friends, families, local organizations and interest groups as well as political parties. 
But the effect of parties was the most significant recruiting agent.  
 
The rational-actor approach tries to answer the question why “some people want to become 
legislators, while most do not” (Matthews 1985:26). While earlier it was assumed that 
“politicians had a specific personality driven by an ego-need for power, which political office 
could help satisfy” (Moncrief 2002:50-51, Lasswell 1948), this approach shifted from the 
psychological dimension to the simple assumption that people become legislators because of 
ambition.  
 
In seeing legislative recruitment as an outcome variable, Matthews (1985) points out that 
incentives predict legislative recruitment. Payne (1972) suggests seven incentives (programme, 
status, adulation, mission, obligation, conviviality and game) that are the most significant to 
drive high-level politicians into politics and to gain personal satisfaction.16 By viewing 
legislative recruitment as a predictor variable, Payne (1968) found that the primary incentive 
type among congressmen is status and argues that a legislature dominated by the incentive of 
status will be characterized by chronic absenteeism, inactive committees, few research 
facilities, disruptive and conflict-provoking patterns of behaviour and ineffective legislating.  
 
                                                 
16 The programme incentive type satisfies working upon specific, concrete public policies; status satisfies attaining 
and exhibiting prestige; adulation satisfies receiving the affection and praise of others; mission satisfies committing 
oneself to a transcendental cause; obligation satisfies relieving anxieties of conscience; conviviality satisfies 
pleasing others and being accepted by them; and game satisfies competing with others in high structured 
interactions (Payne 1972:3). 
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In this study I apply the background approach of legislative recruitment for three reasons. First, 
the data about social and political backgrounds of Mozambican legislators is available from 
Who’s Who in the Assembly of the Republic for all of the 750 legislators of multiparty 
assemblies compared in this study. Second, the process of recruitment approach includes the 
study of both those politicians who succeed and failed to achieve legislative office. This 
approach would require administration of a survey that includes both those politicians who won 
and lost a legislative seat; however data of this nature does not exist. The existing African 
Legislatures Project (ALP) survey includes only the study of those who achieved a legislative 
seat – the legislators.  
 
Third, the rational-actor approach includes the study of legislators’ motivation to run for a 
legislative seat and the ALP survey does not integrate questions on motivations. For the 
comparative purpose of this study it would be problematic to collect data about legislators’ 
initial motivation to run for legislative office after 15 years. Some legislators may have 
forgotten their initial motivation now and others have died or moved out of politics and are 
unable to be found. 
 
Comparing Political Capital in the One-Party Era 
 
The Fourth Assembly (1995-1999) was the first ‘normal’ assembly following the adoption of 
the 1990 democratic constitution and implementation of the 1994 founding multiparty 
legislative election. The previous three assemblies – the First, Second and Third assemblies 
were elected by Frelimo members in an environment that allowed only one political party- 
Frelimo (Assembleia Popular 1977:62-67). By 1990, with the democratic constitution, 
conditions were ‘normalized’ with the acceptance of more than one political party; competitive, 
free and fair elections; and alternative sources of information. For the first time in the country’s 
history assemblies were in 1994 directly elected by the people in more free and fair conditions.  
 
This study therefore commences by assessing recruitment from the Fourth Assembly. However, 
with scarcity of data, I use historical retrospective comparisons to obtain some context and 
knowledge about the strata of the population from which the one-party assemblies were mainly 
drawn. The First Assembly (1977) was a provisional assembly composed by 207 members that 
aimed to create electoral rules for recruitment of legislators of the Second Assembly (1977-
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1986). The First Assembly functioned for a very short period from 31 August to 4 December 
1977 (Assembleia Popular 1977, Assembleia da República 2009).17 The composition of this 
assembly was set up by the 1975 Constitution. The 1975 Constitution prescribed that the 
legislative institution should be composed of: members of the Central Committee of Frelimo, 
members of the Executive Committee of Frelimo, ministers and deputy-ministers, provincial 
governors, members chosen by the Central Committee of Frelimo among them those from the 
army, two representatives by province from the public appointed by the Central Committee of 
Frelimo and members chosen by the Central Committee of Frelimo among them Frelimo 
members and a maximum of ten capable citizens (Constituição 1975). 
 
The Second Assembly (1977-1986) was comprised of 226 legislators while the Third Assembly 
(1987-1994) entailed 249 legislators (Table 2.1).18 When comparing political capital of the 
Second and Third assemblies, the results reveal that the legislative recruitment of officials with 
experience in public administration increased very significantly from the Second (11 percent) 
to the Third (28 percent) Assembly as officials with manual worker and peasant occupational 
status decreased. 
 
Table 2.1: Comparing Political Capital in the One-Party Era, 1977-1994 




Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Occupational status     
    Civil servants 25 11% 70 28% 
    Military officers 35 16% 42 17% 
    Manual Workers 71 31% 54 22% 
    Peasant farmers 65 29% 44 18% 
    Others 30 13% 39 16% 
Total population 226 249 
Note: Data on other indicators of political capital such as formal education and experience in government, 
legislature and political party are not available.  
Data compiled by the author from the following sources: 
Relatório da Comissão Nacional de Eleições sobre as Eleições de 4 de Dezembro de 1977. Boletim da 
 República, Número 150, Suplemento, 24 de Dezembro de 1977. 
Relatório da Comissão Nacional de Eleições sobre as Segundas Eleições  de 14 de Dezembro da 1986. 
 Boletim da República Número 2, Suplemento, I Série, 14 de Janeiro de 1987. 
 
                                                 
17The head of state was also the speaker of the legislature until 1986.  
18 From 1986 the President of the then Popular Republic of Mozambique was no longer the speaker (Assembleia 
da República 2009:9). 
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The reason for the increase in members with experience in civil service was because Frelimo 
regarded that passing laws requires some reading ability which among the existent Frelimo 
officials could be found mainly among those with civil servant occupational status. Individuals 
who had worked in the civil service during the one-party government tended to have better 
reading and writing abilities than those who before entering the legislature were manual 
workers or peasant farmers.  
 
Comparing Political Capital in the Multiparty Era 
 
Educational Achievement  
 
Educational achievement or formal education may provide political capital. Legislators with 
high levels of formal education are more likely to “learn the rules of how the society functions 
and receive knowledge to play out their [legislative] role” (Bertrand and Valois 1994). Who’s 
Who data shows that, like elsewhere in the world (Matthews 1985:18, Norris 1997), the 
Mozambique legislature is far more educated than the general electorate. There are no illiterate 
legislators in the legislature although the levels of formal education are low. In comparing 
assemblies, one observes that there is a significant increase of legislators with secondary 
education from the Fourth (56 percent) to the Fifth Assembly (66 percent) and those with 
university education from the Fifth (27 percent) to the Sixth Assembly (34 percent) (Table 2.2).  
 
Looking at the relationship between party membership and formal education (see Appendix to 
Chapter 2), the Democratic Union (33 percent) and Frelimo (33 percent) are more likely to 
recruit officials with university education than Renamo (21 percent) in the Fourth Assembly. 
In the same assembly, Renamo (60 percent) is more likely to recruit officials with secondary 
education rather than Frelimo (55 percent) and Democratic Union (44 percent). The Democratic 
Union (22 percent) followed by Renamo (19 percent) recruited more officials with primary 
school education than Frelimo (12 percent). In the Fifth Assembly there is no statistical 
difference between the educational achievements of the two existing parties or coalitions. 
Frelimo (27 percent) and Renamo-Electoral Union (26 percent) appear to be statistically equal 
in recruiting officials with university education. The same applies to the recruitment of officials 
with secondary and primary education.  
25 







# % # % # % 
Formal education 
   Primary 38 15% 14 6% 15 6% 
   Secondary 141 56% 166 66% 143 57% 
   University 68 27% 67 27% 86 34% 
   Unknown 3 1% 3 1% 6 2% 
Total population 250 250 250 
Occupational status 
Prof., managerial or white-collar 194 78% 199 80% 207 83% 
   Manual workers 18 7% 7 3% 12 5% 
   Others 33 13% 35 14% 24 10% 
   Unknown 5 2% 9 4% 7 3% 
Total population 250 250 250 
Govt. experience at national level 
   Minister or deputy-minister 12 5% 15 6% 8 3% 
   No govt. exp. at central level 238 95% 235 94% 242 97% 
Total population 250 250 250 
Govt. experience at province level 
Governor or provincial assembly 
MP 
17 7% 23 9% 14 6% 
 No, govt. exp. at provincial level 233 93% 226 91% 236 94% 
Total population 250 249 250 
Govt. experience at district level 
    Mayor, district administrator or 
local councillor 
15 6% 21 8% 33 13% 
   No govt. exp. at local level 235 94% 229 92% 217 87% 
Total population 250 250 250 
Govt. experience at community 
level 
    Chief of administrative post, 
traditional ruler or ward secretary 
4 2% 2 1% 10 4% 
   No govt. exp. at community level 246 98% 248% 99% 240 96% 
Total population 250 250 250 
Party experience at national level 
   Party head-quarter 74 30% 103 41% 100 40% 
   No, party service at this level 176 70% 146 58% 150 60% 
Total population 250 249 250 
Party experience at provincial level 
   Provincial party office 68 27% 126 50% 148 59% 
   No, party service at this level 182 73% 123 49% 102 41% 
Total population 250 249 250 
Note: Percentages were rounded to whole numbers. Due to rounding, columns may not add up to exactly 100. 
Where the total population does not add up to 250 suggests that there is missing data. 
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Table 2.2 Continued: 






 # % # % # % 
Party experience at district level       
   District/city party office 37 15% 49 20% 92 37% 
   No, party service at this level 213 85% 200 80% 156 62% 
Total population 250 249 248 
Party experience at community 
level 
      
   Community party office 19 8% 30 12% 39 16% 
   No, party service at this level 231 92% 219 88% 211 84% 
Total population 250 249 250 
Legislative experience       
   From previous assembly NA NA 104 42% 49 20% 
   No legislative experience NA NA 146 58% 201 80% 
Total population 250 250 250 
   From the Fourth Assembly NA NA NA NA 104 42% 
   No legislative experience NA NA NA NA 146 58% 
Total Population 250 250 250 
Note: Percentages were rounded to whole numbers. Due to rounding, columns may not add up to exactly 100. 
Where the total population does not add up to 250 suggests that there is missing data. NA means not applicable. 
 
In the Sixth Assembly, while Frelimo (36 percent) and Renamo-Electoral Union (35 percent) 
again do not differ in recruiting legislators with university education, Renamo-Electoral Union 
(11 percent) has a higher percentage of legislators with primary education than Frelimo (3 
percent).  
 
Renamo (or Renamo-Electoral Union)19 changed significantly and positively the levels of 
legislators with university education from the Fourth (21 percent) to Fifth (26 percent) and Sixth 
(35 percent) Assembly. This Renamo incremental change is explained by the fact that in the 
Fifth and Sixth assemblies Renamo made coalition with ten other small opposition parties 
(including PCN, Monamo/PMSD, PRD, FAP, Alimo, UDF, PUN, Fumo/PSD, PPPM, and 
Unamo). Most of the leaders of those parties later became Members of Parliament for Renamo-
Electoral Union and had completed honours degrees. In the Fifth Assembly, of the 12 percent 
of those legislators that completed honours degrees, 33 percent came from the ten small parties 
that joined Renamo, 14 percent from Frelimo and 6 percent Renamo. In the Sixth Assembly, of 
the 13 percent of legislators that completed honours degrees 50 percent are from the parties that 
joined Renamo while 12 percent are from Renamo and 12 percent from Frelimo.  
                                                 
19 In the Fifth and Sixth assemblies Renamo made coalition with ten small political parties forming Renamo-
Electoral Union.  
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When breaking down this data by gender,20 assemblymen appear to be more educated than 
assemblywomen in all of the three assemblies. Male legislators are more likely to have 
university education than their female colleagues. Female legislators are more likely to have 
secondary education than males in both the Fifth and Sixth Assembly. This gender difference 
on education may be attributed to early patterns of gender role socialization, with men being 
more involved in public affairs and women in reproductive and domestic affairs.   
 
Occupational Status  
 
Occupational status also may provide political capital. Parliamentary careers are facilitated by 
high occupational status such as barristers, economists, administrators, teachers, trade union 
officials, journalists or political researchers.21 High occupational status provides to members 
political skills and political contacts (Ranney 1965). The Who’s Who data shows that an 
overwhelming majority of the Mozambique legislature is composed of legislators with higher 
occupational status – professional, managerial or white collar. There are very few proportions 
of legislators with manual worker or other occupational status. 
 
Comparing assemblies, legislators with higher occupational status increased significantly from 
the Fourth (78 percent) to the Sixth Assembly (83 percent) but it remained about the same in 
the Fifth Assembly (80 percent). In dissecting legislators’ occupational status data for each 
assembly by parties or coalition of parties one sees that in the Fourth Assembly Frelimo (85 
percent) followed by Democratic Union (78 percent) was more likely to have legislators with 
higher occupational status than Renamo (73 percent). In the Fifth Assembly there is no 
statistical difference between Frelimo (84 percent) and Renamo-Electoral Union (81 percent) 
but in the Sixth Assembly Frelimo (87 percent) is again more likely to have legislators with 
higher occupational status than Renamo-Electoral Union (83 percent).  
 
The absence of statistical difference between Frelimo and Renamo-Electoral Union in the Fifth 
Assembly may reflect the Renamo coalition with ten small parties that resulted in bringing more 
political capital to the Renamo-Electoral Union. Looking at the gender breakdown surprisingly 
the results illustrate that in the first two assemblies female legislators appear to have higher 
                                                 
20 All data by party membership and gender is presented in the Appendix to Chapter 2. 
21 Norris (1997) uses the term brokerage jobs. 
28 
 
occupational status than their male counterparts while no statistical difference is observed in 




Government experience may provide political capital. “Members who have already held public 
office can be expected to have developed expertise, speaking skills, practical knowledge of 
government and social contacts which will be useful in gaining a seat” (Norris 1997:179). This 
study considers legislators’ government experience at national level –that is, whether he or she 
was a minister or deputy-minister before standing in the Assembly, and at sub-national levels. 
At regional or provincial level it considers whether a legislator was governor or provincial 
legislator. At local level it considers whether he or she was a mayor, district administrator, local 
councillor or local assembly legislator. At grass root or community level, it looks at whether a 
legislator was a chief of an administrative post, a traditional ruler or ward/locality secretary.22 
This data was gathered in the form of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses. If yes, this study data indicates 
the legislator has government experience level’. 
 
The results in Table 2.2 show very low levels of government experience in the Mozambique 
legislature. The proportion of members that ever held public office at national, provincial, local 
or grass root level is only about 10 percent. This suggests that about 90 percent never held 
public office before. 
 
The proportion of those who had held public office at national level as minister or deputy-
minister did not change significantly from the Fourth (5 percent) to the Fifth (6 percent) and 
the Sixth Assembly (3 percent). The same applies to members who had held public office at 
provincial level as governor or provincial legislator and at grass root level as chief of 
administrative post, traditional ruler or ward secretary (see Table 2.2). However, government 
experience at local level changed significantly over time. The proportion of those members who 
had held public office at local level as mayor, district administrator or local councillors 
increased from the Fourth (6 percent) to the Sixth Assembly (13 percent). 
 
                                                 
22 Data on whether he or she was a civil servant is also relevant indicator of political capital but it is not 
systematically available from Who’s Who. 
29 
 
In all of the three assemblies Frelimo is more likely to have members who had held public office 
at national, provincial and local levels. This reflects the fact that so far only Frelimo was able 
to appoint government officials at those levels, since it has been governing alone from 
independence and winning all national elections. Nonetheless, from the 2003 local election 
Renamo was able to appoint their officials in government positions at local level in 5 out of 33 
municipalities. In addition, some Renamo legislators, before they joined the party, were Frelimo 
members during the civil war (1976-1992) and served in government either at provincial or 
local levels. While fewer legislators have served in government at grass root level (as chief of 
an administrative post, traditional ruler or ward/locality secretary) we observe no significant 
variation between Frelimo and the opposition in the three assemblies. Some opposition 
legislators that served in government at grass root level were traditional rulers. During the civil 
war Renamo had traditional rulers as their main contact points with the people. Traditional 
rulers were abolished after independence in 1975 probably because of their ties with colonial 
administration but were re-instated in 2000.23 
 
Male legislators (7 percent) are more likely to be ministers and deputy-ministers than females 
(0 percent) in the Fourth Assembly. However, there is no gender statistical difference in relation 
to government experience at lower levels. In the Fifth Assembly male legislators tend to have 
more government experience at national and provincial levels while their female colleagues 
tend more to have government experience at local level. In the Sixth Assembly we only see 




Members who devoted years of service working professionally for their political party may be 
also expected to develop political expertise which will be valuable in gaining a seat. 
Professional party service is concerned with employment by the party directly in national head-
quarters or regional office (McAllister 1997). This study measures party experience by 
professional party service performed by legislators in their political parties at national, 
provincial, local and grass root levels before they stood for legislature.24 The data show that at 
all levels party service increased significantly from one assembly to another, with the exception 
                                                 
23 Decree no. 15/2000 of 20 June. This decree re-instates traditional rulers (community authorities). 
24 For each level the party experience data was collected in the form of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. 
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at the national level from the Fifth to the Sixth Assembly and at grass root level where there are 
only slight increases from one assembly to another.  
 
In comparing the party experience by party membership in each of the three assemblies, the 
findings are as follows: in the Fourth Assembly Democratic Union leads recruiting officials 
with party experience at both the national and provincial levels followed by Renamo at the 
national level in the Fifth and the Sixth Assembly. Frelimo does the same at provincial level in 
the Fifth and the Sixth Assembly. Renamo leads with party experience at the local level while 
Frelimo does so at grass root level. Democratic Union have no members with party experience 
at both the local and grass root level. One question that arises from these findings is how being 
a coalition of parties with tiny parliamentary membership Democratic Union leads party 
experience at both the national and provincial levels.  
 
This reflects the fact that most or even all of the Democratic Union members are also co-
founders of their parties working for the party as the party leader or party secretary-general at 
party head-quarters in the capital city, Maputo, or working for the party as a party provincial 
delegate or representative. On the other hand, Frelimo and Renamo have many members in the 
legislature working for their parties at different levels from top to bottom. These two parties are 
much more institutionalized across the entire country and have more members in the legislature 
than Democratic Union. 
 
Evaluating party experience by gender in each of the three assemblies, the data reveals that 
most Mozambican assemblywomen enter to the legislature after performing party service at 
lower levels while their male counterparts do so after obtaining party experience at higher 
levels. Female legislators are more likely to have party experience first at local level in all of 
the three assemblies; second at grass root level in the Fourth and the Sixth Assembly; and third 
at central level in the Fourth Assembly. In contrast males are more likely to have party 
experience at central level with the exception of the Fourth Assembly and at provincial level in 
the Fourth Assembly.  
 
This finding may suggest that Mozambique female legislators tend to be less ambitious working 
for their parties at higher levels. Along similar lines, at public opinion level Afrobarometer 
surveys demonstrate that Mozambican women are less likely to be interested in public affairs 
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and to discuss politics than men (Pereira at al. 2005, Shenga and Pereira 2009, Afrobarometer 
and CPGD 2013).  
Legislative experience 
Legislative experience also may provide political capital. Members who have already worked 
in the legislature performing legislative functions may have developed political expertise, 
oratorical abilities, practical knowledge of legislative functions and government to deserve 
legislative seat. 
In the Fifth Assembly 42 percent of members of the legislature had served in the Fourth 
Assembly but that proportion declined in the following assembly. In the Sixth Assembly only 
20 percent of members of the legislature had served in the Fifth Assembly. However, 42 percent 
of those who served in the Fourth Assembly returned to the legislature in the Sixth Assembly 
after not serving one term in the Fifth Assembly (Table 2.2). This suggests cumulatively that in 
the Sixth Assembly there were at least 62 percent of members who had served either in the Fifth 
or Fourth Assembly.  
Conclusions 
This study has shown significant positive changes over assemblies in recruiting legislators with 
political capital. However it has not yet shown which characteristic of political capital improved 
more than others. Table 2.3 compares and weighs the magnitude of change in political capital 
patterns. The evidence shows that the political capital of Mozambican legislators changed 
positively first, in experience working in their party regional or provincial office, district or city 
office and head-quarter. Second, political capital changed positively in member’s formal 
education, experience working in local government as mayor, district administrator or local 
councillor. Third, it changed positively in experience working in party grass root office; and 
professional, managerial or white collar occupational status. 
The proportion of members with experience working in their party regional or provincial office 
increased 23 percent in the Fifth Assembly and 9 percent in the Sixth Assembly. It also 
increased 5 percent in the Fifth Assembly and 17 percent in the Sixth for members with 
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experience working in party district or city office; and 11 percent in the Fifth Assembly for 
those with experience working in party head-quarters.  
 
The proportion of those with secondary education increased 10 percent in the Fifth Assembly 
and of those with university education 7 percent in the Sixth Assembly. In the Sixth Assembly 
the proportion of those with secondary education declined as a result of the increase of those 
with university education.    
 











Formal education    
   Secondary education NA +10% -9% 
   University education NA 0%  +7% 
Occupational status    
   Professional, managerial or white collar 
occupational status 
NA +2%  +3% 
Experience working in government    
   Experience working in government as 
minister or deputy minister 
NA +1% -3% 
   Experience working in government as 
governor or provincial legislator 
NA +2% -3% 
   Experience working in government as mayor, 
district administrator or local councillor  
NA +2%  +5% 
   Experience working in government as chief  
of administrative post, traditional ruler or ward 
secretary 
NA -1% +3% 
Experience working in party    
   Experience working in party headquarter NA +11%  -1% 
   Experience working in party provincial office NA +23%  +9% 
   Experience working in party district or city 
office 
NA +5%  +17% 
   Experience working in party community 
office 
NA +4%  +4% 
Experience of working in the legislature    
   Experience working in the legislature NA NA -22% 
Note: NA means not applicable. Significant increases are highlighted. Some changes become significant when the 
first and last assembly are compared. 
 
The proportion of members with experience working in local government as mayor, district 
administrator or local councillor increased in the Sixth Assembly (5 percent). The proportion 
of members with experience working in party community office and those with professional, 
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managerial or white collar occupational status increased, respectively 8 percent and 5 percent, 
from the Fourth to the Sixth Assembly. Members with political capital in terms of professional, 
managerial or white collar occupational status appear to be more in the legislature but the 
proportion of lawyers, economists, administrators or social scientists is low in it.25 
 
The data also shows a negative change in legislative experience. The proportion of members 
with experience of working in the legislature declined 22 percent from the Fifth to the Sixth 
Assembly. However, 42 percent of those members from the Fourth Assembly returned in the 
Sixth Assembly after not serving in the Fifth. This suggests that although there was enormous 
decline in experience working in the legislature, cumulatively, about 62 percent of members in 
the Sixth Assembly had experience working for the legislature either in the Fifth or Fourth 
Assembly. 
 
The positive changes in political capital in the Fifth and Sixth Assembly may constitute an 
adaptation resulting from the external pressures of the process of economic liberalization and 
democratization. As Mozambique commenced with economic and political reforms toward free 
market and democracy, the process of liberalization and democratization demanded that the 
new multiparty legislative functions are exerted by individuals who possess political capital – 
that is, those who are better educated, possess higher occupational status, and experience 
working in government, legislature and political party. But it may be also a consolidation 
resulting from internal pressures. As the legislature started performing the multiparty legislative 
functions, legislators and their political parties have learnt that exerting these functions requires 






                                                 
25 Among those legislators with professional, managerial or white collar occupational status 22 percent are 
teachers,  11 percent technicians , 10 percent civil servants, 7 percent typists, 7 percent accountants, 5 percent 
businessman, 4 percent university lecturers, 3 percent nurses or pharmacists, 3 percent company administrators, 3 
percent lawyers, 2 percent economists and 2 percent medical doctors. Those comprising percentage below 2 were 
not reported. 
26 Thompson and Moncrief (1992) describe change as adaptation resulting from external pressures and 
consolidation resulting from internal pressures. 
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Legislative institutional development can be observed from three perspectives: reform, 
professionalization (capacity) and institutionalization (Rosenthal 1996). This chapter focuses 
on legislative reform, which includes modernization of rules of procedure, internal structures 
and improvements in working conditions (Rosenthal 1996:170).  
 
In the Fifth and the Sixth Assembly the legislature increased recruiting members with political 
capital, as seen from the previous chapter, therefore I expect to observe in the same period 
positive changes in legislative rules of procedure, internal structures and working conditions. 
Members with political capital may have received knowledge to play out their legislative roles. 
They may have developed expertise of politics, legislature and government, political skills and 
political connections. In order to play out their roles they are more likely to use their exceptional 
knowledge and expertise to modernize rules of procedure, internal structures and working 
conditions. I consider positive changes in rules of procedure, structures and working conditions 
as those that would increase professionalization, institutionalization and performance of the 
legislature. 
 
Legislative reform is relevant because it allows members to perform their legislative roles with 
appropriate internal structures (e.g. committee system), working conditions (e.g. office space) 
and rules of procedure (e.g. standing orders and other constitutional and statutory provisions). 
 
This study assesses legislative reform by employing legislative standing orders and legal 
provisions as well as parliamentary archival data. It assesses first, legislative rules of procedure 




Comparing Legislative Reform in the Multiparty Era 
Rules of Procedure Reform 
 
By legislative rules of procedure I mean both the legislature standing orders as well as other 
statutory or constitutional provisions that affect the legislature’s processing of bills (Cox 2002). 
To what extent has the Mozambican multiparty legislature made changes or created new rules 
of procedure in its standing orders and statutory or constitutional provisions?  
 
Before analysing the rules of procedure reform in the multiparty era, I analyse it briefly in the 
one-party period. The First Assembly (1997) was a provisional assembly established to create 
rules for recruitment of legislators for the Second Assembly (1977-1986).27 Thus, it did not 
create rules of procedure for itself. The Second Assembly created rules for the legislature to be 
chaired by the head of state;28 to meet twice a year in ordinary sessions of eight days each; to 
work part-time; and to allow the steering (house-keeping) committee to enact bills into laws 
when the legislature was in recess (Assembleia Popular 1977).29 
 
However in its final year in 1986, as a result of amendment of the 1975 Constitution, the Second 
Assembly changed rules of procedure by creating new ones. It did not allow the steering 
committee to enact bills; and separated the head of state from the speakership position of the 
legislature.30 The Third Assembly (1987-1994) created new rules of procedure through new 
standing orders as a result of the 1986 constitutional amendment.31 It also created rules of the 
democratic game in the 1990 constitution for multiparty legislature.  
 
Moving to the multiparty era, the legislature has made at least three major rules of procedure 
reforms in its internal rules (as summarised in Table 3.1). The first reform in the first year of 
the Fourth Assembly (1995-1999) was to create new rules to adapt the legislative process to the 
new political system of multiparty democracy. It included rules for: i) the functioning of the 
legislature; ii) accountability of the head of state and iii) attorney-general to the legislature; iv) 
election of the speaker within  the legislature as well as his or her responsibilities; v) constitution 
                                                 
27 Assembleia Popular (1977), Assembleia da República (2009). 
28 Constituição (1975). 
29 Standing orders (Regulamento Interno da Assembleia Popular 1977), Law no. 4/77 of 24 December. 
30 Law no. 4/86 of 25 July, Assembleia da República (2009). 
31 Resolution no. 10/87 of 21 September. 
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and composition of caucus; vi) organs of the legislature; vii) speaking procedures; viii) 
petitions, claims and complaints; ix) legislative process; x) government programme, social and 
economic plan, and budget; xi) accountability of the government to the legislature; and xii) 
voting rules.    
 







The legislature creates rules 
for democratic process (1st 
Standing order, Law no. 
1/95 of 8 May) 
It reviews and strengthen 
rules for democratic process 
(2nd Standing order, Law no. 
6/2001 of 30 April) 
 
It reviews and strengthen 
rules for democratic process 
(3nd Standing order, Law no. 
17/2007 of 18 July) 
 
The second rules reform took place in the second year of the Fifth Assembly (2000-2004). The 
Fifth Assembly first combined rules of procedure for petitions, claims and complaints from the 
Fourth Assembly with the petitions institution within the legislature by establishing the 
Committee of Petitions. The Fourth Assembly created rules for petitions, claims and complaints 
but it did not set up an institution within the legislature to deal with petitions. Second it 
strengthened rules of procedure for accountability by creating new rules to review and 
scrutinize public accounts. The new rule consisted in compelling the executive by law to submit 
the public account report to the legislature on state revenues and expenses; to present the report 
to the legislature; and to respond questions to legislators.32 This rule reform was fostered by 
three bills enacted by the legislature in 1997 associated with public accounts: Law of Previous 
Oversight of Public Expenses,33 Law of Successive Oversight of Public Expenses34 and Law of 
General Framework for State Budget and Public Accounts.35 In short the second rules reform 
consolidated rules of procedure created from the first reform in the Fourth Assembly. 
 
The third rules reform occurred in the third year of the Sixth Assembly (2005-2009). It firstly 
created rules of procedure for declaration of a state of siege and a state of emergency. It ruled 
that the state of siege and state of emergency is initiated by the president, but it requires approval 
of the legislature. Secondly, the third rules reform reduced the law-making power of the 
                                                 
32 The accountability mechanism that existed before this new rule was only on mid-term review of 
implementation of annual social and economic plan and budget. 
33 Law no. 13/97 of 10 July. 
34 Law no. 14/97 of 10 July. 
35 Law no. 15/97 of 10 July. 
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legislature by setting up rules allowing the executive also to enact bills in the form of decree-
laws. The executive makes a request to the legislature then the legislature enacts a bill 
authorizing the executive to initiate, review and enact a bill within a specific scope. This new 
standing order rule resulted from a bill approved by the Sixth Assembly in 2005 known as the 
bill of ‘legislative authorization’.36 In legislative authorization there is no committee referral 
and review. The debate of authorization occurs in the plenary and then follows the final voting. 
A jurist and senior parliamentary staff pointed this as necessary on issues that the legislature 
does not have technical capacity and expertise.37 
However this reduces legislative production, if one looks at law-making as an output, as the 
legislature shares this function with the executive. More importantly it reduces civil society 
interaction or engagement with the legislature as the legislature does not decide on bills to be 
passed by the executive. Thirdly the third rules reform increased transparency of the legislature 
by establishing new rules – the rules to review and scrutinize the annual report of the activities 
and accounts of the legislature. 
Unpacking the Three Rules Reform 
Besides assessing the major aspects of these three rule reforms it is also important to analyse 
them in some detail. The Mozambican assemblies changed the time to end ordinary sessions. 
The Fourth Assembly set up rules that allowed the legislature to spend more hours in plenary 
sessions than the Fifth and Sixth assemblies. The working hours in the Fourth Assembly were 
six from 8:30 to 14:30 but in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies they were reduced to 4.5 from 8:30 
to 13:00. Afternoons were dedicated to committee meetings for committee members but also 
rank-and-file members (those who only attend plenary sessions) got more time to engage with 
the electorate. This allowed more time for committees to do their committee work in the 
afternoons. It also helps rank-and-file members to engage with citizens and interested groups 
after plenary sessions.  
On legislative process, the Fifth Assembly improved the rules for information that a committee 
opinion report on a bill has to contain. The Fourth Assembly prescribed that the committee 
36Law no. 6/2005 of 13 December. 
37Interview with a jurist and senior parliamentary staff in Mozambique legislature on ‘legislative authorization’, 
Date of interview: 16 October 2012.  
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opinion report on a bill must contain views of different sectors of society, committee views and 
respective arguments, bill amendments and conclusions. In the Fifth Assembly the justification 
of the bill, legal and government programme frame and financial implications should be also 
included. This helps committees to better scrutinize and oversee bills that are referred to them.  
No significant change was observed in the Sixth Assembly. 
 
The Fifth Assembly also made positive changes on rules for reviewing specific bill clauses. The 
Fourth Assembly established that the review of specific clauses was made by the plenary. The 
committee work was limited to review general principles of bills. But the Fifth Assembly 
changed this and required this to be done by a relevant committee in committee meeting and 
then reported to the plenary.38 Besides simply reviewing the general bill principles and reporting 
their opinion (i.e. Parecer) to the plenary, from the Fifth Assembly committees also began 
review of specific bill clauses, debating, voting and then reporting outcomes (i.e. Relatório de 
Análise, Debate e Votaçãona Especialidade) to the plenary. This helps the committee to exert 
an in-depth review and scrutiny of bills. In addition the Fifth Assembly also ruled to give the 
right to members that are not from the committee which is reviewing the bill to submit their 
written opinions to the committee for debate.  
 
There were also significant changes in the rules of procedure for reviewing and approving the 
government quinquennial programme.39 The Fourth Assembly ruled that the executive had to 
reformulate the government programme if the legislature rejects it in the first voting. If the 
programme is rejected in the second voting, the executive president either dissolves the 
legislature or dismisses the cabinet. The Fifth Assembly required that a rejection of the 
government programme implies dissolution of the legislature and a second rejection suggests 
that the president dismisses the cabinet. The Sixth Assembly prescribed that the legislature can 
be dissolved if the government programme is rejected for the first time. In sum, none of these 
reforms allow the legislature to reject the executive programme if legislators find out major 
inconsistencies in the government programme, as legislators fear the legislature being dissolved 
by the executive president (Table 3.2). This reduces autonomy of the legislature to influence 
policy-making as it increases the power of the executive president in policy-making by reducing 
that of the legislature. 
 
                                                 
38 See Clause 94 of Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April and Clause 109 of Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
39 This is the 5-year government programme deriving from electoral manifesto of the winning party. 
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1st rejection The executive 
reformulates (No 1 of 
Clause 92 of Law 
1/95, of 8 May) 
The president dissolves 
the legislature (No 2 of 
Clause 108 of Law 
6/2001, of 30 April) 
The president 
dissolves the 
legislature (No 2 of 
Law no. 17/2007, of 
18 July) 
2nd rejection 
The president either 
dissolves the 
legislature or 
dismisses the cabinet 
(No 2 of Clause 92 of 




cabinet(No 3 of Clause 
108 of Law no. 6/2001, 
of 30 April 
Not Applicable – No 
2nd rejection 
Note: Data from three standing orders of the three legislatures. 
There were also significant changes in rules of procedure for the review of the annual social 
and economic plan and State budget. The Fourth Assembly did not rule on the number of days 
necessary to discuss the social and economic plan and budget in the plenary, leaving it open-
ended. But the Fifth and Sixth assemblies were more precise by allocating three days. This 
helps the legislature to increase session length (which is a measure of professionalization). 
On the timing for submitting the bills emanating from the social and economic plan and budget 
to the legislature, the Fourth Assembly prescribed that that had to be submitted 60 days in 
advance, the Fifth Assembly left it open-ended and the Sixth Assembly established that the 
executive has to direct them until 30 of September. At committee level, the Fourth and Fifth 
assemblies required 30 days for the speaker to direct them before the debate in plenary while 
the Sixth Assembly improved it by ruling “immediately after the speaker receives them”.40 This 
helps the legislature to better monitor the executive or hold it to account. 
On accountability of the executive to the legislature, the Fourth Assembly did not make rules 
on the number of days in advance caucuses have to submit questions to the executive before it 
appears in plenary to present the report on the mid-term review of the implementation of the 
social and economic plan and budget. The Fifth and Sixth assemblies required fifteen days. This 
allowed much more time for the executive to prepare and provide comprehensive answers to 
the legislature. But, most importantly, the legislature did not adopt rules to hold the executive 
40 Standing orders, Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
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president accountable. It made no demands for the head of the executive to present and respond 
to his governance programme to the legislature – the quinquennial government programme, as 
well as the mid-term review of implementation of the annual social and economic plan and state 
budget.41 The legislature assigned those responsibilities to the executive president’s assistant, 
the prime-minister, enabling the executive president to avoid being checked by assemblies.  
With regard to rules of accountability of the head of state to the legislature, there was an 
improvement from assembly to assembly. In the Fourth Assembly the standing orders subjected 
the address of the head of state on the state of the nation to debate in plenary but it made clear 
in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies it was not subjected to debate. This prevented opposition 
legislators from trying to force the head of state to respond to their questions. 
With respect to rules of accountability of the attorney-general, the standing order arranged that 
the attorney-general annual report is subjected to debate in all of the three assemblies. But it 
adds in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies that the accountability takes place in the first ordinary 
session with duration of two working days. In the Fourth Assembly the standing order ruled 
that it occurred only for the duration of one working day. Furthermore, in the Sixth Assembly 
the standing order demanded that the attorney-general submit his or her annual report to the 
legislature within fifteen days before its presentation in the plenary and specify the content of 
the report: “The annual address of the attorney-general must deal with the general state of 
justice”42 and contain other specific aspects such as internal organization and evolution of the 
prosecutor’s office activity and control of legality. This reform helps the legislature to better 
oversee the attorney-general but also, the extension to debate attorney-general report, helps the 
legislature to increase session length. 
With respect to rules for the establishment of caucuses, in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies the 
legislature prescribed more rigid rules against political parties or party coalitions than the 
Fourth. The standing order required in the Fourth Assembly at least five legislators for parties 
or coalitions to constitute a caucus group while in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies it required 
eleven. The last two assemblies granted right of intervention in debate to those members with 
no caucus, however in practice no party or coalition was penalized by these rules in the three 
assemblies. All parties and coalitions were able to have membership above the thresholds. But 
41 See Clause 206 of the Constitution 2004.  
42 Clause 26 of Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
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this rule may force members of small parties to join larger caucuses unless rules are changed in 
the beginning of a term.  
The rules of procedure for reviewing and scrutinizing public accounts (that is, the financial 
report of execution of state revenues and expenses) improved significantly in the Sixth 
Assembly. The Fourth Assembly did not set up rules for public accounts. The rules associated 
with public accounts were adopted by the legislature late in 1997.43 In the Fifth Assembly the 
deadline for the executive to submit a report for the execution of the public account was 31 
December while in the Sixth Assembly it was shortened to 31 May. This change gave the 
legislature and accounting tribunal44 more time to review public accounts executed by the 
executive.  
In addition in the Sixth Assembly the standing order prescribed a due date by which the 
accounting tribunal had to direct its technical opinion and report to the legislature. The Sixth 
Assembly arranged that the executive directs the public account until 31 May to the legislature 
and accounting tribunal.45 The accounting tribunal then has until 30 November to direct its 
technical report to the legislature. The legislature then examines and approves the public 
accounts in the first ordinary session, March-May, of the following year rather than the second 
session, October-December, as it was in the Fifth Assembly. This allowed the legislature to 
shorten the approval of public accounts with delay of two years rather than three. For example 
in the Sixth Assembly the legislature began approving public account of 2004 in 2006 rather 
than 2007 as it would be in the Fifth Assembly.   
This procedure commences with the speaker distributing the public account [and related 
documents] immediately to legislators as well as refers them to the Committee of Planning and 
Budget. Within fifteen days before the plenary debate the Committee of Planning and Budget 
reviews and formulates its written opinion on the public account based on the technical report 
of accounting tribunal. The session of debate in the plenary takes a maximum of three days. It 
commences with the presentation of the opinion of the Committee of Planning and Budget 
43Law no. 13/97 of 10 July, Law no. 14/97 of 10 July and Law no. 15/97 of 10 July. 
44 The tribunal in charge of overseeing the execution of state revenues and expenses and providing technical data 
to the legislature to approve the account report. 
45 In the Mozambican context the Accounting Tribunal corresponds to a small section of the Administrative 
Tribunal, the so-called Third Section of Administrative Tribunal. 
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followed by plenary debate, the executive clarifications and ends up with its review and voting. 
The public account is approved in the form of resolution rather than act/law. 
 
Working Conditions Reforms 
 
This study measures working conditions by its basic aspect – working office space. Space 
reform was one of the major reforms in the three assemblies. Renovation of the parliamentary 
building and construction of an office building provided space for standing committees, 
caucuses, parliamentary staff and a library. Renovations and construction took place in mid-
Fourth Assembly and the legislature began using the buildings from early Fifth Assembly.  
 
During renovation and construction in the Fourth Assembly the legislature worked in limited 
space. It assembled in a borrowed facility (Clube Militar) which was suitable for plenary 
sessions but not standing committees or staff. Staff had to move back and forth between 
borrowed and renovation facilities during session periods to support the Fourth Assembly. As 
a consequence of renovation and construction, members did not have offices, with the exception 
of the speaker and deputy-speakers. Standing committee chairs and rapporteurs were only able 
to share office space with their committee staff in the committee office or meeting room. Other 
committee members did not have office space in the committees they serve. This space reform 
was very significant and positive for the plenary and standing committees but it did not support 
most of the legislators individually to do their jobs by providing offices to them.  
 
The availability of a new office building for staff in the Fifth Assembly affected 
professionalization (capacity) of the legislature. It led to the recruitment of better educated staff 
in 2000 (2) and 2001 (6) with university degrees to support the plenary and committees. In the 
Fourth Assembly, parliamentary staff had only secondary education or less, with the exception 
of the secretary-general of the legislature secretariat and one staff member. Committees 
received supporting staff varying from 1 in the Fourth Assembly to 2 and 3, respectively, in the 
Fifth and Sixth assemblies. But they did not have the assistance they needed to investigate more 
deeply into their policy domains. The Committee of Planning and Budget did not receive fiscal 
or audit staff, the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights did not obtain legal staff and 
so forth.  
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The space reform also led the legislature to acquire more equipment like computers, printers 
and internet facilities for its supporting staff and even a computer laboratory for legislators 
(Assembleia da República 2009). In the Sixth Assembly the number of desktop computers 
increased from 39 in 2006 to 100 in 2007 and 138 in 2008 while the number of laptops improved 
from 4 in 2007 to 34 in 2008. The number of printers increased from 20 in 2006 to 40 in 2007 
and 72 in 2008 (Assembleia da República 2009:88). 
Structural Reforms
The standing orders indicate that the formal structures of the Mozambican legislature entails 
the plenary, a steering (house-keeping) committee and working committees. With respect to 
composition, the plenary and steering committee did not vary at all across the three assemblies. 
They had 250 and 15 members respectively from the Fourth to the Sixth Assembly. However, 
the structure of working committees changed to a considerable extent. 
Committee Structure 
Before the first multiparty legislative election in 1994, the legislative structure entailed a 
plenary, a steering committee, which substituted for the plenary during the interim period and 
had legislative power, and working committees that either were inexistent in reality or met only 
irregularly for eight days a year in each session (Assembleia da República 2009).46 Bills were 
initiated by the Frelimo Central Committee, Frelimo Executive Committee, the executive, the 
president and the legislature and were mainly ratified by either the legislature steering 
committee or plenary. 
After the 1994 founding multiparty legislative election the legislature recognized the 
importance of committees. A committee structure of seven standing committees was 
established in the first year of the Fourth Assembly to work permanently for the entire term 
with law-making, oversight and representation responsibilities.47 They included: (1) Planning 
and Budget; (2) Social Affairs, Gender and Environment; (3) Agriculture, Regional 
46 Standing committees of the one-party era only met for the 16 days that the legislature met annually 
(Assembleia da República 2009:8). However, parliamentary records does not mention any committee established 
in one-party era. 
47Law no. 1/1995 of 8 May. 
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Development, Public Administration and Local Government; (4) Economic Activities and 
Services; (5) Defence and Public Order; (6) International Relations; and (7) Judicial Issues, 
Human Rights and Legality (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Committee Structure in the Multiparty Era, 1995-2009 






Standing committee 7 8 8 
Ad hoc committee 4 5 0 
Inquest committee 1 1 0 
Total 12 14 8 
Note: Data on standing committees gathered from standing orders and other parliamentary documents. Data on 
ad hoc and inquest committees collected from Assembly resolutions. 
 
In the Fifth Assembly the legislature added a Committee of Petitions to deal with public 
petitions, claims and complaints delivered to the legislature. The responsibility of this 
committee is to represent public interest by performing investigative-oversight of the received 
petitions, claims and complaints. When the petitions deal with issues of legal requirements 
necessary for the formulation of a process the committee delivers them to the prosecutor’s office 
requesting information about their decision. If the petitions deal with claims and complaints 
that require opinion/report from standing committees this is requested.48 
 
No additional standing committees were created in the Sixth Assembly but three standing 
committees changed their names. The Committee of Judicial Affairs, Human Rights and 
Legality changed slightly to become Committee of Constitutional Affairs, Human Rights and 
Legality. The Committee of Agriculture, Regional Development and Local Government 
became Committee of Public Administration, Local Government and Media. The Committee 
of Economic Activities and Services became Committee of Agriculture, Rural Development, 
Economic Activities and Services. 
 
Besides standing committees, Mozambique’s multiparty assemblies also created the possibility 
for the creation of ad hoc and inquest committees to deal with specific issues. These committees 
differ with standing committees regarding to their duration. While standing committees 
function for the duration of the term, ad hoc and inquest committees are abolished even before 
the end of the term when they achieve their goals. Ad hoc committees have law-making 
                                                 
48Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April and Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
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responsibilities. Inquest committees perform investigative-oversight responsibility. They 
investigate the respect of rule of law and national interest in the functioning of institutions. 
They have the same investigative power as judges or courts. Their procedures occur behind 
closed doors in inquest committee meetings as well as in plenary sessions. 
 
The Fourth Assembly established four ad hoc committees: (1) for Review of the Standing Order 
and Legislator’s Statute, (2) for Review of the Constitution, (3) for Review of the National 
Anthem; and (4) for Review of the Electoral Law. The Fifth Assembly set up five ad hoc 
committees by adding to those of the Fourth Assembly Ad hoc Committee for Review of the 
National Flag and Republic Emblem. The Sixth Assembly did not create any ad hoc committee. 
 
With respect to inquest committees, the Fourth Assembly created one inquest committee - the 
Inquest Committee for Investigation of the Alleged Land Usurpation in Inhambane Province. 
The Fifth Assembly created also one - the Inquest Committee for Investigation of the Facts 
from the Demonstration of November 2000. The Sixth Assembly did not establish any inquest 
committee.  
 
While there were some improvements in committee structure during the multiparty era it did 
not become more complex. Committees, for example, did not unpack themselves to create sub-
units or subcommittees. Complexity involves “multiplication of organizational subunits” 
(Huntington 1968). However, committee structures did allow to some extent division of labour 
and specialization of committee members. As each committee has a specific area of competence 
replicating the executive ministries (Table 3.4), the committee structure fostered the division of 
labour. In addition, considering the standing order rules that no standing committee member 
can serve on more than one standing committee, the committee structure contributed to 
specialization: “specialization and expertise can be reinforced if committee members 
concentrate their work on one and only one committee” (Strøm 1998). 
 
Although the committee system replicates the executive ministries, committees are 
characterized by many and broad portfolio areas. For instance, the Committee of Social Affairs, 
Gender and Environment and the Committee of Agriculture, Rural Development, Economic 
Activities and Services cover countless executive ministries (see Table 3.4). Only few standing 
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committees cover few executive ministries. In comparing assemblies, the seven existing 
committees covered 2349 executive ministries in the Fifth and 2750 in the Sixth Assembly.51 
 
Table 3.4: Relations between Standing Committees and Executive Ministries in the Sixth 
Assembly, 2005-2009 
Standing Committees Executive Ministries 
Committee of Constitutional Issues, 
Human Rights and Legality 
Ministry of Justice 
Committee of Planning and Budget Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Planning and Development 
Committee of Social Affairs, Gender 
and Environment 
Ministry of Women and Social Affairs 
Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Action 
Ministry of Education and Culture 
Ministry for Issues of Fighters for National 
Liberation  
Ministry of Youth and Sport 
Ministry of Health 
Committee of Public Administration, 
Local Government and Social 
Communication 
Ministry of Public Service 
Ministry of State Administration 
Committee of Agriculture, Rural 
Development, Economic Activities 
and Services 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Ministry of Tourism 
Ministry of Fishery 
Ministry of Public Work and Housing 
Ministry of Mineral Resources 
Ministry of Energy 
Ministry of Transport and Communication 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Education and Culture 
Committee of Defence and Public 
Order 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of National Defence 
Committee of International Relations Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 
Committee of Petitions Not Applicable, standing committee is not law-
making committee  
Note: Some ministries are related to more than one committee because an executive ministry bill can be referred 
to more than one standing committee. For example, an executive health bill can be referred to the Committee of 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Economic Activities and Services as health is a service but also to Committee of 
Social Affairs, Gender and Environment as it is social issue.     
 
 
                                                 
49 Who is Who in the Government of Mozambique 2000 (Quem é Quem 200 no Governo de Moçambique). 
50 Who is Who. Ministers and Deputy-Ministers (Quem é Quem. Governo e Vice-Ministros). 
51 Ministries in Presidency were excluded from the analysis as they do not match with committees. 
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This suggests that the Mozambican committee system has not moved toward greater 
specialization. Strøm (1998) argues that small committees [those with few and narrow portfolio 
areas] increase the incentives to specialize. Even though the rules of the game prescribe no 
member can serve on more than one standing committee, the rules also propose that standing 
committee members may serve in ad hoc or inquest committees. Multiple memberships are 
allowed from standing to ad hoc and inquest committees.  
 
Other Legislative Structures 
 
Besides the legislative structure indicated by the standing orders, the Mozambique legislature 
also has in its structure units that represent certain societal groups. The establishment of 
parliamentary units occurred only in the Sixth Assembly. In the first year of the Sixth Assembly 
the legislature established two units: the parliamentary unit to prevent and fight against 
HIV/AIDS (Gabinete Parlamentar de Prevenção e Combateao HIV/SIDA)52 and the 
parliamentary women’s unit (Gabinete da Mulher Parlamentar) to promote gender equality.53 
The establishment of these units helps to represent marginalized groups in society like women 




The supporting structure of the legislature - the General-Secretariat of the Assembly of the 
Republic - is also a relevant and integral part of the legislative structure. The statutory 
provisions of the legislature secretariat indicate that there were changes in the supporting 
structure: one in the fourth year of the Fourth Assembly and another in the last year of the Fifth 
Assembly.54 No changes were registered in the Sixth Assembly. Between 1977 and 1983 before 
the 1994 founding multiparty legislative election the legislature technical support was provided 
by a group of civil servants coming from different ministries (i.e. Grupo de Organização das 
Sessões da Assembleia Popular) that only supported legislative sessions. The legislature 
secretariat was only established in 198355 with limited staff (Assembleia da República 2009:54-
56).  
                                                 
52 Resolution no. 35/2005 of 19 December. 
53 Resolution no. 33/2005 of 19 December. 
54 Diploma Ministerial no. 59/89 of 13 May and Law no. 11/04 of 20 October. 




In the Fourth Assembly the supporting structure of the legislature consisted of two directorates 
of services: one for law-making and another for administration. In the Fifth Assembly 
improvements from the previous reform were consolidated as a result of the approval of the 
strategic plan of the legislature.56 There were several improvements: the first improvement in 
the second reform was to transform the supporting structure and make it larger. In fact, the 
directorate of service from the first reform was elevated to the category of general directorate; 
departments were elevated to divisions; partitions became departments and sub-partition was 
elevated to partition. The number of staff was enlarged as well as new legislative careers were 
created in the second supporting structure reform. The second improvement was to grant 
autonomy to some supporting services. The division of committee support, division of public 
and international relations, and information and technology centre became autonomous.57 
 
The consequences of these reforms are that they established formal spaces to professionalize 
legislative staff through recruitment and/or training of specialized staff such as: parliamentary 
specialist and legislative technician; providing members technical capacity in the beginning of 
the terms on aspects concerned to functioning of the legislature, standing order, structural 
organization of the legislature, legislative process, monitory mechanism to the executive, etc.; 
recognizing in law the legislature administrative and budget autonomy; strengthening the 
relationship between member and constituents; creating interactive website and media; public 





The Mozambique legislature created and changed a couple of rules of procedure during the one-
party era. In the Second Assembly (1977-1986) the legislature ruled for the assembly to be 
chaired by the head of state; meet twice a year in session of eight days each; and allowed the 
steering committee to enact bills during the recess period. In 1986 it gained some autonomy 
from the steering committee and the head of state: it changed rules by stopping the steering 
committee to enact bills and the head of state to be the speaker. In 1990 in the Third Assembly 
                                                 
56 One of the recommendation of of the strategic plan of the Assembly was to revise and approve a new supporting 
structure. See Assembleia da República. 2003. Plano Estratégico da Assembleia da República (2004-2008) 
57 No 2 of Clause 28 of Law no. 11/04 of 20 October. 
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(1987-1994) it created rules of the democratic game by adopting the democratic constitution. 
This fostered rules of procedure, structures and working conditions reforms in the multiparty 
era.  
Multiparty assemblies have made a series of changes in rules of procedure, internal structures 
and working conditions (Table 3.5) that connote legislative institutional and performance 
improvements. In the Fifth Assembly the legislature combined rules from the previous 
assembly for citizens and organized groups making petitions by establishing the Committee of 
Petitions. This helps the legislature to represent public interest. In the Sixth Assembly it 
strengthened financial accountability by shortening the period that the executive has to submit 
report of the execution of revenues and expenses (public account). This helped the approval of 
public accounts from the Sixth Assembly with delay of two years rather than three as it used to 
be in the Fifth Assembly. In the Fifth Assembly committees began playing an important role in 
law-making by also reviewing and scrutinizing specific bill clauses.58 This helps committee 
system to exert an in-depth review and scrutiny of bills. In the Sixth Assembly the legislature 
was more precise on allocating a date for the executive to submit the bill of plan and budget. 
This helps the legislature to better monitor the executive and hold it to account. 
In the Fifth Assembly the legislature reduced the working hours of plenary sessions by ending 
it at 13:00.59 This allowed more time for committee members to do their committee work in the 
afternoons. It also helps rank-and-file members to engage with citizens and interested groups 
after plenary sessions. In the Fifth Assembly the legislature added the justification of bill, legal 
and government programme frame and financial implications to the information that the 
committee opinion report has to contain.60 This helps committees to better scrutinize and 
oversee bills that are referred to them. In the Fifth Assembly the legislature assigned three days 
to debate the government annual plan and budget.61 This helps the legislature to increase session 
length (professionalization). In the Fifth Assembly the legislature extended the number of days 
that attorney-general has to account from one day in the Fourth Assembly to two; and in the 
Sixth Assembly it added that the attorney-general report has to be submitted fifteen days in 
58 In the Fourth Assembly committees  only reviewed the general principles of bills. 
59 Plenary sessions ended up at 14:30 in the Fourth Assembly.  
60 In the Fourth Assembly the legislature prescribed that committee opinion report on particular bill has to 
contain views of different sectors of society, committee views and argument, bill amendments and conclusions. 




advance as well as provided guidelines of the report content. This helps the legislature to better 
oversee the attorney-general but also helps to increase session length. 
 













Rules of procedure    
Petitions NA + No change 
Legislative authorization NA No change - 
Hours for starting sessions NA + No change 
Data that committee report contains NA + No change 
Committee review NA + No change 
Government programme NA - No change  
Number of days in plenary of debate of plan 
and budget 
NA + No change 
Time of submitting plan and budget  NA - + 
Accountability of the executive NA - No change 
Accountability of the attorney-general  NA + + 
Public accounts NA + + 
Internal structures    
Committee structure NA + - 
Other structures NA No change  + 
Supporting structure NA + No change 
Working conditions     
Space  NA + No change 
Note: NA means not applicable – there is no previous multiparty assembly to compare with. But it should be 
emphasized here that there were positive changes from one-party to multiparty assemblies in almost all the 
indicators. No change means that no major change was made following the previous multiparty assembly. Things 
remained about the same. 
 
Regarding working condition reforms, the legislature improved its space in the Fifth Assembly 
with a renewed parliamentary building and a constructed office building. This reform provided 
modern and additional space to the plenary and standing committees to do their job generally 
but it did not support most legislators individually to do their jobs by providing office space. 
Besides the speaker and deputy-speakers, only committee chairs and rapporteurs and staff were 
provided office space.  
 
On legislative structures, the legislature improved the number of committees in the Fifth 
Assembly but declined in the Sixth. The positive change in the Fifth Assembly allows more 
division of labour and gives prospects to specialize committee members but committees are 
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characterized by many and broad portfolio areas and have to cover many executive ministries. 
In the Sixth Assembly it created new internal structures: one unit to prevent and fight 
HIV/AIDS and another of women legislators to promote gender equality. This helps the 
legislature to represent marginalized groups. In the Fifth Assembly the legislature also 
strengthened its supporting structure by making it larger. This reform provided formal space 
for the legislature to increase its capacity by recruiting qualified supporting staff to assist 
committees and plenary.   
 
These improvements support Thompson and Moncrief’s (1992) postulates of change describing 
it as adaptation, resulting from external pressures of transition to democracy; and as 
consolidation, resulting from internal pressures of improved political capital. As the legislature 
transited to democracy it began in the Fourth Assembly creating rules of procedure of the 
democratic game and appropriate structures and working conditions. When it commenced 
improving recruiting legislators with political capital in the Fifth and the Sixth Assembly it also 
strengthened those rules, structures and working conditions.  
 
However, the Mozambique multiparty legislature also made negative changes in the rules of 
procedure not helping it to professionalize, institutionalize and/or perform relatively well its 
functions. In the Sixth Assembly the legislature authorized the executive also to enact bills.62 
This reduces law-making production as bills to be enacted by the legislature may be enacted by 
the executive. Also citizens and organized groups who aim to introduce their input in the 
legislation find little space when it is the executive to enact a bill. This because the executive 
legislative process is not that opened compared with of the legislature. 
 
The legislature also created rules of procedure that reduced its performance in oversight. In all 
of the three assemblies the legislature did not adopt rules to hold the executive president to 
account. It made no demands for the executive president to present and respond to his 5-year 
governance programme, annual plan and budget and mid-term review of the execution of plan 
and budget. This enabled the executive president to avoid being checked by the legislature.  
 
This reflects the fact that the Mozambican political system is “ruled by a single leader who 
[relies] heavily on distribution of patronage in the form of appointments to government 
                                                 
62 “As the ruling parties increases their parlaimentary majorities in the second and subsequent legislative 
elections, executive and legislative powers become fused” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005:18). 
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positions and the distribution of rents to maintain himself in office” (Barkan 2009:12). In 
Mozambique the president is both the head of state and head of the executive; commander in 
chief of the army; appoints and dismisses all chairs of judiciary, and even academic institutions; 
and is president of the ruling party, which controls all electoral machinery. The existence of 
this type of leader (popularly known as neopatrimonial leaders, or “big men”) increases the 
probability of the parliamentary majority to adopt rules of procedure that enable the executive 
president to avoid being checked by the legislature. 
 
In the Fourth Assembly if the legislature rejected the 5-year term government programme the 
executive was compelled to reformulate it. A second rejection after the reformulation meant 
that the president dissolves the legislature or dismisses the cabinet. In the Fifth Assembly a first 
rejection meant the president dissolves the legislature and a second dismisses the cabinet. This 
reduces legislative autonomy to influence policy-making. It increases the power of the 


























Legislative professionalization is the second of the three dimensions of legislative development 
(Rosenthal 1996) that this study assesses and compares. It is “a concept that assesses the 
capacity of both legislators and legislatures to generate and digest information in the 
policymaking process” (Squire and Moncrief 2010:75). It is measured by the length of the 
legislative session, staff support services and resources (like budget) and legislative salary and 
benefits (Moncrief 2002, Squire 2007, Squire and Moncrief 2010). Professional legislatures are 
then those bodies that have “unlimited legislative sessions, superior staff resources and salaries 
sufficient to allow the members to pursue service as their full time occupation” (Squire and 
Moncrief 2010). “If money is available, these traits can simply be manufactured” (Hibbing 
2002) to professionalize legislatures. 
 
In this study I assess and compare legislative professionalization across Mozambique’s 
multiparty assemblies from 1995 to 2009. As the Mozambique legislature has been recruiting 
relatively better-qualified legislators and reforming rules of internal procedure, structures and 
working conditions in the Fifth and the Sixth Assembly, this study expects to also find 
improvements in its level of professionalization over the same period. Better-qualified 
legislators who made positive changes in rules of procedure, structures and working conditions 
demand more payment and resources as well as the legislature’s capacity to support their work.  
 
Legislative professionalization “influences legislator behaviour and legislative output in many 
important ways” (Squire and Moncrief 2010). Professionalization helps legislatures generally 
but also legislators individually to do their jobs (Rosenthal (1996). The theoretical implications 
of increasing members’ salary and benefits is that it increases individual incentive to serve, 
leading to longer tenure in office (institutionalization) as well as increasing the ability to focus 
efforts on legislative activities. For the legislature, it leads members to serve for longer tenure, 
creating a more experienced body as well as attracting better-qualified members (Squire 2007, 




The implications of increasing time devoted for service for legislators is that it reduces their 
opportunity to pursue other employment and increases the need for a high salary to compensate 
for the loss of income. For the legislature, it provides more time for policy development and 
deliberation. The increase of staff and resources increases members’ ability to influence the 
policymaking process, their job satisfaction and enhances their re-election prospects. The 
increase in staff and resources makes the legislature a more serious policymaking competitor 
with the executive (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Implications of Professionalization for Legislators and the Legislature 
Measure of 
Professionalization  
Implications for legislators Implications for the 
legislature 
Salary and benefits Increased incentive to serve, 
leading to longer tenure. 
Increased ability to focus efforts 
on legislative activities. 
Lead to members with longer 




Time demands of 
service 
Reduced opportunities to pursue 
other employment and 
increased need for higher salary 
to compensate for lost income. 
Increased opportunity to master 
legislative skills. 
More time for policy 
development. 
More time for policy 
deliberation. 
Staff and resources Increased ability to influence 
policymaking process. 
Increased job satisfaction. 
Enhanced re-election prospects. 
Make legislature a more serious 
policymaking competitor with 
the executive. 
Adapted by Squire, P., & Moncrief, G. (2010).State Legislatures Today. Politics Under the Domes. Boston: 
Longman from Squire, P. (2007). Measuring Legislative Professionalization: The Squire Index Revisited, State 
Politics and Policy Quarterly, 7. pp. 2013. 
 
 
Comparing Legislative Professionalization in the Multiparty Era 
 
Time Devoted for Service 
 
Legislative studies have considered session length as the time devoted for service but they have 
not included the time dedicated for work undertaken out of session (Rosenthal 1996:174) 
overseeing government agencies. Instead of simply using session length, which is narrow as it 
mainly taps only work in plenary, this study employs the concept of time devoted for service, 
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which is broader and it may include both the length of legislative session and other work 
dedicated outside the plenary like oversight. This study views time devoted for service by the 
number of working days in and outside the plenary and working hours in plenary. To what 
extent do Mozambican assemblies devote time for their responsibilities? How does it change 
over time? 
In the one-party era the Mozambique legislature met only for eight days in each of the two 
sessions a year (Assembleia da República 2009). Some Mozambican critics emphasize that in 
the multiparty era the legislature only works for 90 working days a year, in two ordinary 
sessions a year, each meeting with no more than 45 working days.63 In contrast the data of 
parliamentary schedules reveals that the average number of legislative working days (including 
ordinary and extraordinary plenary sessions and oversight) is about 113 in the Fourth and the 
Fifth Assembly. However, this average number declined about 7 percent (105) in the Sixth 
Assembly (Table 4.2). In the Sixth Assembly the legislature did not conduct extraordinary 
sessions as it did in the Fourth and the Fifth Assembly.  











Plenary ordinary and extraordinary session 
sitting days 
98 98 90 
Committee oversight working days 15 15 15 
Total 113 113 105 
Note: The average number of sitting days for plenary session is calculated from the average of ordinary and 
extraordinary meetings in a determined legislative year. This data was multiplied by two to obtain the average 
number of plenary working days in a year, because the legislature meets twice a year. The data was calculated 
from the planned working days from ordinary and extraordinary meeting schedules. This study did not find data 
for the Fourth Assembly of the first 1996 and 1998 ordinary meetings, second 1997 ordinary meeting, and first 
and second extraordinary meetings. And for the Fifth Assembly, it did not find data of first and fourth extraordinary 
meetings. In the final year of all the three assemblies the second ordinary meetings were not carried out because 
of presidential and legislative electoral campaigns and elections.  
The average number of legislative working days in and outside plenary in the three assemblies 
is 110. This corresponds to 42 percent of working days in a year (260) making laws and 
conducting oversight. By adding 35 working days of constituency service, this is equivalent to 
56 percent of working days in a year. In other words, Mozambique legislators spend 44 percent 
63 Standing Orders: Law no. 1/95 of 8 May, Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April, Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
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(115) of the 260 working days in a year working in other industries rather than the legislature 
or enjoying holidays. 
 
So far we have observed the time devoted for legislative service in days. Turning it to hours, 
the data of parliamentary schedules indicates that plenary ordinary and extraordinary meetings 
take place only in mornings: 8:30 to 13:00.64 But in the last two or three days of the second 
ordinary session of the year (October-December)meetings tend to take the whole day (08:30-
16:30) due to time constraints and number of bills that are left for the last days.  
Professional Staff 
 
Professional staff can be operationalized “as the total number of professional employees, total 
number of professional staff plus support staff, or staff members per legislator” (Rosenthal 
1996). In the one-party era the Mozambique legislature almost did not have own staff. The 
parliamentary secretariat (GOSAP – Group of Organization of Sessions of the Popular 
Assembly) established in 1983 in the Second Assembly (1977-1986) was characterized by a 
very small structure that use to increase in session periods (Assembleia da República 2009). It 
was composed of civil servants from ministries and volunteers. As data on professional staff 
has never been recorded by the legislature systematically, except with what is presented in 
Table 4.3, it becomes difficult to compare professional staff over time in the multiparty era. 
The results from the existing data show that the total number of professional employees in the 
Sixth Assembly is 280; suggesting one legislator is served by approximately one staff (280 staff 
divided by 250 legislators).  
 
Table 4.3: Parliamentary Staff in 2009 and Sixth Assembly (2005-2009) 
 Sixth Assembly 
(2005-2009) 
 Count Percentage 
Committee support staff 26 9% 
Plenary support staff 23 8% 
Other legislative support 
staff 
21 7% 
Other employees 235 77% 
Total  305 (280) 100% 
Note: No data available for the Fourth and Fifth assemblies. 
Table presents data from 2009, with exception to the total in parenthesis, which is the average of staff in 2006 
(243), 2007 (270), 2008 (303) and 2009 (305).  
                                                 




However, this data might be misleading as it includes professional employees who are not 
involved in supporting the legislature directly. By only considering those who are involved in 
providing technical support to legislators (which includes staff supporting committees, plenary 
and other legislative structures such as parliamentary documentation, the HIV/AIDS 
parliamentary unit, the women parliamentary unit and legislative research unit – Gabinete 
Técnico), the 2009 data shows that very few staff support legislative activity directly. Of the 
305 Mozambican legislature staff in 2009 only about one-fourth are involved in supporting the 
legislature directly in committees (9 percent), plenary (8 percent) and other legislative services 
(7 percent). One legislative staff had to serve four legislators.  
 
Moving this analysis to committee level, we observe about the same. There are many standing 
committee members that are not served by committee staff. As the 26 committee staff in the 
final year (2009) of the Sixth Assembly covered eight standing committees, each committee 
was served by three committee staff. As there were 15 members in each committee there were 
120 committee members. The ratio between committee staff and committee members is one-
fifth (26 staff divided by 120 committee members). One committee staff had to serve five 
committee members. In the legislature committee staff serves mainly committee chairs and 
committee rapporteurs who ask them to submit committee meetings and travel reports. 
 
By looking at the educational achievement of all the 305 staff, two have a doctorate degree, 
three masters, 47 honours, 11 bachelor, 136 secondary school, 103 primary and three are 
unknown (Assembleia da República 2009:32). This study did not find comprehensive data of 
how formal education of those staff supporting legislators directly changed over time. But it 
was possible to find out that the two staff with doctorate degrees support standing committees, 
and all committee and plenary support staff either have an honours degree or were about to 
obtain one. In the Fourth Assembly, in contrast there were no staff with university degrees in 
the legislature, with the exception of the secretary-general of the assembly secretariat plus one 
staff. One of the first groups of staff with university degrees was recruited in the Fifth 
Assembly. In 2000 and 2001, respectively, two and six university graduates joined the 






Members’ compensation is a measure of legislative professionalization that is different than the 
previous two. “Session length and staff are institutionally connected indicators; they have direct 
impact on the way the legislature works” (Rosenthal 1996:175). Compensation is an 
individually connected indicator with indirect effect on the legislature itself. Members can have 
high pay but lower performance while high session length and professional supporting staff 
may make a difference in legislative development and performance. Members’ compensation 
is measured by member salary plus allowances/benefits including per diem and subsidies.  
 
In the one-party era legislators did not have a salary. They were part-time legislators working 
eight days a session and the steering committee had law-making power when the legislature 
was in recess. The steering (house-keeping) committee members began receiving salary only 
in the Third Assembly (1987-1994) as a result of the 1986 rules of procedure reform that 
transformed them to work full-time (Assembleia da República 2009). In the multiparty era 
members of the Mozambican legislature receive a monthly salary and allowances or benefits 
which includes constituency service subsidy, plenary and/or committee per diems, honorarium, 
and subsidy associated with their work65 (Assembleia da República 2002). Obtaining this data 
has been difficult.66 However I was able to obtain a significant amount of member’s salary data 
and, based on single year data on members’ allowances plus data on their salary, it was possible 
to calculate valid estimates for member’s allowances across the three assemblies (see Appendix 
to Chapter 4).  
 
The average monthly compensation of the Mozambican legislator in Mozambique’s multiparty 
assemblies is approximately 35,058 Meticais (US$1,298). Comparing assemblies, there is a 
significant incremental change in members’ compensation. It increased 61 percent in the Fifth 
Assembly (MZN 30,648 / US$ 1,135) and 55 percent in the Sixth Assembly (MZN 55,757 / 
US$ 2,065). To make sure that these improvements are not being driven by inflation, I removed 
inflation and recalculated the percentage increase of member’s compensation.67 By taking into 
                                                 
65 In Portuguese, subsídio de representação. 
66 Some legislature staff have been classifying this data as confidential as it is known as “Internal norms for 
execution of the Assembly budget”. 
67Five-year inflation averages calculated from annual inflation rates found 




consideration inflation rates, member’s compensation improved by about one-half in each 
assembly (Table 4.4).  
 






Sixth Assembly  
(2005-2009) 






% of increase - 61% 55% 
% of increase, considering inflation - 48% 47% 
Note: NA means not applicable – there is no previous multiparty assembly. The figures are reported in local 
currency – Meticais (MZN). In parenthesis is the corresponding amount in American Dollar (US$) at the rate of 




The legislative resources can be indicated by the expenditure or budget of the legislature to 
conduct its core business of making laws, overseeing the executive and represent voters. 
Different than compensation, legislative expenditure has a direct effect on the way that 
legislatures work as it is institutionally related. This study used the amount of money that was 
budgeted for each year from where legislature’s averages were calculated due to the difficulty 
in gathering actual expenditure information.   
 
The average legislative budget of multiparty assemblies is 186,224,563 Meticais (US$ 
6,897,206). By removing the members’ compensation from the legislative budget as it 
constitutes more than half of the budget of the legislature more accurate budget figures are 
obtained that may impact directly on legislative performance. The results in Table 4.5 show 
progressive changes over time. Considering consumer prices, legislative expenditure of the 
Mozambican legislature improved by 5 percent in the Fifth Assembly and 21 percent in the 
































% of increase NA 18% 29% 
% of increase, considering 
inflation NA 5% 21% 
Note: NA means not applicable – there is no previous multiparty assembly. The figures are reported in local 
currency – Meticais (MZN). In parenthesis is the corresponding amount in American Dollar (US$) at the rate of 





In the one-party era Mozambique’s legislature was not a professional body. It dedicated eight 
days for plenary session, being substituted by the steering committee in recess period. 
Supporting staff were very limited and comprised of civil servants from the executive and 
volunteers; members did not have salary; and the legislative budget was very limited. However, 
positive changes were made over time to professionalize both the legislature and legislators in 
the multiparty era (see Table 4.6). But legislative professionalization of the legislature is still 
shallow. 
 











Time dedicated for law-making and 
oversight 
NA No change - 
Professional staff NA + + 
Members’ compensation NA + + 
Legislative budget NA + + 
 
In the Fifth and Sixth assemblies the legislature improved the academic achievement of plenary 
and committee staff by recruiting staff with doctorate, masters and honours degrees. The ratio 
of staff that directly supports legislators to legislators is one to four; and the ration of staff that 
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directly supports committee system to committee members is one to five. Committee staff 
support directly committee chairs and committee rapporteurs while the rest of committee 
members are not directly served by committee staff. The increase in staff academic achievement 
may help legislators to better perform their law-making, oversight and representation functions. 
In the Fifth and Sixth assemblies the legislature increased significantly the legislative budget 
and members’ compensation. However, the legislative budget which is an institutionally 
connected indicator of professionalization and may have a direct impact on performance 
increased 5 percent and 21 percent. On the other hand, members’ compensation which is an 
individually connected measure improved 48 percent and 47 percent. Members’ compensation 
may not affect directly legislative performance but it may affect institutionalization. It may 
increase incentive for members to serve; it leads to longer tenure in office. 
These findings confirm that recruiting politicians with political capital and improving rules of 
procedure, structures and working conditions makes legislatures to professionalize. 
Mozambique’s legislature made positive changes in legislative professionalization in the Fifth 
and Sixth Assembly as a result of positive changes in recruiting politicians with political capital 
and reforming internal rules of procedure, structures and working conditions in the same period. 
However, the legislature did not make positive changes in the time dedicated for legislative 
service. In the Fourth Assembly it spent 113 working days in plenary making laws and outside 
it conducting oversight. This number did not change in the Fifth Assembly and it declined in 
the Sixth Assembly. Mozambican legislators devote less time for their service. Of the 260 
existing working days in a year they spend only 145 (56 percent) making laws, conducting 
oversight and contacting constituents in their constituencies.  
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This chapter focuses on the third dimension of legislative institutional development, legislative 
institutionalization, which is the process by which organizations transform to become 
institutions. By institutionalization I mean a process of an organization differentiating from its 
environment – that is, developing autonomy, adhering to norms that constitute an unwritten 
understanding of what conduct is proper or improper (Eulau 1994) and its members 
differentiating from non-members. This involves retaining members within the legislature, 
recruiting leaders from within the legislature with seniority, adopting universal criteria for 
selection of members to internal positions of power, and increasing autonomy from both the 
executive and political party outside the legislature.  
 
As the Mozambique legislature has been recruiting politicians with political capital; reforming 
rules of procedure, internal structures and working conditions; and professionalizing I expect 
transformations of the legislature from simple organization to institution. Essentially better 
educated legislators with higher occupational status and experience working in government, 
legislature and political party are more likely to be appointed into leadership positions of power 
or high-status positions and subsequently participate more in the discussion of bills and 
oversight of executive agencies. Members who see positive changes in their compensation and 
view the service more rewarding are likely to continue serving in the legislature; they are more 
likely to want longer tenure in office and make carrier in the legislature.68 Members who view 
increases in legislative staff adopt rules of procedures leading to autonomy of the legislature 
from the executive.   
 
Legislative institutional development is relevant for legislative performance. Shipan highlights 
that “one reason to study institutional development is the belief that institutions affect member 
behaviour” (Shipan 2005:58). In addition as legislatures develop institutionally they also affect 
                                                 
68 Members of the legislature are more likely to serve for extended periods in the body because the service is 
rewarding. The average member compensation in the three assemblies (1995-2009) is only US$1,298 per month, 




public opinion. Legislatures that develop institutionally well are more likely to receive public 
support and contribute toward democratization and democratic consolidation.  
 
The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization 
 
The study of legislative development commences with Nelson Polsby’s assessment of the 
United States House of Representatives (Polsby 1968). Polsby referred to legislative 
development as legislative institutionalization. Polsby conceptualized an institutionalized or 
developed organization as having three major characteristics. Firstly that the organization is 
relatively well differentiated from its environment - its membership is stable, with turnover 
infrequent and entry relatively difficult. Its leaders are recruited from within the organization 
and have substantial tenure in office.  
 
Second, the organization is relatively complex, that is, “there is growth in the autonomy and 
importance of committees, growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and the general 
increase in provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office 
space, salaries, allowances, staff aid and committee staffs” (Polsby 1968:153). Third, the 
organization operates on a universalistic base (i.e. seniority) rather than particularistic criteria 
and automatic rather than discretionary methods for distribution of positions of power.  
 
As legislative studies have been carried out in legislatures other than the United States House 
of Representatives, Polsby’s theory has slightly modified. Squire suggested the separation of 
‘internal complexity’ from institutionalization as most of its considerations indicate the concept 
of professionalization (Squire 1992). Hibbing defines legislative professionalization “as 
involving changes that deal with the body itself and that can be accomplished by statute or by 
legislative edict. Included would be session length, member compensation, number of staff, 
other perquisites, general legislative resources, and committee structure” (Hibbing 2002). But 
Rosenthal (1996) indicates that legislative structure is part of legislative reform rather than 
professionalization. 
 
What remains as institutionalization from Polsby’s conceptualization are the characteristics of 
organizational differentiation and operational procedure for conducting internal business. 
Legislative institutionalization is indicated by personnel differentiation; adherence to norms - 
64 
 
the degree to which norms exist and members follow norms that differentiate them from non-
members; institutional authority or autonomy to manage its own affairs without substantial 
control or intervention from outside (Rosenthal 1996); and differentiation between party 
machinery inside and outside the legislature (Squire 1992, Hibbing 2002). Similarly Hibbing’s 
measures of institutionalization include norms and standard operational procedures, 
institutional autonomy, leadership positions that require extensive service in the body itself and 
extended careers in the body (Hibbing 2002).  
 
This study assesses legislative institutionalization by employing the original data covering the 
15-year period corresponding to the Fourth (1995-1999), Fifth (2000-2004) and Sixth (2005-
2009) assemblies. The data was collected from three legislators’ directories - Who’s Who in the 
Assembly of the Republic (Assembleia da República and AWEPA 1996, 2001, 2006) and 
supplemented by standing orders and other legal previsions. It also uses the author observations 
and experiences about the legislature. 
 
Comparing Legislative Institutionalization in the Multiparty Era 
 
If the Mozambican legislature institutionalized from the Fourth to the Sixth Assembly one 
should observe increasing levels of retention of members and decreasing turnover, 
parliamentary leaders will increasingly be selected within the legislature and with seniority, and 
the selection to positions of power will tend to be based on universalistic criteria rather than 
discretion. One should also observe increasing legislative autonomy from the executive and the 
party outside the legislature. 
 
Before comparing legislative institutionalization in the multiparty era it is important to provide 
a snapshot of one-party assemblies. In one-party era the legislature created and changed rules 
of procedure that constrained and improved slightly its institutionalization. In the Second 
Assembly (1977-1986) the legislature reduced its autonomy first from the head of state by 
allowing him to be the speaker; and second from the steering committee by allowing it to enact 
bills. In 1986 it slightly increased autonomy from the head of state by stopping him to be the 




However it did not increase autonomy from the executive and the party outside the legislature. 
The staff that assisted legislative sessions comprised those of the executive and volunteers 
(Assembleia da República 2009). There was no difference between the party inside and outside 
the legislature.69 In the Third Assembly (1987-1994) the legislature adopted the 1990 





Seniority is indicated by membership retention –that is, the number or proportion of members 
that kept their seat from the previous assembly at the beginning of a term (Rosenthal 1996, 
Squire 1988). Seniority is indicated by retention in relation to turnover – the number or 
proportion of new members at the beginning of a term. 
 
As members of the one-party assemblies were part-time legislators with no salary, working 
eight days per session and created rules of the democratic for their successors, they did not 
handover to their successors in the multiparty era. They did not have legislative experience of 
the multiparty assemblies. In the founding democratic assembly – that is, the Fourth Assembly, 
all the legislators were new to the new (democratic) procedures of political competition, rule of 
law and vertical and horizontal accountability. They were also new to the new responsibilities 
of oversight, representation and constituency service. The previous one-party assemblies only 
exerted law-making responsibility. 
 
To learn how the legislature functions, with support from international donors community 
(SUNY/USAID, AWEPA, UNPD, SIDA, DANIDA, Westminster Foundation, DFID), 
Mozambican legislators receive training concerning their primary responsibilities in the first 
few days of each term. Sometimes the training is directed at specialized committees during a 
session. For instance, members of the Committee of Planning and Budget will receive training 
on fiscal policy and budget. In addition, the relations that the legislature develops with other 
                                                 
69As in one-party era the legislature assembled only for eight days in each session with no salary, the tenure of its 
members in office might have been very low; and leaders might not have been those who were recruited within 
the organization with substantive tenure. As members’ political capital and tenure was very low, the selection of 
member to leadership positions of power might be based on particularistic and discretionary criteria rather than 
automatic and universal. 
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legislatures and legislative associations from stable and emerging democracies allow members 
of parliament (MPs) to improve their understanding of the obligations of the legislative 
institution. Although this training make some difference in the knowledge and abilities of 
Mozambican MPs, they would be much more effective if attending members already had at 
least some legislative experience. 
The Who’s Who data entailing the full population of multiparty assemblies in Table 5.1 shows 
that in the Fifth Assembly the legislature retained 42 percent of members from the Fourth 
Assembly. This level declined in the following assembly: In the Sixth Assembly the legislature 
retained only 20 percent of members from the Fifth Assembly. Approximately eight in every 
ten (80 percent) members from the Sixth Assembly at least did not serve in the Fifth Assembly. 
However, 42 percent of members who have served in the Fourth Assembly returned to the 
legislature in the Sixth Assembly after not serving one term in the Fifth Assembly. By observing 
in this perspective, one view that seniority increased greatly in the Sixth Assembly. 
Cumulatively membership retention increased to 62 percent in the Sixth Assembly. 










From previous (Fourth/Fifth) assembly 
Retention NA 42% 20% 
Turnover NA 58% 80% 
From the Fourth Assembly* 
Retention NA NA 42% 
Turnover NA NA 58% 
Cumulative NA NA 62% 
Note: NA means the question was not applicable to that assembly. 
*Question applied in the Sixth Assembly only. The question asked whether he or she was MP in the Fourth
Assembly.
In the Mozambique’s context, the high turnover is affected by the role played by political parties 
which are the gatekeeper of the process of recruitment to the legislature. In a closed-list PR 
electoral system, like Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia, a politician does not enlist him 
or herself to become MP; he or she needs to be enlisted by the political party or party boss. 
Members have not been pleasing enough their party boss to be re-enlisted in good position for 




Selection of Leaders within the Legislature with Seniority 
 
To what extent have legislative leaders been selected within the legislature with seniority? I 
propose that leaders are more likely to be selected within the legislature with seniority. This is 
because the service is more rewarding for them than rank-and-file members. Rank-and-file 
legislators receive salary, per diem for their attendance at plenary sessions and constituency 
service subsidy while committee members receive additional per diem for committee sessions. 
Leaders such as the speaker, deputy-speakers, committee chairs, rapporteurs and steering 
committee members receive further benefits including fuel, a vehicle for official use, office 
space and subsidy associated to the position (subsídio de representação). But also members’ 
compensation had been increasing over time. As the service is relatively rewarding for 
legislators in leadership positions, leaders adopt long-term perspectives and create and maintain 
organizational schemes to meet their career need by being reappointed to leadership positions 
of power.  
 
The Who’s Who data in Table 5.2 show a relative growth in selecting leaders within the 
legislature with seniority. All leaders here meaning speaker and committee chairs70 in the 
Fourth Assembly had no prior democratic legislative experience but the leaders from the Fifth 
and the Sixth Assembly were selected within the legislature with seniority. In fact, their 
‘apprenticeship period’ lengthened. Of the nine leaders in the Fifth Assembly five (56 percent) 
served five years in the Fourth Assembly as speaker or committee chair prior to selection to 
these positions, while four (44 percent) had never before served in the legislature. 
 
In addition, of the nine leaders in the Sixth Assembly, five (56 percent) served ten years in the 
legislature as speaker or committee chair before their selection to these positions and three (33 
percent) served five years in the legislature before their selection.71 Only one leader (11 
percent), the committee chair, had never served in the legislature before his first selection. In 
sum, the average years served in the legislature before selection as speaker or committee chair 
increased from 3 years in the Fifth Assembly to 7 years in the Sixth. These findings suggest 
evidence of a seniority system in the selection of members to leadership positions. The seniority 
                                                 
70 For the purpose of this variable, the positions of deputy speaker, steering committee member, caucus leader, and 
deputy caucus leader are excluded because the work of the top two leadership positions, speaker and committee 
chairs, are more tangible. 
71 Leopoldo Ernesto was selected committee chair for the first time in the Fourth Assembly and then for a second 
time in the Sixth. In the Fifth Assembly he served as deputy speaker.  
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system is not, however, independent of election results as the parties with more seats select 
more members to leadership positions on basis of PR system. Overall the major party, Frelimo, 
appointed nine members to leadership positions while the major opposition, Renamo, appointed 
four during the period of 1995 to 2009.  
 
Table 5.2: Years Served in the Legislature Prior to Selection as Speaker or Committee 










Speaker    
    Eduardo Joaquim Mulembwe NA 5 10 
Committee chair    
   Virgínia Videira NA 5 10 
   Ossumane Aly Dauto NA 5 10 
   Alfredo Gamito - 0 5 
   Aurélio Zilhão - 0 - 
   Domingos Pilale - 0 - 
   Jerónimo Malagueta Naila NA 5 10 
   Dionísio Ferreira Quelhas - 0 - 
   Eduardo Nihia NA 5 - 
   Alexandre Meque Vicente - - 0 
   Lutero Simango - DNS 5 
   Leopoldo Ernesto NA DNS 10 
   Açucena Duarte - DNS 5 
Total Average years NA 3 7 
Note: Dash means he or she did not serve as Member of Parliament in that assembly. 
DNS means he or she served as Member of Parliament but not as committee chair. 
NA means that he or she served as committee chair in the founding democratic assembly. 
 
The Criteria for Selection to Positions of Power 
 
Legislatures institutionalize when they employ seniority as the universalistic criteria for 
selection to positions of power (Polsby 1968). While seniority matters for institutionalization72 
                                                 
72 By applying Polsby’s general theory of legislative institutionalization at the state legislative level of the 
California Assembly, Squire found that the universalistic criteria, indicated by seniority, does not apply at the 
California legislative level for distribution of positions of power because members of the California Assembly 
have different career ambitions than those from the United States House of Representatives (Squire 1992). Squire 
explains this difference by the place the house and state legislatures occupy in the hierarchy of the political system. 
As the house is located at the top of political hierarchy with limited upward mobility and the house service is 
rewarding, house members adopt long-term perspectives and create and maintain organizational schemes to meet 
their career need. But members of state legislatures adopt a short-term perspective because they have more 
opportunities and ambitions to run for higher office. The fact that state legislatures are located at the intermediate 
level in the hierarchy of the political system gives their members more chances for upward mobility. 
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I propose the concept of political capital which is broader as it taps both seniority and other 
relevant aspects. I propose that legislatures institutionalize when they select their members to 
positions of power on the base of members’ political capital which includes members’ 
educational achievement, occupational status, experience of working in government, legislature 
(seniority) and political party. I test and examine the simultaneous effects of these 
considerations on positions of power employing multi-linear regression model. But first I 
analyse the allocation of members to positions of power in the legislature and bivariate 
correlations between positions of power and political capital.73 
 
Positions of Power  
 
The Mozambican legislature is featured by the following positions of power: speaker, deputy-
speaker, caucus leader, deputy-caucus leader, steering committee member, caucus rapporteur, 
committee chair, committee rapporteur, and simple committee member. Almost half of the 
legislature is comprised of rank-and-file members (deputado simples) with their work limited 
to the attendance of plenary sessions. 
 








 Count % Count % Count % 
Speaker 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 
Deputy-speaker 3 1% 2 1% 2 1% 
Caucus leader 3 1% 2 1% 2 1% 
Deputy-caucus leader 1 0% 2 1% 2 1% 
Steering committee member 13 5% 10 4% 10 4% 
Caucus rapporteur 0 0% 2 1% 2 1% 
Committee chair 7 3% 8 3% 8 3% 
Committee rapporteur 7 3% 7 3% 8 3% 
Committee member 92 37% 98 39% 103 41% 
Rank and file member 123 49% 117 47% 112 45% 
Missing 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 
Total population 250 250 250 
Note: In the Mozambican legislature Members of Parliament may occupy more than one parliamentary position. 
Some are both committee chair and standing committee member. The speaker is both speaker and steering 
committee chair and member. The parliamentary position variable is indicated by the highest parliamentary 
position performed by a legislator therefore some categories will not have the expected count or percentage. For 
instance, considering there are 8 standing committees each entailing 15 members in the Sixth Assembly we should 
not expect to observe 120 committee members in this table. 
                                                 




Rank-and-file positions do not vary significantly across the three assemblies but slight 
reductions were observed from the Fourth (49 percent) to the Fifth (47 percent) and the Sixth 
(45 percent) assemblies. The reason for the reduction, especially in the Fifth Assembly, is the 
establishment of an additional standing committee, the Committee of Petitions, in 2000 to deal 
with public claims, complaints, and petitions.74 Thus in the Fifth Assembly, fifteen additional 
rank-and-file members found upward mobility by serving as a standing committee member.  
 
At the intermediate level of parliamentary positions, one finds those legislators who are 
standing committee members (39 percent). This group is mainly responsible for in-depth 
reviews and scrutiny of parliamentary bills which the speaker refers to the committees. Standing 
committee members are led by committee chairs (3 percent) with support of committee 
rapporteurs (3 percent). They are also responsible for amending bills as well as recommending 
that proponents of bills improve them before consideration to the plenary meaning that in 
essence they can ‘kill’ a bill should they find its provisions in some way unsatisfactory.  
 
At the top of the parliamentary positions is the speaker, who is supported by deputy-speakers 
(1 percent). Below them follow caucus leaders (1percent) and their deputies (1 percent), 
steering committee members (4 percent) and caucus rapporteurs (1 percent). The speaker chairs 
the plenary sessions and the steering committee which is responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the legislature. The caucuses entail political parties or coalition of parties sitting 
in the legislature according to PR electoral system. 
 
Does Political Capital Matter? 
 
Bivariate correlations show associations between political capital indicators and the positions 
of power (see the first column of coefficients in Table 5.4). Better-educated members; those 
who had worked professionally in their party headquarter; members with managerial, 
professional or white-collar occupational status; and to some extent those who had served in 
government as minister or deputy-minister tend to be selected to leadership positions of power 
more than others. Former manual workers and members who had worked in party district office 
are less likely to be selected to leadership positions of power. The results also show positive 
                                                 
74 See Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April. 
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associations between had served in the legislature (seniority) and leadership positions of power. 
Members who had served in the legislature tend more often to hold leadership positions of 
power than new members.  
 
Table 5.4: Political Capital Model for Selection to Leadership Positions of Power in the 
Multiparty Era, 1995-2009 
 All the three assemblies 
Bivariate 
correlations Model 1 Model 2 
Formal education .367** .299*** .310*** 
Occupational status    
    Professional, managerial or white collar 175** .032  
    Manual workers -.136** -.030  
Government experience    
    Minister or deputy-minister .084* .009  
   Governor or provincial MP .040 .046  
   Mayor, district administrator or local councillor .014 .027  




Legislative experience    
    Served in previous assembly .193** .111** .108** 
   Returned after not serving  .189** .102** .108** 
Party experience    
    Headquarter .207** .080* .077* 
   Regional office -.031 -.011  
   District office -.130** -.076* -.075* 
   Community office .064 .045  
Adjusted R Square  .185 .176 
Total population 750 
Note: Entries in Models 1 and 2 are standardized Ordinary Least Square regression beta coefficients and in 
bivariate correlations are Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
Model 1 incorporates all predictor variables. Model 2 incorporates only those effects that were found significant 
in Model 1. 
***Significant at the level of .001; ** Significant at the level of .01; * Significant at the level of .05 
 
Although some political capital considerations appear to be associated with the leadership 
positions of power it is not clear whether the bivariate associations are spurious. Multivariate 
technique allows one to consider many factors together while holding others constant. By 
holding up all considerations against one another, the multivariate results in column two of 
Table 5.4 show that the selection to leadership positions of power is driven primarily by 
legislators’ formal education, secondly their experiences of working in the legislature and in 
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party headquarter and party district office. But the effect of experience of working in party 
district office is negative. Legislators with high educational achievement, had experiences of 
working in the legislature and in party headquarter are more likely to be selected to leadership 
positions of power. Those with experience of working in party district office are less likely to 
do so. 
 
While Model 1, which includes all explanatory variables considered in this study, contributes 
to roughly 19 percent of the explained variance for the selection to positions of power, Model 
2 omits considerations that are statistically insignificant thus producing a more accurate 
explanatory variance (i.e., adjusted R square) and a more parsimonious model (Kerr, Hall and 
Kozub2002). Model 2 explains about 18 percent of variance for the selection to leadership 
positions.  
 
Autonomy from the Executive 
 
The development of managerial autonomy is one of the most important indicators of 
institutionalization (Huntington 1968, Squire 1992, Rosenthal 1996, Hibbing 2002). 
Institutional autonomy can be measured by the organization ability “to manage its own affairs 
without substantial control or intervention from outside” (Rosenthal 1996:190). The standing 
orders and other legal provisions show that in the Fourth Assembly the legislature did not have 
autonomy do create the structure of its secretariat. In fact, the organizational structure of the 
legislature secretariat was adopted in 1998 by the executive ministries, namely: Ministry of 
State Administration, Ministry of Plan and Finance, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of 
Labour75 rather than by the legislature.  
 
By the end of the Fifth Assembly the legislature gained autonomy to approve its own 
organizational structure.76 In the same assembly the legislature also gained autonomy to 
approve its own budget but its budget amount is still negotiated with the Ministry of Finance. 
This suggests that the legislature may only increase its staff if the executive accept to provide 
it with more funds. No major change is observed in the Sixth Assembly. 
 
                                                 
75 See Diploma Ministerial no. 59/98 of 13 May. 
76 Strategic plan of Assemby of the Republic, PEAR. 
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Autonomy from Political Party outside the Legislature 
Besides institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the executive, the autonomy of the legislative party 
from the party outside the legislature is another most important indicator of legislative 
institutionalization. Legislative party autonomy may be measured by the distinction between 
party machinery inside and outside legislature (Squire 1992, Hibbing 2002) and the control of 
nominations by an external party organization (Jewell 1973).  
Legislatures institutionalize when parties within the legislature and outside the legislature are 
different. Own observations and experience about the legislature suggests that in the 
Mozambican political system there is no such difference: Parties within and outside the 
legislature are about the same. This means that when the legislative party want to decide on a 
bill in committee they have to consult first their party bosses outside the legislature. Legislators 
are tied to a strong party discipline and driven by their party outside the legislature. They do 
not have so much space of manoeuvre to escape from the strong control from the external 
parties, in part, due to the PR electoral system and centralization of the party around their 
individual leaders.  
The aftermath of breaking the strong control from the external parties or not to please their party 
leaders is enormous. First, legislators can either be punished by being removed from the PR 
party list in the following legislative election or be ranked low on it thus reducing their chances 
for re-election. An example of this is the discontinuity of Renamo (or Renamo-Electoral Union) 
members like Maximo Dias who often did not cope with party discipline in the legislature. 
Second, Members of Parliament can be dropped off from their caucus. As a result of 
unpleasantness with the party leader, Raúl Domingos, a Renamo senior member, and other 
Renamo members were dropped off from the Renamo parliamentary bench and subsequently 
lost the opportunity to air their views in plenary sessions.77 As the speaker allocates speaking 
time to caucuses based on the PR electoral system, those who were dropped were not given the 
floor to speak as they became ‘unidentified’ to a caucus.  
Legislatures also institutionalize when the external party cannot control nominations made by 
the legislative party. In the Mozambique political system the external parties have control over 
77 The same happened recently in the current Seventh Assembly (2010-2014) with Ismail Mussá, a MDM 
(Mozambique Democratic Movement) senior member. 
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legislative party nominations. One of the evidences of this comes from the Committee of 
Planning and Budget in the Fifth Assembly when it nominated a small group of its members 
for a working visit to the Portuguese Assembly. After the committee decided the composition 
of the group one member from the major party had been dropped off from the group and 
replaced by his party colleague within the committee. The affected MP told me sadly that his 
party colleague had lobbied with the external party at the Central Committee so that the change 
would take place.  
 
The control of nominations by external parties is strong in the Mozambique system partly 
because of the PR electoral system. In the PR system legislators are more dependent on their 
party organization that “determines the order of names on the list and not all of those on the list 




The analysis shows that the Mozambican legislature has become more institutionalized in three 
out of the five measures employed. In two measures, the Assembly is not moving toward greater 
institutionalization. First, membership tends to be unstable and turnover is frequent. But after 
serving one term in the Fourth Assembly some members returned in the Sixth Assembly 
increasing greatly seniority. Second, there is no difference between the party machinery within 
the legislature and the party machinery outside the legislature; they are the same. This reflects 
the strong control of party leaders of what is going on within the legislature as a result of the 
PR electoral system which narrows the relationship between legislators and their party leaders.  
 
However, in the other three measures, the legislature appears to be moving towards greater 
institutionalization. First, leaders tend to be selected from within the organization and have 
greater tenure in office than those who are not. Second, particularistic and discretionary criteria 
tend not to be followed for selection to positions of power. In fact, the criterion for selection to 
positions of power in the legislature is driven by legislator’s political capital. Rather than 
selecting members for leadership positions of power based on favouritism or nepotism, the 
legislature selects those members whose level of formal education is high, who had served in 
the legislature at least one term and worked professionally in their party headquarter. Third, the 
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legislature improved autonomy from the executive by approving its own organizational 
structure in the Fifth Assembly.  
 
Institutionalization improvement of the Mozambican legislature has been driven by internal 
pressure from members with improved political capital and of strengthening rules of procedure 
and increasing capacity. The recruitment of leaders with substantial tenure in office and to some 
extent institutional autonomy commenced increasing in the Fifth Assembly when the legislature 
began recruiting more legislators with political capital and strengthened rules of procedure and 
increased capacity. None of the institutionalization measures showed that a minimal level of 
institutionalization existed in the Fourth Assembly. This suggests that the external pressures of 
transition to democracy do not immediately foster assemblies to institutionalize. 
















































This chapter focuses on legislative performance in law-making. Legislative performance or 
accomplishment in law-making can be specified in terms of legislative output– the number of 
bills introduced and enacted into law but also the source of the bill, whether the bill is originated 
within the legislature (e.g. committee, caucus or private member bill) or outside the legislature 
(e.g. executive or presidency bill). According to this criterion legislatures that perform 
relatively well are those that enact a high number of bills into law and initiate a substantial 
number of those bills.  
 
Legislative accomplishment in law-making may be also specified in terms of legislative process 
– the process by which a bill undergoes from its entrance and registration in the legislature until 
its approval or rejection. I assume that a legislature must participate in law-making by not only 
ratifying proposals but also examining, modifying, rejecting, offering alternatives and filling in 
the gaps left by an administration’s programme (Rosenthal 1974:11). I analyse law-making 
process by paying attention to the committee structure. This because the in-depth law-making 
function is exerted by committees where the individual clauses of bills are reviewed and 
reported rather than by the plenary which mainly accepts committee recommendations (see also 
Rosenthal 2009:414-15). 
 
The Mozambican legislature adopted a committee structure to perform the law-making 
function. It established six standing committees for the entire legislature with law-making 
responsibility. This refers to those standing committee that review bills to be enacted into laws. 
This includes the Committee of (1) Planning and Budget; (2) Public Order and Defence; (3) 
Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality; (4) Social Affairs, Gender and Environment; (5) 
Economic Activities and Services; and (6) Agriculture, Regional Development, Public 
Administration and Local Government. It also created ad hoc committees for law-making for 
short periods within assemblies: Ad hoc Committee for Review of Electoral Legislation; Ad hoc 
Committee for Review of Standing Orders and Statute of Legislator; Ad hoc Committee for 




This study assesses legislative accomplishment in law-making from five dimensions: First, the 
referral of legislation - that is, the extent to which committees receive bills from their parent 
chambers. Second, the screening of legislation and whether committees actually are decisive in 
the fate of bills they favour and ones they oppose. Third, is the shaping of legislation by means 
of committee amendments and substitutes. Fourth, is the passage of legislation - the extent to 
which committee-sponsored bills survive intact on the floor (Rosenthal 1997:18-19). 
 
I propose that the Mozambican legislature will show improvement in law-making. This is 
because the legislature relatively increased legislators with political capital over time but also 
it reformed and modernized rules of procedure, working conditions and structures; and has 
become more professionalized; and institutionalized. Rosenthal (1974) showed that legislative 
law-making performance is derived from legislative institutional development and legislator’s 
characteristics.  
 
I assess legislative performance in law-making in the multiparty era employing a bill-tracker of 
original data over the 15-year period (1995-2009) corresponding to the first three multiparty 
assemblies.78 A 5-year period of data was collected by the author from many official 
parliamentary documents and government gazettes as part of the ALP (African Legislatures 
Project) bill-tracker of Mozambique, 2003-2007. For the purpose of this study the author added 
an additional 10-year period of data collection for years 1995-2002 and 2008-2009.  
 
Comparing Law-making in the Multiparty Era 
 
Before focusing on law-making in the multiparty era it is important to provide a snapshot of 
one-party assemblies. In the one-party era the Mozambique legislature mainly rubber-stamped 
bills. It functioned for about 16 days a year and the steering (house-keeping) committee had 
power to pass bills when the plenary was out of session. In the Third Assembly (1987-1994) 
the legislature changed rules by stopping the steering committee from passing bills as well as 
increased the number of working days.79 Bills were referred to committees but committee 
                                                 
78 The bill-tracker is a dataset that tracks bills from the period they were submitted to legislative assemblies either 
by the presidency, executive or legislature to their referral to committees, amendment, voting, rejection/approval 
and publication in government gazette. 
79 Parliamentary records state that this number of working days increased from the Third Assembly (1987-1994) 
but it does not specifies those number of days (Assembleia da República 2009). 
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system only worked under those 16 plenary working days and they were passed consensually. 
Difference of opinions was not a common characteristic of Frelimo during the one-party era.80 
 
The Referral of Legislation 
 
Referral of legislation is the first dimension of legislative performance in law-making. It 
“involves the extent to which committees receive legislation” (Rosenthal 1974). A committee 
system can only perform relatively well if a substantial number of bills or a number of 
substantial bills are referred to that system.   
 
In the Mozambique every bill that can be enacted into law by the legislature is referred to a 
standing committee to be reviewed and scrutinized before it goes to the plenary for adoption or 
rejection.81 However, bills of ‘legislative authorization’ - those that enable the executive to pass 
law by decree82 are not referred to, and reviewed by, committees. Their review and examination 
in detail is made in plenary and their initiation is solely a prerogative of the executive.83 The 
executive initiates this type of bill to obtain full legislative power so that he can legislate without 
direct control of the legislature. Mozambican legislators, practitioners and even scholars are 
convinced that legislative authorization is necessary when the issue to be enacted into law is 
too complex and the executive is the one that has more technical and detailed information. But 
this may constitute a danger for the legislative function of representation as well as law-making 
considering that the executive law-making process does not follow the rules of openness and 
transparency as of the legislature. Also its existence may reduce the law-making power of the 
legislature. 
 
In the three multiparty assemblies the legislature referred 93 percent of the 308 bills introduced 
to the committee system. Seven percent of bills that were not referred to the committee system 
correspond to bills of legislative authorization and those reviewed in the first year of the 
multiparty assembly – Fourth Assembly (1995-1999). In the first year of the Fourth Assembly 
the new legislators had to learn about their responsibilities and democratic legislative process. 
                                                 
80 Being critical within the party would be seen as counter government.  
81 Standing Orders. Law no. 1/95 of 8 May; Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April; and Law no. 17/2005 of 18 July. 
82 Bills enacted by the executive are called decree-laws. Decree-laws have the same power as laws. In Mozambique 
the legislative acts are the laws and decree-laws. 
83 Standing Order, Law no. 17/2005 of 18 July. 
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Thus bills of 1995 were mainly referred to a small working group of legislators as a substitute 
of standing committees. Although the committee system was established in the first year of the 
founding multiparty assembly and the selection of committee members also took place in the 
same year, in practice the referral of bills to committees commenced in 1996 after the legislature 
had received training in the context of multiparty democracy. Committee members also had to 
receive training about legislative process of multiparty politics. 
The bill tracker data in Table 6.1 show an increase of bills referred to committee system from 
the Fourth (87 percent) to the Fifth Assembly (100 percent) but a decrease in the Sixth 
Assembly (92 percent). The decrease reflects the change in rules of procedure in 2005/2007 
allowing the executive to enact bills in the form of decree without referral to committee 
system.84 







# % # % # % 
Referral of legislation 
  Yes 87 87% 89 100% 109 92% 
  No 13 13% 0 0% 10 8% 
Screening of legislation 
  Yes 56 56% 60 67% 88 74% 
  No 31 31% 10 11% 0 0% 
NA 13 13% 19 21% 31 26% 
Shaping of legislation 
  Yes 51 51% 49 55% 81 68% 
  No 36 36% 21 24% 7 6% 
  NA 13 13% 19 21% 31 26% 
Passage of legislation 
Plenary shaping of legislation 
        No 54 54% 43 48% 81 68% 
        NA 46 46% 46 52% 38 32% 
Total 100 89 119 
Note: NA means Not Applicable. A second measure of passage of legislation is enactment of bills that were referred 
to committees. Its results are in Appendix to Chapter 6 (Also see Table 6.2). 
84 The Law no. 6/2005 of 13 December approves ‘legislative authorization bill’ which precipitated its incorporation 
in the Standing Order in 2007, Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
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The Screening of Legislation 
 
The second step in assessing legislative performance in law-making is the screening of 
legislation. That is, if bills are referred, to what extent do the committees make favourable or 
unfavourable recommendations to the plenary? The literature prescribes that “when committees 
choose to support most of the bills referred to them, they are not really making judgements of 
their own. Instead they are abdicating major responsibility for decision to individual sponsors, 
legislative leaders, party caucuses or to the chamber’s membership as a whole (Rosenthal 
1974:24). An appropriate operating rule for assessment is: a committee system performs 
relatively well if a significant proportion of bills referred to it are not given favourable action. 
 
The general practice of the Mozambican legislature is that committees do not report on all of 
the bills that are referred to them. Only favourable bills are reported to the plenary. Bills that 
are not reported are only known by standing committees in the steering (housekeeping) 
committee meetings. Of the 308 bills of the three assemblies 66 percent were reported 
favourably for adoption in the plenary. This suggests that the Mozambican’s committee system 
is very permissive. This is because, in part, of the PR electoral system which influences 
committee members to abdicate their major responsibility for decision to their party caucuses 
and party bosses. Due to strong party discipline Mozambican committee members do not vote 
freely and individually but according to their party caucuses. Often they delay making a position 
about bills because they must hear the opinion of their party caucuses and even the party leader 
outside of the legislature.  
 
Bills that were not reported (13 percent) tend to be those initiated by either the opposition, 
which rarely find support from the majority party, or by the executive. As Manning observed, 
“Renamo has not succeeded in pushing through much substantive legislation” (Manning 
2002:73). For instance, its initiative to create an inquest committee to investigate the 1999 
“election results was voted down by Frelimo’s majority” (Manning 2002:78). The opposition 
bills tend being killed by the legislature as they do not find support from the major party. On 
the other hand, the executive bills tend to be postponed to the following session and even year 
as sometimes committees demand submission of a new draft of the bill when they find them to 
be unsatisfactory. An evidence of this, for instance, can be seen from a letter below addressed 
to the speaker from the executive after committees demanded the executive to make profound 
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changes on a Bill of Natural Calamities. The letter has as subject: “Information on probable 
date for submission of the reviewed text of the bill of calamities”. The document says as 
follows: 
 
“In sequence of the working meetings between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in representation 
of the sponsor, and assembly committees, the executive decided to review the bill on calamities, 
submitted to the Assembly of the Republic through the document No 46/PM/2001, of 4th 
December 2001. 
 
In this context, I hereby inform to Your Excellency that a new bill version will be presented as 
soon as possible, in substitution of the previous.  
 
Best Wishes.  
 
[Signed by the Acting Prime-Minister, Dr Leonardo Simão]”85 
 
But there are also cases where bills initiated by the legislature were not reported or screened 
because committees were waiting for deliverables of specialized reports from consultants 
outside parliament that were still in the process of recruitment. Most of the absence of 
committee screen of legislation in the Fourth Assembly (31 percent) is due to this delay of 
external consultants’ specialized reports.86 This lack of screening of legislation in the 
Mozambican committee system should be more understood as postponing rather than killing of 
legislation. 
 
Among bills that were not reported there are those that committees had no power over their 
fate. These bills fall, in Table 6.1, under the ‘Not Applicable’ category (21 percent). In the Sixth 
Assembly (26 percent) they are bills of legislative authorization; they are not referred to, and 
reviewed by, committees. But in the Fourth Assembly they are ordinary bills from the first year 
of this assembly - the period that the committee system was not operating although it was 
established. In the Fifth Assembly (21 percent) they are mainly bills that were not discussed in 
the legislative body. They entered to the legislature but the proponents removed them from the 
legislature or for some other reasons were not enrolled in the agenda. 
                                                 
85 AR-V/Infor./346/26 March 2002. 




Table 6.2: Screening of Legislation in the Multiparty Era, 1995-2009 






# % # % # % 
Screening of legislation      
  Yes 56 64% 60 86% 88 100% 
  No 31 36% 10 14% 0 0% 
Total number of bills 87 70 88 
Note: This table removes those bills that committees did not have power over their fate because were not referred 
to, and the scrutinized by,committees. 
 
Among those bills that committees had power over their fate, the legislature committee system 
was less permissive in the Fourth Assembly (64 percent) than in the Fifth (86 percent) and the 
Sixth Assembly (100 percent).87 In the Fourth Assembly the committee system was more 
unfavourable (36 percent) that in the Fifth (14 percent) and the Sixth Assembly (0 percent) 
(Table 6.2). The Fourth Assembly postponed and even killed more bills than other assemblies 
that I compare. 
 
The Shaping of Legislation 
 
The third step examining legislative performance in law-making “involves the extent to which 
committees shape the nature of legislation” (Rosenthal 1974:24). Besides considering 
committee’s advancement of bills they may also modify them. They may not be satisfied simply 
to recommend the adoption of the bill in the plenary but can also make their own action. In this 
way a committee system performs relatively well if it makes more changes in proportion to the 
bills it proposes for passage on the floor. 
 
In the Mozambican legislature committees makes modifications of the bills that are referred to 
them in Relatório de Análise, Debate e Votação na Especialidade, which is a report that 
contains, among other things, different positions and contributions from different actors in 
society, committee modifications and amendments of individual clauses of the bill and the 
                                                 
87 In the United States “the overwhelming majority of bills introduced in Congress die in committees” 
(Rosenthal 1974:20). At state level Maryland’s committee system is the most permissive (58 percent) while 
Connecticut is the least permissive (27 percent). Mississippi (48 percent), Florida (47 percent) and New Jersey 
(45 percent) fall in between (Rosenthal 1974:23-24). 
84 
 
opinion of the committee.88 This report focuses on specific clauses of individual bills. An 
exception applies, however, to the Fourth Assembly where there was no such committee report. 
Instead there was only a committee opinion report which focused on general bill principles.89 
The Mozambican committee system can amend bills that are referred to them but they do not 
tend to rewrite them. Mozambican committees allow the sponsor of the bill to rewrite it based 
on contributions from the working meeting between either the sponsor and committee or civil 
society and committee. The document presented above from the executive to the speaker is an 
example of that. However, the bill tends to be rescheduled for the following session or year 
rather than being presented on the floor in the same session.  
 
This study considers shaping of legislation as substantive amendments or modifications rather 
than typographical or grammatical amendments.90 Of the 245 bills that were referred to 
committee system 74 percent were modified or amended by committees. By comparing 
assemblies we observe a significant increase in the extent of shaping legislation. The bill tracker 
data in Table 6.3 shows that the committee system increased greatly modifying legislation in 
the Fifth (70 percent) and the Sixth Assembly (92 percent).  
 
Table 6.3: Shaping of Legislative in the Multiparty Era, 1995-2009 






# % # % # % 
Shaping of legislation      
  Yes  51 59% 49 70% 81 92% 
  No  36 41% 21 30% 7 8% 
Total number of bills 87 70 88 
Note: This table removes those bills that committees did not have power over their fate because were not referred 
to, and the scrutinized by,committees. 
 
The Passage of Legislation 
 
The fourth step in analysing committee performance in the law-making process “involves the 
extent to which committees affect passage of legislation. Committees must not only make 
                                                 
88 Standing Orders: Clause 90 of Law no. 6/200, of 30 April; Clause 105 of Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
89 Standing Orders, Clause 74 of Law no. 1/95 of 8 May. 
90 To verify whether the amendment is substantive rather than typographical or grammatical I read the 245 
committee reports corresponding to the 245 bills referred to committees and then I compared the original bill 
referred to committee with the respective committee report – the one that incorporates amendments. 
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choices, they must also persuade their parent chambers to adopt the choices they have made” 
(Rosenthal 1974:28). Effective committee performance is the ability of the committee to affect 
the passage of legislation on the floor. In this perspective, a committee system performs 
relatively well if a number of its bills are not prevented from being considered or if its bills are 
not frequently rejected or amended on the floor. 
 
In the Mozambican legislature committee and plenary choices are essentially the same. Before 
they make a decision on a bill, committee members always consult their party caucuses. The 
same applies to plenary members. Thus, the position of committee members on a bill will be 
the same as of plenary members. Both the committee and plenary legislators make decisions on 
the basis of their party discipline. This reflects the PR system that narrow ties between 
legislators and their party caucuses and leaders. In the major party Frelimo all its legislators 
vote accordingly to party discipline but in the main opposition Renamo-Electoral Union some 
legislators like Máximo Dias had been showing opposite behaviour to this party discipline. 
Being a coalition with other small parties Renamo becomes more fragmented than Frelimo. 
 
By assessing floor substantive amendments the results show that the floor accepts committees’ 
modification of legislation in all of the three assemblies. There is ‘no’ ‘plenary shaping of 
[committee] legislation’. The floor makes no substantive amendments at all on committee 
amendments (Table 6.1). However, if floor amendments are made they tend to be more 
typographical or grammatical rather than substantive. The results of typographical or 
grammatical amendments made in the legislative process to the final bill in the legislature show 
improvements in the Fifth and the Sixth Assembly (Appendix to Chapter 6).   
 
By comparing bills passed with bills referred to committee, there is a decline and an increase. 
In the Fourth Assembly the legislature passed 62 percent of the 87 bills referred to committee 
system. In the Fifth Assembly the legislature declined in bills passed to 48 percent of the 89 
bills referred to committees and in the Sixth Assembly it increased by enacting 74 percent of 




Classifying the Committee System 
On the basis of the dimensions of legislative performance in law-making, I have classified the 
Mozambican committee system. How does the Mozambican committee system perform making 
laws? Table 6.4 shows committees by their performance in law-making dimensions. Of the 
eight existing standing committees over the three assemblies, six perform a law-making 
function. The Committee of Petition and Committee of International Relations may perform 
other functions than law-making in the legislature, as no bill has ever been referred to them to 
be screened, modified or enacted into law. The results identify three groups of committees: 
better, average and poorer performing committees.   
The better-performing committees considered a significantly higher volume of legislation 
compared with average or poorer-performing committees. They also screened and shaped a 
significantly higher volume of legislation and their bills were more likely to be enacted into 
laws on the floor. Their levels of referral, screening, shaping and enactment of bills vary 
between 20 percent and 32 percent. These include the Committee of Planning and Budget and 
the Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality.  
The average-performing committees include the Committee of Agriculture, Regional 
Development, Public Administration and Local Government, Committee of Social Affairs, 
Gender and Environment and Ad hoc Committee for Review of Electoral Legislation. Their 
levels of referral, screening, shaping and enactment of legislation vary between 8 percent and 
14 percent while the poorer-performing committees vary between 1 percent and 4 percent. 
These include the Committee of Economic Activities and Services, Committee of Defence and 
Public Order, Ad hoc Committee for Review of the Constitution, Ad hoc Committee for Review 
of Standing Order and statute of Legislator and Ad hoc Committee for Review of the National 
Anthem. 
Despite this ranking, the Mozambican committee system has been performing poorly on some 
specific bills. While the annual Budget Bill, for instance, is referred to all standing committees, 
with the exception of the Committee of Petitions,91 and screened by the Committee of Planning 
and Budget, no substantive amendments are made either by committees or the plenary. 
91 Committee of Petitions does not perform law-making function. 
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Secondly, the Bill of the National Electoral Commission, which is referred to the Ad hoc 
Committee for Review of the Electoral Legislation, has been enacted for this electoral 
institution that supervises elections to be biased to the major political party. This is because the 
legislature uses the PR system for membership to this electoral institution. Thus the 
representation of the National Electoral Commission is the exact copy of political parties within 
the legislature. 
 
Table 6.4: Committee System in the Multiparty Era by Law-Making 
Levels of 
performance 












Planning and Budget 
64 21% 57 28% 36 20% 57 27% 
Committee of Legal 
Affairs, Human 
Rights and Legality 









32 10% 25 12% 25 14% 25 12% 
Ad hoc Committee 
for Review of 
Electoral Legislation 
25 8% 20 10% 19 11% 20 9% 
Committee of Social 
Affairs, Gender and 
Environment 






13 4% 8 4% 8 4% 8 4% 
Committee of 
Defence and Public 
Order 
10 3% 7 4% 7 4% 7 3% 
Ad hoc Committee 
for Review of the 
Standing Order and 
Statute of Legislator 
12 4% 8 4% 8 4% 7 3% 
Ad hoc Committee 
for Review of the 
Constitution  
5 2% 2 1% 1 1% 2 1% 
Ad hoc Committee 
for Review of the 
National Anthem 
3 1% 1 1% 1 1% 1 1% 
 Not Applicable 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 16 7% 
Total 284 204 181 215 
Note: This contingency table includes data from 1995 to 2009. 
 
The same applies to the body that validates election results, the Judiciary Constitutional 
Council, which bill is referred to the Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality. 
88 
 
Instead of being an independent body, as stated in the Constitution, the bill of the Judiciary 
Constitutional Council was enacted by the legislature for this body to be composed by the 
parliamentary parties using PR system. The strength of parties and of the executive play a 
significant role shaping and enacting legislation of the Mozambican legislature but its impact 
sometimes, as portrayed by above examples, is negative for the quality of democracy and 
democratic consolidation. This because members of this judiciary are appointed politically by 
parties represented in the legislature in proportion to their parliamentary representation. 
Horizontal accountability is likely to be subverted as well as constitutionality and rule of law, 




This study found that the committee system of the Mozambican legislature performed relatively 
well in three out of four dimensions of law-making. It performs relatively well in the referral 
of legislation as the proportion of bills referred to committees has increased significantly over 
time. Second, the committee system does not perform well in the dimension of screening of 
legislation as the proportion of bills screened by committees increased significantly over time. 
This suggests that committees are not increasingly in control of the screening of legislation. 
They are increasingly becoming more permissive due to the strong influence of party caucuses, 
especially the dominant one, and the executive. 
 
Third, it found that the committee system performs reasonably well shaping legislation, as the 
proportion of changes it made in bills referred to committees increased over time. Fourth, the 
committee system performs relatively well on the passage of legislation as it increased the 
ability of plenary not shaping substantively committee legislation over time; committee choices 
tended to survive in the plenary over time. However committee choices are often the choices of 
party caucuses that orient them to follow party discipline.  
 
The legislature’s committee system increase in referral, shaping and passage of legislation 
reflects in part the association between the improvement in the development of legislative 
institution making reform, professionalizing and institutionalizing; and recruiting legislators 








Legislatures perform the function of oversight when they evaluate “how enacted policies are 
being implemented and how effectively they are working” (Rosenthal 2009:417). This chapter 
probes the oversight performance of Mozambique’s multiparty assemblies. I expect to find 
Mozambique’s legislature performing relatively well on oversight. This is because the 
legislature has been over time recruiting legislators with better qualifications, reforming rules 
of procedure, working conditions and structures; professionalizing or creating capacity for its 
members and itself as well as institutionalizing. 
 
Oversight is relevant for the quality of democracy because it allows the legislature to hold 
executive officials to account for the implementation of delegated authority. It enhances 
accountability as legislative committees summon public officials to testify. It also allows public 
officials to implement policies according to approved bills. Thus it enhances constitutionalism 
and the rule of law.  
 
The literature indicates that of the three legislative functions: law-making, oversight and 
constituency service, “oversight is performed less and less well than [law]-making and 
constituency service” (Rosenthal 1981, Rosenthal 1974:12, Ogul 1976, Shipan 2005, Rosenthal 
2009). This finding is based mainly on the perceptions of legislators themselves. Regardless of 
legislator perceptions, the literature also provides evidence that oversight is being performed 
by legislatures (Rosenthal 1981:116, Rosenthal 2009:417-18). For instance, oversight has 
increased rapidly at the U.S. Congress level, by both Senate and House committees (Aberbach 
1979) and at state legislative level (Rosenthal 1981, Rosenthal 2009) with establishment in the 
1970s of special audit and evaluation committees and staff in more than half of the states.  
 
The individual orientations and behaviour approach, which has dominated the study of 
oversight in political science, assumes that political institutions are shaped largely by the people 
who inhabit them and these people are motivated by specific purposes and particular incentives, 
most of which involve their own self-interest. According to Rosenthal (1981), it focuses on 
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attempts by legislators to maximize credit, achieve concrete results and avoid making additional 
trouble for themselves. Oversight confers little credit in comparison with that produced by other 
legislative activities. “Credit claiming” [which often comes from the introduction and 
enactment of legislation and/or representation of their constituency] is one of the major 
activities of legislators as they seek to enhance the prospect of re-election (Mayhew 1974). In 
contrast, oversight receives credit from the public only rarely when it receives a great deal of 
media attention due to bureaucracy misconduct.  
Besides maximizing credit for re-election, legislators try to achieve concrete results. They want 
to solve a problem like improving legislative production by enacting bills into laws but 
oversight seldom leads to the elimination of governmental programmes or the generation of 
large budgetary savings. As a member of a state legislature in the U.S. observed: “legislators 
still judge effectiveness in terms of how much legislation they introduce and pass” (Rosenthal 
1981). Similarly, in the Mozambican legislature, in her inaugural speech to the Seventh 
Assembly (2010-2014), the speaker also judged effectiveness in terms of the increase in the 
number of bills initiated by the legislature.92 
Oversight frequently unsettles things and antagonizes people. “To legislators, oversight seems 
an unfathomable business, and not at all convenient to pursue. They do not want to engage in a 
long study; they do not want to spend inordinate time on an issue; they do not want elegance or 
preciseness in the solutions they adopt. They want simple and straightforward options” 
(Rosenthal 1981:121); “legislators are not accustomed to looking backward; they look forward” 
(Rosenthal 2009:417). Legislators also face time constraints to do everything that they feel is 
expected of them. Many have other outside occupations to pursue. And sometimes committee 
members have to serve in more than one committee.  
However, by focusing on individuals we tend to count all legislators equally.93 But oversight is 
performed only by a few –those affected by institutional incentives, including: legislative 
climate, posture, capacity and mission that promote oversight activity by at least some members 
92 Speech of the speaker of the Mozambican Assembly in the inaugural session of the Seventh legislature (2010-
2014) in March 2010. Assembleia da República. O Parlamentar. Boletim Informativo da Asembleia da República. 
No 0, Year 1 (March 2010).  
93In tabulating responses the researcher “may be making an unjustified analytical leap from the individual to the 
institution, aggregating data for the former in order to characterize the functioning of the later” (Rosenthal 
1981:128).  
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of the legislative institution (Rosenthal 1981, Rosenthal 2009:417-18). The legislative climate 
assumes that citizens and their representatives are inclined to think that cutting governmental 
agencies and programmes down to a smaller size is conducive to legislative oversight. The 
legislative posture explanation assumes that the coequal status and independence of the 
legislature in relation to the executive leads to legislative oversight: “Oversight emerges as a 
relevant activity, since it entails checking on the executive – just what an independent and 
assertive legislature is supposed to do” (Rosenthal 1981:124). The legislative capacity 
assumption assumes that institutional capacity makes a significant impact on oversight by 
increasing the number of professional staff support to oversight committees. The legislative 
mission assumption is based on the duty of some special and standing committees whose 
obligation is oversight: “Committees and staff assigned oversight are institutionally obliged to 
perform this function” (Rosenthal 1981:125).  
In this chapter, I consider the institutional approach to deal with oversight performance using 
standing orders data, legal provisions and other documentary sources. But I also consider 
individual orientations approach employing as the African Legislatures Project (ALP) 
legislator’s survey. I also use my own observations about the functioning of the legislative 
institution. 
Legislative Oversight in the Multiparty Era 
African legislators interviewed by ALP confirm the literature that oversight is performed 
relatively less frequently than either law-making or representation. About 54 percent of African 
legislators in 11 countries rated the performance of the legislative assemblies as very good or 
good monitoring executive actions. In contrast, 80 percent and 79 percent, respectively, gave 
the same answer in terms of making laws, and representing constituents (Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 
7.3). Looking at countries individually, this finding continues to hold both for Mozambique and 
all 10 other countries compared here, although Ugandan, Tanzanian and Nigerian legislators 
are far ahead of the ALP average and perceive that more oversight is going on in comparison 
to other African legislators. 
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Figure 7.1: Legislators’ Evaluation of Oversight in 11 Sub-Saharan African Countries 
The percentages are of those who responded very good/good. 
ALP survey question: How well or badly is the parliament doing its job monitoring executive action? 
Figure 7.2: Legislators’ Evaluation of Law-Making in 11 Sub-Saharan African 
Countries
The percentages are of those who responded very good/good. 
ALP survey question: How well or badly is the parliament doing its job making laws? 
Figure 7.3: Legislators’ Evaluation of Representation in 11 Sub-Saharan African 
Countries
The percentages are of those who responded very good/good. 
ALP survey question: How well or badly is the parliament doing its job representing constituents? 
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In contrast to law-making, the literature shows that it has not been possible to specify the 
dimensions of oversight primarily because “neither legislatures nor their committees have 
devoted much attention at all to the tasks associated with this function” (Rosenthal 1974:66, 
Rosenthal 2009:417). Very few legislators are affected by institutional incentives conducive to 
oversight (Rosenthal (1981). “Systematic oversight is still not something to which legislators 
or legislatures give much attention” (Rosenthal 2009:418). 
 
Shipan (2005) points out that searching for evidence of bureaucratic misdoings, as “police 
patrols”, is inefficient as it is costly in terms of both time and effort, and criminals might just 
avoid streets where patrols are taking place. “Commonly, the kind of oversight that gets done 
by legislatures is haphazard. It surfaces when constituents or interest groups complain that 
policies and programmes are not working as they should” (Rosenthal 2009:418). As viewed by 
Shipan, oversight becomes more efficient when constituents and organized groups can alert 
legislatures, as “fire alarms”, to the potential problems by examining agency decisions or 
granting them standing to appeal these decisions, or facilitating actions that allows them to 
contact legislatures or go to court (Shipan 2005:445-6).   
 
In the rest of this chapter, I employ institutional level data to analyse oversight. This study 
specifies the concept of oversight in an exploratory and tentative way by focusing on legislative 
structure for oversight, executive hearings and information that legislatures develop for 
oversight. Oversight “includes inquiries about policies that are or have been in effect, 
investigations of past administrative actions and the calling of executive officers to account for 
their financial transactions” (Harris 1964:9). Legislatures perform relatively well if they 
establish functional organizations for conducting oversight, committees summon executive 
ministries for hearings and develop information for oversight. 
 
Legislative Structure for Oversight 
 
Institutional structure for oversight is indicated by the presence of legislative auditors, special 
committees and standing committees assigned to perform oversight (Rosenthal 1974). If these 




The legislative auditor plays an important role for external oversight. The Mozambique’s 
legislature established a kind of legislative auditor in the Fourth Assembly94 but removed it in 
the Fifth Assembly.95 However, this position was meant for internal auditing rather than 
external. It had responsibilities for only auditing parliamentary accounts.96 Legislative auditor 
for the purpose of auditing public accounts does not exist in the Mozambican legislature. To 
review and evaluate public accounts, the legislature relies on technical and specialized 
information developed by the 3rd Section of Administrative Tribunal, which corresponds to the 
public account court (here after public account court).  
The public account court conducts annually dozens of audits of public institutions and directs 
its auditing technical report to the legislature. The legislature especially standing Committee of 
Planning of Budget relies on the technical report of the public account court to hold the 
executive to account on public revenues and expenses. Before that the Committee of Planning 
and Budget hold the public account court to account on its auditing. Besides holding the 
executive to account on public revenues and expenses, the Committee of Planning and Budget 
does the same during budgeting process. 
Special Committees  
As Alan Rosenthal put it, “oversight is a very specialized activity; it is one which, if performed 
at all, is performed by specific specialized agencies charged with the mission” (Rosenthal 
1981:129). In the Mozambican legislature there are two specialized committees (the Committee 
of Petitions and Inquest Committees) with responsibilities to perform oversight. These 
committees conduct investigative oversight mainly when citizens or interest groups pull the 
“fire alarm” and alert for ascending problems in the way public and private entities are 
functioning. The legislature may choose between referring the issue to the Committee of 
Petitions or to establish an inquest committee for investigation. 
94 Diploma Ministerial no. 59/98 of 13 May. 
95 Law no. 11/04 of 20 October. 
96 No 2 Clause 7 of Diploma Ministerial no. 59/98 of 13 May. 
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Committee of Petitions. Based on petitions, claims and complaints they have received from 
citizens and organizations, the Committee of Petitions conducts investigations about alleged 
misconduct of public officials. In the Fourth Assembly the legislature investigated14 percent 
of all received petitions. But from the Fifth Assembly the percentage of investigations increased 
very significantly to 52 percent (Table 7.1), as a result of change in the rules of procedure which 
established Committee of Petitions in 2001 in the Fifth Assembly.97 
 
Table 7.1: Investigative Oversight in the Multiparty Era, 1995-2009 






Investigations 14% 52% 251* 
Note: Data from 1995-2001 is from Shenga, C. 2002. O Papel da Assembleia da República na Representação dos 
Interesses da Sociedade Civil, pp. 23. The Fifth Assembly average is estimation based on 2000, 2001 and 2003. 
* This data is observed count. It is difficult to estimate its percentage as the 2007, 2008 and 2009 Committee of 
Petitions Reports do not indicate the number of petitions investigated in relation to those that entered in the 
legislature. 
 
As investigative oversight data of each year of the assemblies was not well stored in the 
legislature, in this section I compare assemblies based on existing data of some years. In the 
Fifth Assembly, especially 2003, the Committee of Petitions received 291 petitions, claims and 
complaints from individual citizens and organizations of which 62 percent (179) were 
investigated.98 According to the 2003 Committee of Petitions report, the committee 
investigations consist firstly, of preliminary examinations of the received petitions in committee 
meetings; secondly, obtaining further information; thirdly, in-depth analysis; and fourthly, 
making decision. In 2003, the committee divided into working groups visiting 8 out of 10 
provinces (Maputo Province and Maputo City, Sofala, Manica, Zambézia, Tete, Nampula, Cabo 
Delgado and Niassa) plus Maputo City. They heard both the petitioners and state institutions 
and other agencies in litigation; they also sent letters to these institutions to obtain formal 
information on specific aspects.  
 
In the Sixth Assembly, particularly 2007, 2008 and 2009, the Committee of Petitions 
investigated 251 petitions plus the petitions of the former Mozambican workers in East 
                                                 
97 Standing Orders, Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April. In 2000 the legislature conducted no investigation at all of the 
received petitions (Shenga 2002:23, USAID 2001). In 2000 the legislature turned its attention to assist the victims 
of floods that devastated vast part of the Centre and Southern region of the country.The legislature approved a 
Resolution on participation of all Mozambicans from public and private, social, humanitarian and religious 
instituins to save the vitms of natural calamities (Resolution no. 8/200 of 5 May).   
98 Comissão de Petições. Informação da Comissão à IX Sessão Ordinária da Assembleia da República. AR-
V/Infor./527/12/12/2003. 
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Germany and former workers of the Railway Company (CFM). One of the biggest 
accomplishments in the Sixth Assembly in terms of geographical coverage of the country is 
that the Committee of Petitions was able to conduct investigations in all provinces of the 
country plus Maputo City. The petitions of the former Mozambican workers in East Germany 
and former workers of CFM were treated separately due to their complexity and magnitude. 
Although the 2007, 2008 and 2009 Committee of Petitions reports do not indicate the number 
of petitions investigated in relation to those that entered in the legislature, its individual counts 
from 2007 (81 petitions), 2008 (98) and 2009 (70) are smaller compared with that from 2003 
in the Fifth Assembly (179).  
However, the biggest investigation so far conducted by the Committee of Petitions holding the 
executive accountable is on financial compensation to Mozambicans that worked in the former 
East Germany between 1979 and 1990. The reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 
altered the agreement of 24 February 1979 between the Mozambican and East Germany 
governments on temporary employment of Mozambican workers in East Germany. It had to 
compensate the Mozambican workers in the event their contract was terminated early as well 
as facilitate their advance return to Mozambique.99 
After receiving information that all compensation was transferred by Germany to Mozambique 
government as well as trying many unsuccessful negotiations with the executive represented by 
the Ministry of Labour, in 2001 the forum of the former workers from the East Germany 
(hereafter forum) submitted a petition to the Mozambican legislature claiming that the executive 
had not paid their financial compensation completely. The speaker referred the claim to the 
Committee of Petitions to investigate the case.  
The Committee of Petitions examined all letters and documents the forum had sent to the 
Ministry of Labour during their negotiations. The 2003 Committee of Petitions Report 
contained 13 annexes of which 9 (containing more than one hundred pages) dealt with the issue 
of the forum.100 On 11 September 2002, in audience with the executive, the committee called 
the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to account. On 12 
99The compensation included 70 percent of their salary for about 3 months and social security they discounted to 
the Germany social security system besides extraordinary payment of US$1,860 (DM3.000) and reimbursement 
of trip expenses.  
100 Comissão de Petições. Informação da Comissão à IX Sessão Ordinária da Assembleia da República. AR-
V/Infor./485/02.05.2003 – Adenda (Anexo 1-6); and AR-V/Infor./486/02.05.2003 – Adenda (Anexo 7-13).  
97 
September 2002, as a consequence of the audience, the committee formally requested the office 
of the prime minister to submit documented explanations for the investigation.101 The request 
was followed by a committee questionnaire with specific questions for response by the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The formal responses to the questionnaire were provided by the Embassy 
of Federal Republic of Germany and sent to the Committee of Petitions by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.102 
The responses to the committee questionnaire revealed among many other aspects that the 
former East German government transferred, in line with the 1979 agreement on the 
employment of Mozambican workers, approximately US$18.6 million for social security and 
US$74.4 million for salaries making a total of US$ 93 million. In 2002, during the period the 
forum petition was being investigated in the legislature, the executive authorized the payment 
of US$7.5 million.103 Having the questionnaire responses in its possession and all other 
investigation information, the plenary decided in closed doors. However, the parliamentary 
record–i.e. the list of all legislation approved by the legislature shows no evidence of 
parliamentary resolution on the subject submitted to the attorney-general to charge those 
implicated in the case.   
Inquest Committees. The Mozambican legislature has established an Inquest Committee for 
Investigation of Land Usurpation in Inhambane Province, and an Inquest Committee for 
Investigation of November 2000 Demonstration Facts. 
In the second ordinary session of 1998 in the Fourth Assembly the legislature established the 
Inquest Committee for Investigation of Land Usurpation in Inhambane Province104 as a result 
of public complaints of land usurpation in Inhambane.105In 1999 the Inquest Committee 
travelled to Inhambane Province to hold hearings to the Administrator of Paindane District; 
Provincial Director of Agriculture, Fishery, Geography and Cartography; Provincial Director 
of Industry and Tourism; Stella Pateguane (one of the owners of the two tourist complexes) and 
101 Commissão de Petições. N/Ref. No 965 SGAR/DCT/CP/02 
102 Embaixada da República Federal da Alemanhã, Pol 321.58/10. Nota 192/2002; and Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros e Cooperação, No 41/GVMNEC/03, Maputo, 10 January 2003. 
103 SAVANA, Dossier “Madgermanes”: Governo Alemão transferiu 93 milhões de doláres, 21.02.2003. 
104 Resolution 11/98, of 19 November. 
105 Two tourist complexes (Tourist Complex and Paindane Resorts) were identified as one of the land usurpers.  
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her business partner; Inhambane Governor; Inhambane Prosecutor; and dwellers of Paindane 
District.  
 
After meeting these relevant individuals, triangulating information and collecting official 
documents connected to the investigation, the Inquest Committee reported to the plenary behind 
closed doors. Then the plenary approved a resolution that was delivered to the attorney-general, 
Ministry of State Administration, Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fishery and Ministry of Public Works and Housing.106 However, so far the 
legislature has not disclosed the resolution to the Mozambican people. 
 
The second inquest committee was established to investigate the 9thNovember 2000 Renamo-
Electoral Union national demonstration protesting against the 1999 presidential and legislative 
elections results. Renamo-Electoral Union and its leader Afonso Dhlakama claimed that it had 
won the election and that the incumbent party and its winning presidential candidate committed 
major irregularities and fraud.107 “Electoral administration was both technically flawed and 
politically charged in the 1999 general elections” (Manning 2002). In some regions of the 
country the demonstrations were peaceful but in others they were violent with confrontation 
between the police and demonstrators. On the day of the demonstration, 44 civilians and 6 
police officers died and 38 people were injured in the entire country. In the Montepuez District 
of the Northern Province of Cabo Delgado 27 civilians and 6 police officers died.108 “In several 
instances police fired into crowds and attacked demonstrators” (Manning 2002:79). On 18th and 
22nd November 2000 respectively, 7 and 76 people that had been arrested in connection with 
the demonstration were found dead due to suffocation in Montepuez under police custody. In 
total 110 people and 6 police officers died in Montepuez as a result of the 9 November 2000 
demonstration, of which 83 were found dead in police custody.109 
 
Ordinary Mozambican citizens, national and international media and the international donor 
community strongly criticized the executive due to the police behaviour. As a result, the 
Mozambican legislature established an inquest committee to investigate the tragedy.110 The 
                                                 
106 Resolution no. 9/99 of 27 January. 
107http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/julgamento-de-policias-envolvidos-no-caso-de-montepuez-vai-ser-
repetido-57820, serched on 7 February 2014.  
108 Relatório. Comissão de Inquérito. Assembleia da República (draft). The local human rights watchdog (LDH) 
claimed that the police shot real bullets into the crowd trying to disperse the demonstrators. 
109 http://www.mol.co.mz/noticias/metical/2000/mt1129.html, searched on 7 February 2014. 
110 Resolution no. 18/2000 of 19 December. 
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inquest committee was composed of 7 legislators, in proportion to parliamentary representation, 
who drafted the inquiry questionnaire, the format for notification of the entities to be 
investigated as well as their identification. All inquest committee activities from beginning to 
the end of the inquiry were based on consensual decisions. The committee selected four 
provinces (Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Sofala and Manica) plus Maputo City as the areas for 
investigation. The following individuals were inquired: provincial governors, district 
administrators, provincial and district prosecutors, provincial and district representatives of 
Renamo party, provincial and district police chiefs, provincial and district criminal investigative 
police chiefs (PIC) as well as representatives of civil society, including religion leaders, 
businessmen, community leaders and the public. Those who were arrested in connection to the 
demonstration were also held heard. 
 
The inquest committee report was approved by the legislature behind closed doors and sent to 
the Attorney-General to support prosecutions. Some people connected to the demonstration 
either from the police or Renamo were convicted, but with the end of the trial the Inquest 
Committee report has still today not been made public. Although inquest committee reports and 
meetings follow rules of secret of justice and their cases are discussed behind closed doors, it 
is the duty of the institution of representative democracy to make them accessible to the public 




The responsibility for policy review and evaluation is diffused in the Mozambican legislature 
with special committees and standing committees all engaged in such tasks. Besides law-
making responsibility, the standing committees are also supposed to conduct oversight. 
Standing committees constitute the general structure for oversight in the Mozambique 
legislature. They monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
government’s social and economic plan and budget in their respective policy domain.  
 
However, standing committees do not perform oversight to the same degree. The single year 
data111on parliamentary activity in 2008 at provincial level shows that among the eight existing 
standing committees, the Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality neglects 
                                                 
111 Overtime data on number of oversight visits performed by committees was not available. 
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oversight as it conduct less oversight visits. It tends to focus its oversight visits only on the 
human rights policy domain by monitoring the functioning of prisons. It does not oversee, for 
instance, the effectiveness of implementation of bills approved by the executive with 
legislature’s authorization. The Committee of International Relations also neglects oversight. 
To conduct oversight it only visits provinces that have borders with other countries. On the 
other hand, the Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and Environment; and Committee of 
Economic Activities and Services lead in oversight visits while other committees (Committee 
of Planning and Budget; Committee of Petitions; Committee of Agriculture, Regional 
Development, Public Administration and Local Government; Committee of Defence and Public 
Order; and Committee of International Relations) are at the intermediate position (Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: Ranking Standing Committees by Oversight Visits in Provinces in 2008 
 Number of Oversight 
Visits 
Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and Environment 9 
Committee of Economic Activities and Services 7 
Committee of Planning and Budget 5 
Committee of Petitions 5 
Committee of Agriculture, Regional Development, Public 
Administration and Local Government 
4 
Committee of Defence and Public Order 4 
Committee of International Relations 4 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality 2 
  
Total 40 
Source: Relatório da Actividade Parlamentar da AR do Ano de 2008, Gabinete da 1ª Vice Presidente da AR. AR-
VI/Inform./459/11.6.2009. 
 
Despite neglecting the oversight function, the Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and 
Legality carried out a remarkable oversight investigation when the media “pulled the alarm” 
and broadcasted a situation where 12 detainees were found dead on 16th March 2009 in a police 
prison cell in Mogincual District, Nampula Province. A group of 5 legislators of the Committee 
of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality was established to investigate the causes and 
circumstances of the deaths. The group engaged itself in the assignment producing terms of 
references of the mission, contacting central and provincial authorities and requesting formally 
to the provincial governor for all necessary related documents. After a week visiting Nampula 
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Province, especially Mogincual District, the group produced its investigative report to the 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality which was reported to the plenary.112 
The hearings from different entities and people connected to the investigation show first, that 
the health sector, especially Local Red Cross activists, distributed chlorine to the local 
population to purify water and prevent cholera, which was affecting severely the rural 
population. Second, the rural population concluded that the Red Cross activists were 
distributing cholera instead of chlorine.113  
Third, on 13 March a group of rural dwellers attacked the Red Cross activists. Some of the 
activists were beaten, tortured and even killed. The rural people blamed the activists for 
bringing cholera. As a result16 people were tortured, houses were burnt and one person was 
killed. The well-known case is of a female activist who was tortured and buried until her neck. 
On 14 March the police tried to bring order but some were ambushed and police officers had 
their weapons taken, were beaten and two were killed. The police, however, was able to detain 
on 15 March 2009 a dozen people involved in this disinformation campaign and torture. Fourth, 
12 detainees were found dead due to suffocation in the cell of police headquarters of Mogincual 
District on 17th March.114 The police had kept 34 people in a cell which could only support 10 
people. In the hearing with the Human Rights representative it was said that some of the dead 
detainees were handcuffed and tortured. Three police officers allegedly connected to the deaths 
were suspended and charged with criminal negligence. The other detainees were also charged.       
The committee group visited Nampula Province, including Mogincual District, from 26th March 
to 1st April 2009. It interviewed and heard on 27 March the following: the Provincial Governor 
of Nampula, Northern Region Representative of Human Rights, Acting Provincial Director of 
Health, Provincial Attorney-General, former Police Chief of Mogincual District, former 
Criminal Investigative Police Chief of Mogincual District, police officers that worked overnight 
in the police cell and representatives of the Red Cross. On 28 March the group heard the 
Administrator of Mogincual District, police chief of Mogincual District, activists of Red Cross 
112 Relatório da Missão Parlamentar à Mongicual. Commissão dos Assuntos Jurídicos, Direitos Humanos e 
Legalidade. AR-VI/Inform./439/24.04/2009. 
113 The words chlorine (in Portuguese cloro) and cholera (colera) are very close to each other in pronunciation, 
mainly for rural people with no formal education. 
114 Revealed the autopsy. Relatório da Missão Parlamentar à Mongicual. Commissão dos Assuntos Jurídicos, 
Direitos Humanos e Legalidade. AR-VI/Inform./439/24.04/2009. 
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and Mogincual District Director of Agriculture. On the same day the group also visited the 
police prison cell where the detainees died. On 30 March the investigative committee group 
heard the Administrator of Angoche District, Angoche District Attorney-General and survivors 
of the deaths in police cell.115 On 31 March the group heard in Quinga the Quinga authorities. 
On the last day, 1st April, the group met again and briefed the Nampula Governor, gave a press 




Oversight mostly takes place during the conventional process of law-making and budgeting 
(Rosenthal 2009; see also Moncrief, Thompson and Cassie 1996:323). It “occurs during the 
course of budget [and law-making] hearings, when legislators inquire into an agency’s 
operations” (Rosenthal 2005:418). Executive hearings constitute means by which legislators 
exert control to the executive.  
 
The data in the standing orders of the legislature prescribe that standing committees can 
subpoena executive ministries to testify in front of committees. In the Mozambican legislature 
every bill is subject to hearings.116 The procedure is that the executive minister sponsoring the 
bill is invited to justify its need, its integration in government programme and its effect in 
society.117 All the standing committees involved in law-making control the executive with 
hearings during the process of making law. The more standing committees receive bills the 
more they conduct this form of oversight.  
 
The law-making data from Chapter 6 show that the Committee of Planning and Budget and 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality are the standing committees that 
receive more bills while Committee of Defence and Public Order and Committee of Economic 
Activities and Services receive fewer bills to be enacted into law. Committee of Agriculture, 
Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Government; and Committee of 
Social Affairs, Gender and Environment are in-between these two clusters. As Committee of 
                                                 
115 29 March was a Sunday, the committee group did not work. 
116 This finding is not only based on standing order but also the author’s experience supporting committees and 
observations. 
117 Cabinet ministers cannot refuse when summoned by committees. See Standing order: Law no. 1/95 of 8 May, 
Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April and Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July 
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Petitions and Committee of International Relations receive no bill they do not conduct this type 
of oversight during law-making process.  
 
The Development of Information 
 
Regardless of the overall neglect of the oversight function, the committee system has been 
developing information necessary for review and evaluation tasks. Standing committees have 
been producing reports of assessments they have made at local government level in the scope 
of oversight visits they conduct in interim period. This has been helpful for committee members 
to question the executive in session of Questions and Answers after the executive presentation 
of the mid-term review of the implementation of social and economic plan and budget. 
 
In the session of Questions and Answers, data based on observations from assisting plenary 
sessions reveal that, legislators from the major Frelimo party have been pleased with the 
executive performance but request it to do more. For instance, a rank-and-file member from 
Frelimo spoke in the Questions and Answers session saying that his constituents were satisfied 
in the way the executive was handling the delivery of public services, as they have brought 
drinking water to the communities, but the communities also want the executive to build good 
roads so that they can transport their farm products easily.118 On the other hand, opposition 
legislators have been asking the executive to explain more about privatization, megaprojects, 
justice administration, civil service reform, alleged corruption, mismanagement and/or 
misconduct of public officials in office.119 
 
Classifying Committee System 
 
This study classifies Mozambique’s committees on the basis of the institutional incentives or 
obligations they have to perform oversight. It classifies committees into three groups: better, 
average and poorer performing committees. Better-performing committees include special 
committees (the Committee of Petitions; and Inquest Committees) and budget and public 
account committee (Committee of Planning and Budget). The special committees perform 
investigative oversight responsibility. The Committee of Petitions perform more investigative 
                                                 
118 Frelimo legislator. 
119 Renamo legislator. 
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oversight as it performs this responsibility for the entire legislature while inquest committees 
only perform investigative oversight for a short period – about one or two years, that is, the 
period of their creation. The Committee of Planning and Budget also conduct more oversight 
during the budget and law-making process hearing the executive as well as holding the 
executive to account on public revenues and expenses. 
 
Poorer-performing committees are those that neglect the oversight function. These include 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality; Committee of International Relation; 
and Committee of Defence and Public Order. Although the legal affairs committee conduct 
more executive hearing as it receives more bills to scrutinize, it travels less to provinces to 
evaluate policy implementation. The Committee of International Relations does not receive 
bills at all to be able to hold the executive to account during law-making as well as it lagged 
behind in terms of number of oversight visits. The Committee of Defence of Public Order 
ranked both low in number of oversight visits and bills received to be able to hold the executive 
to account during law-making.  
 
Average performing committees are located at intermediate level (see Table 7.3). These 
committees are located between the better and poorer performing in terms of holding the 
executive to account in law-making and number of oversight visits.  
 
Table 7.3: Classification of Committee System Performing Oversight by Committee 
 Committee 
Better-performing Special committee 
1. Committee of Petitions 
2. Inquest committees 
Budget and Public Account committee 
3. Committee of Planning and Budget 
Average-performing 1. Committee of Agriculture, Regional 
Development, Public Administration and 
Local Government 
2. Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and 
Environment 
3. Committee of Economic Activities 
Poorer-performing  1. Committee of Legal Affairs, Human 
Rights and Legality 
2. Committee of International Relations 







This study revealed that oversight is less performed than law-making or representation. 
However, oversight is being conducted in Mozambique’s legislature by a specialized structure 
for it. Although Mozambique’s legislature did not establish a legislative auditor in its structure 
for oversight, it did establish special committees (that is, Committee of Petitions and Inquest 
Committees) with the obligation to conduct investigative oversight. One special committee was 
established in the Fourth Assembly and two in the Fifth. The percentage of investigative 
oversights performed by the Committee of Petitions improved over time.  
 
Second, the legislature created rules for standing committees to hold the executive to account 
in every bill the executive direct to it by hearing the executive. During the law-making process, 
standing committees summon executive ministries to testify in front of them. All law-making 
standing committees conduct executive hearings. However, committee performance conducting 
executive hearings varies according to the number of bills they receive. Committees that receive 
more bills from their parent chamber held the executive to account more. They conducted more 
executive hearings. 
 
Third, the legislature also established a budget and public account committee (that is, 
Committee of Planning and Budget) whose obligation is also oversight. The budget and public 
account committee conducts oversight during the budgeting and law-making process by hearing 
the executive as well as holding the executive to account on public revenues and expenses. 
Together with special committees, the budget and public account committee conduct more 
oversight than any other committees in the legislature. However, among special committees the 
Committee of Petitions conducts more oversight than Inquest Committees. The former function 
for the entire legislature while the later for the period of its creation – that is, one to two years.   
 
Fourth, the legislature allowed committees to develop information to conduct oversight. 
Standing committees produce reports of evaluations they conduct when the legislature is out of 
session, which has been helpful for committee members to ask questions to the executive in 








Besides making laws and overseeing how government implements those laws, perhaps the most 
critical function of a legislature is representation. Legislators and the legislature are deemed to 
adopt policies and control their effectiveness in order to better represent the views of their 
constituents. That is the essence of a representative democracy. This chapter focuses on 
representation in Mozambique’s multiparty era.  
 
This study expects to find improvements in representation as a result of improvement over time 
in recruiting politicians with political capital, reforming rules of procedure, working conditions 
and structures, professionalizing or creating capacity for legislators and legislature, and 
institutionalizing.  
 
Representation allows those who cannot participate directly in legislatures to be substantively 
represented in representative democracy. Second, legislative representation should contribute 
to the legitimacy of the democratic political system. “Legislatures are both legitimate and 
authoritative institutions. [They] are empowered to act for the whole body politic and are 
legitimized. And because, by virtue of representation, they participate in legislation, the 
represented accept legislative decisions as authoritative” (Eulau et al 1959). 
 
This chapter combines data from the Mozambican bill tracker, the African Legislatures Project 
(ALP) legislator survey, the 2008 Afrobarometer public opinion survey and archival data. The 
Mozambican bill tracker covers a 15 year period of all three multiparty assemblies. The ALP 
legislator survey is based on one point of time (2008) with a random representative sample of 
50 legislators out of 250. It entails questions on legislator’s attitudes and behaviours toward 
their job and legislature. The Afrobarometer public opinion survey is based on random, multi 
stratified, probabilistic and representative sample of 1,200 adult Mozambicans. This study also 
relies on the author’s assessment of the subject covering the Fourth Assembly (1995-1999) and 




Approaches for Measuring Representation 
 
Legislative scholars observe the legislative function of representation from different 
perspectives. Role orientation scholars analyse legislative representation by legislators’ role 
orientations. Wahlke et al (1962) and Eulau et al (1959) distinguish three representational role 
orientations of legislators: trustee, delegate and politico, while Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) 
distinguish constituent servant, institutionalist and partisan role orientations.  
 
Other scholars observe representation by comparing the extent to which legislatures resemble 
the demographic characteristics of their society. If half of the population in the society is female 
then they would expect half of the legislative population to be female. The same would apply 
to ethnicity, race and so on (Mansbridge 1999, Graffin and Keane 2006).  
 
Policy representation approach analyse whether legislator’s policy preferences as well as bills 
passed by the legislature reflect public policy preferences. This approach leads scholars to move 
from simple descriptive to substantive representation (Canon 2005, Celis and Gent 2006, 
Beckwith 2007). Tremblay (1998) analysed whether female descriptive representation is 
conducive to substantive representation of women.  
 
Another form of observing representation is by looking at whether legislatures develop 
structures for representation. This might include rule reforms that attempt to increase the 
potential for improved representation. Legislatures might, for instance, establish channels for 
citizens and interest groups to engage with them either through public hearings or debates, 
petitions or constituency service programme. But they also might establish institutions to deal 
with petitions and/or means to conduct constituency service. For constituency service, scholars 
would even track how many times legislators visit their constituencies, how long they stay and 
what type of activities they perform in their constituencies. 
 
In this study I measure legislative representation by legislator’s role orientations, descriptive 
representation, comparison of legislators’ policy preferences as a reflection of voters’ policy 
preferences, structure for representation, civil society attendance to public hearings, 
effectiveness of civil society attendance to public hearings, citizens and organized groups 
108 
petitions and their effectiveness, legislator’s travel to, duration in their stay and activities in 
their constituency. 
Representation in the Multiparty Era 
In the one party era the legislature functioned for a very short period only to ratify bills initiated 
by the executive. Oversight was not conducted at all. Members did not have a salary, with 
exception to those in the house-keeping committee from the Third Assembly (1997-1994). If 
law-making was poorly performed and by amateur legislators and oversight not performed at 
all, this suggests that the legislature performed representation poorly in the one party era. 
However, the percentage of women in the legislature increased from the Second Assembly (12 
percent) to the Third (16 percent).120 With the 1990 democratic constitution and the 
establishment of the founding multiparty assembly (1995-1999), the legislature created rules 
and structures for representation. The rest of this chapter deals with representation in the 
multiparty era starting with legislator’s role orientation toward his or her job of being MP.  
Mozambican Legislator’s Role Orientations 
The concept of “role refers to the pattern of expectations or norms of behaviour that are 
associated with a position in a social structure. The role of a legislator consist of the rights, 
duties, and obligations that are expected of anyone holding that position” (Jewell 1970:462). 
Its important characteristic is that it always relates to an actor’s confrontations with other actors 
in a role relationship (Wahlke et al 1962). The term role orientation refers to a distinct “pattern 
of norms making up a particular role” or “systematic differences in legislators’ conceptions of 
a particular component of the role of legislator” (Wahlke et al. 1962). 
Eulau et al. (1959) and Wahlke et al. (1962) used an open-ended question “How would you 
describe your job of being a legislator?” to distinguish three representational role orientations: 
trustee, delegate and politico. A trustee legislator “follows his [or her] own judgements based 
on an assessment of the facts in each case, his [or her] understanding of the problems involved, 
120Relatório da Comissão Nacional de Eleições sobre as Eleições de 4 de Dezembro de 1977. Boletim da 
República, Número 150, Suplemento, 24 de Dezembro de 1977. Relatório da Comissão Nacional de Eleições 
sobre as Segundas Eleições de 14 de Dezembro de 1986. Boletim da República, Número 2, Suplemento, I Série, 
14 de Janeiro de 1987. 
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his [or her] thoughtful appraisal of the side of the issue” (Eulau et al. 1959:750). In contrast to 
trustee, a delegate legislator should not use his or her “independent judgement or convictions 
as criteria of decision-making” (Eulau et al. 1959:751). He or she “relies heavily for advices on 
others” (Jewell 1970). Politico is the legislator “who express both trustee and delegate 
orientations, either simultaneously or serially” (Eulau et al. 1959).  
 
However, that measure of legislator’s roles poses a methodological problem. First, while with 
the open-ended question’ scholars believe it is more useful to conceive roles as discrete 
categories, “legislators should be placed in such a category only if they have a clear and strong 
belief that legislator ought to act in the specified way. This also suggests that legislators with 
ambiguous or ambivalent viewpoints should not be classified at all” (Jewell 1970). An approach 
that employs this measure to predict legislative behaviour has the disadvantage of excluding a 
number of legislators from the analysis.  
 
Second, “when we refer legislator as a delegate, politico, or trustee, we are applying a stereotype 
to him [or her]” (Jewell 1970) by making a firm prediction that he or she will always act in a 
certain way. But legislators do not always hold the same role. Even a trustee who relies on his 
or her own judgement in decision-making turns to others for advice in a situation where he or 
she does not have enough information about everyone. A delegate who relies on advice of others 
may probably follow the view of his or her constituents if it becomes sensitive to constituent 
opinion.  
 
Alternatively some scholars advocate that it is more useful to consider roles with a continuous 
measure that predicts the probability of a legislator acting in a certain way. With a continuous 
measure they classify “legislators by scoring their degree of agreement with several questions 
and then defining those with a particular range of scores” (Jewell 1970:488) as ‘institutionalist’, 
‘constituent servant’ or ‘partisan’ oriented (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011), for example. Viewing 
roles in a probabilistic way suggests recognizing that legislators will not always act according 
to a particular role orientation if contradictory pressures become too intense.    
 
This study employs a continuous measure of role. The African Legislatures Project legislator’s 
survey asked first, “In your opinion, which of these following jobs is the most important being 
a legislator?” Second, “For you personally, which role brings you the most satisfaction?” The 
role responses for both questions are: debating bills and passing laws; making public policy by 
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writing laws; overseeing the executive; bringing development to your constituency; 
representing constituents views in parliament; assisting constituents with their personal 
problems; or raising funds for your constituents. Third, “In general, when you take a position 
about an issue in the parliament, which of the following is most important?” The role responses 
are: The views of your party leader; the views of your party; the views of your constituents; the 
national interest; your own knowledge about the issue; or your personal convictions.  
 
This study classifies role orientations following Mattes and Mozaffar (2011): institutionalists, 
partisans and constituency servants but it does not ignore Eulau et al. (1959) and Wahlke et al. 
(1962) typology of trustee. Constituency servants refer to those legislators who see constituency 
service or representation as both the most important and the most rewarding part of the job and 
see constituents as the most important influence when taking their position in session. Partisans 
see the party or party leader as most important influence when taking their position in session. 
Institutionalists are those who view law making, debating or oversight as both the most 
important and the most rewarding part of the job; they also see the national interest, their own 
knowledge or personal convictions as the most important influence when taking position in 
session.  
 
The African Legislature Project (ALP) legislator survey shows that Mozambican legislators 
tend more to express the constituency servant role orientation more than institutionalist. Of the 
50 legislators interviewed 52 percent expressed the constituent servant to be the most important 
part of their job. The same applies when asked about the role that brings them the most 
satisfaction, 52 percent responded constituency servant. About 48 percent said that being an 
institutionalist was both the most important part of their job and the role that brings them the 










Figure 8.1: Institutionalist and Constituency Servant Role Orientations, 2008
 
ALP questions:  
For the first bars: In your opinion, which of these following jobs is the most important being a legislator? 
For the second bars: For you personally, which role brings you the most satisfaction? 
 
When considering partisan role orientations in the equation, the data in Figure 8.2 shows that 
Mozambican legislators tend more to express partisan role orientations than other roles. About 
45 percent of legislators say that when they take a position about an issue in parliament the 
views of their party leader or party are the most important. However, a very significant 
proportion (39 percent) responded as a constituent servant. Ten percent responded to be trustee 
– i.e. their own personal convictions or knowledge about the issue is the most important when 
taking a position about an issue in parliament. However a significant amount (6 percent) 
expressed mixed role orientations when they have to decide on an issue in the legislature. They 
do not hold a single role orientation when it comes to vote on a particular issue. 
 
Figure 8.2: Partisan, Constituency Servant and Trustee Role Orientations, 2008
 
ALP question: In general, when you take a position about an issue in the parliament, which of the following is 
most important?” 
 
That Mozambican legislators are more likely to be partisans than constituency servants or 
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strong in the legislature. Legislators do not vote individually when taking a position about an 
issue in the legislature but tend to follow the view of their party or their party leader. This is 
also influenced by the Mozambican PR closed list electoral system that encourages legislators 
to represent their party bosses more than constituents. The influence of the party (boss) outside 
the legislature to the party (boss) within the legislature is high. The PR closed list system widens 
the gap between the represented and representatives and narrows the one between 
representatives with their party leaders. Party bosses control legislators political future but also 




Descriptive representation refers to whether representatives “mirror the demographic 
characteristics of their constituents” (Canon 2005). This assumes, for example, that women 
would be better represented by female legislators, young by young representatives, single by 
single MPs, Maputo residents by those representatives born or living in Maputo constituencies 
and so on. At the institutional level, a descriptively representative legislature would “resemble” 
Mozambique. The legislature “would have the same demographic profile as the nation” (Canon 
2005:173). Based on the most recent census data – the 2007 Mozambique population census, 
this means the legislature would be comprised of 52 percent of female representatives, 79 
percent of young legislators, 58 percent of married MPs and 11 percent of residents from 
Maputo.  
 
The Who’s Who data shows that legislators and the legislature do not descriptively resemble 
their constituents. The majority of representatives do not have the same demographic profile as 
the nation. An overwhelming majority of 79 percent are drawn from 17 percent of the country 
adults; and two-thirds (68 percent) from 48 percent of males in the country (Table 8.1). As 
Eulau et al. (1959) point out: “the function of representation in modern political systems is not 
to make the legislature an exact mathematically copy of the electorate”. “Regardless of 
democratic institutions and values, [legislators] will tend to be chosen from among those 
ranking high in [society’s] system of social stratification” (Matthews 1954:23). “Almost 
everywhere [including the Mozambique assemblies] legislators are better educated, possess 
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higher-status occupations and have more privileged backgrounds than the people they 
represent” (Matthews 1985).121 
 















Gender      
   Male 72% 69% 62% 68% 48% 
   Female 28% 31% 38% 32% 52% 
Age      
   Young (18-35) 10% 8% 6% 8% 79% 
   Adult (36-60) 85% 73% 80% 79% 17% 
   Elder (over 60) 5% 14% 12% 10% 5% 
   Unknown 0% 6% 2% 3% 0% 
Marital Status      
  Single  25% 30% 35% 30% 31% 
  Married  69% 60% 52% 60% 58% 
  Separated, 
widow/divorced  
6% 9% 13% 9% 10% 
  Unknown  0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Birth Place      
  Niassa 4% 6% 4% 5% 6%* 
  Cabo Delgado 9% 11% 13% 11% 8% 
  Nampula 19% 16% 16% 17% 20% 
  Tete 7% 8% 6% 7% 9% 
  Zambézia 20% 20% 20% 20% 19% 
  Manica 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 
  Sofala 9% 7% 10% 9% 8% 
  Inhambane 8% 8% 10% 8% 6% 
  Gaza  7% 6% 9% 8% 6% 
  Maputo Prov/City 11% 10% 6% 9% 11% 
  Abroad 2% 2% 0% 1% 0% 
  Unknown  0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
N 250 250 250 750 23 million 
* Due to absence of birth place population census data, population census data of those living in provinces was 
employed. The population census data was collected from the National Institute of Statistics: www.ine.gov.mz 
 
“The big losers in [legislatures] everywhere have been women” (Matthews 1985). The world 
average of women in parliaments in the lower house is 19 percent. This percentage is higher in 
Nordic countries (42 percent) than Americas (22 percent); Europe – OSC member countries, 
                                                 
121 “This have been found to be the case in the US Senate and the House of Representatives, among America state 
legislators, and in city councils. The same general findings have emerged from dozens of studies of legislatures in 
other advanced, industrial democracies, in developing countries, and in contemporary Communist regimes” 
(Matthews 1985:18).   
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including Nordic countries (22 percent); Europe - OSC member countries, excluding Nordic 
countries (20 percent)’ Sub-Saharan Africa (19 percent); Asia (18 percent); Pacific (13 percent); 
and Arab States (13 percent).122 In Mozambique the average of the three assemblies of women 
representation is 32 percent.  
But the Mozambique legislature has been improving representing women. In the one party era, 
the percentage of women in the legislature was 16 percent in the Third Assembly. But in the 
multiparty era, it increased to 28 percent in the Fourth Assembly, 31 percent in Fifth Assembly 
and 38 percent in Sixth (Table 8.1). This reflects the electoral system effect (Trounstine and 
Valdini 2008). Underrepresented groups like women are most likely to be represented in 
proportional representation systems with multimember constituencies. The closed party list PR 
electoral system with large numbers of representatives per district provides an opportunity for 
the election of greater percentages of women to parliament (Rule 1992). But also the major 
party Frelimo have been recruiting more female officials than opposition parties in all the three 
assemblies because of its gender quota on behalf of women. 
Even though women are the ‘big losers’ in the Mozambique legislature, their representation is 
significantly high compared to most advanced and emerging democracies. However, this 
relatively high level of representation of women in the Mozambican legislature is more 
reflection of the fact that they are enlisted in their party PR list than their motivation (i.e. 
ambition) to politics.123 Interest in public affairs and discussion of politics tend to be mainly a 
feature of Mozambican men than women (Afrobarometer 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012). In 
American politics and perhaps other Single Member District advanced democracies, women 
tend to be less represented in the Congress due to ambition to politics rather than their levels of 
formal education and occupational status. In advanced democracies women are becoming more 
qualified than men. In Mozambique assemblywomen tend to have high occupational status than 
assemblymen in the Fourth and Fifth assemblies.   
However, there is no significant difference between marital status and birth place of 
Mozambican citizens and their representatives in the legislature. Legislators’ marital status and 
place of birth resemble those of their constituents. 
122 Women in Parliaments: World and Regional Averages. http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm searched on 4 
April 2011.  
123 The same applies to South Africa due to gender quota from the ruling ANC. 
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Legislators’ Policy Preference Versus Voters’ Policy Preference 
 
Do legislators’ policy preferences reflect voters’ policy preferences? The ALP and 
Afrobarometer surveys show that Mozambican legislators’ policy preferences do not reflect 
those of the voters. About 36 percent of legislators expressed that the most important problem 
facing the country that government should address is poverty or destitution while the voters say 
unemployment (33 percent). Only 6 percent of legislators have unemployment as their policy 
preference. In addition, legislators’ policy preferences do not include health, education, water 
supply and food shortage or famine while voters’ policy preferences do. Instead legislators have 
other policy preferences like inflation, crime and security and farming (Figure 8.3 and Figure 
8.4). In part, this reflects the Mozambican multimember districts electoral RP electoral system, 
as it widens the gap between representatives and voters. Aldrich (2006) points out that “PR 
electoral systems fail to create legislatures that mirror the preferences of the public”.124 
 
Figure 8.3: Legislators’ Policy Preferences, 2008
 
Those problems that did not add up to 5 percent are not shown here. 
ALP question: In your opinion, what are the three most important problems facing this country that government 
should address? (First response).  
 
Mozambican legislators’ policy preferences reflect, in part, the executive policy preferences. 
These policies tend more to be discussed by the executive within the legislature. The executive 
often presented to the legislature the poverty plan - PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan) I 
and II. It also presented and discussed often within the legislature two major agriculture 
                                                 
















policies: PROAGRI – Agriculture Programme125 and Green Revolution126. It presented them to 
the legislature as the basis for national development. The legislators’ preference toward 
inflation policy is mainly an effort from the executive to stabilize macroeconomic indicators 
especially keeping inflation at a single digit. Legislators’ preference toward crime and security 
policy is also fostered by the executive and influenced to the executive by the media.  
 
Figure 8.4: Voters’ Policy Preferences, 2008
 
Those problems that did not add up to 5 percent are not presented here. 
Afrobarometer question: In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that 
government should address? (First response). 
 
Rules and Structure for Representation 
 
The first of the series of rule reforms that the legislature attempted to increase the potential for 
improved representation was the development of three instruments early in the Fourth 
Assembly under the “Relationship with the Constituent” programme supported by 
SUNY/USAID, 1995-2001.127 The instruments were established in a legal framework where 
the constitution compels to the public debate of constitutional review bills and the standing 
orders encourages public hearings of any other bills.128 The legislature developed: 
                                                 
125 PROAGRI I was launched in 1998 and PROAGRI II in 2003, http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/4142.pdf 
126 Green Revolution was initiated in 2007, http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2010/10/26/10011/ 
127 SUNY/USAID – State University of New York/United States of America Agency for International 
Development. 

















“A database about civil society organizations containing more than 700 organizations and 
organized associations according to their respective areas of specialization aligned with 
legislative committees, their objectives and respective representatives; opinion polls about 
specific topics carried out with civil society organizations to produce committee opinions; and 
brief issues which are summaries of current legislation that explain in a simplified manner how 
the legislation will affect citizens life.” (Shenga 2002:22). 
 
The second rule reform that attempted to increase representation was the openness for citizens 
and interest groups to direct complaints, claims and petitions to the legislature. Further, to 
increase capacity to conduct improved representation the legislature also established the 
Committee of Petitions to respond to the petitions, claims and complaints directed to the 
legislature.  
 
The third rule reform that attempted to enhance representation was to develop a “Constituency 
Service” programme as a way for legislators to access and dialogue with constituents in their 
constituencies when the legislature is out of session. In order to conduct constituency service, 
the legislature provides all legislators with an allowance for 35 working days annually. In the 
Sixth Assembly the legislature provided four wheel drive vehicle for MPs to travel within their 
constituency. 
 
Civil Society Attendance to Legislative Public Hearing 
 
One of the channels for citizens and organized groups to influence the law-making process is 
through public hearings. The standing orders of all the three multiparty assemblies prescribe at 
the committee stage of the legislative process that committees organize public hearings with 
civil society agencies before they report a bill to the plenary.129 
 
One of the first times that civil society attended a public hearing took place in 1996 on the Land 
Bill in the Committee of Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local 
Government (Shenga 2002).After the Land Bill was referred to the Committee of Agriculture 
the committee organized a public hearing in which they invited agriculture and peasant 
                                                 
129Standing orders: Law 1/95 of 8 May; Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April; and Law no. 17/2007 of 18 July. 
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associations, political parties, school institutions, district administrators, non-government 
organizations (NGOs), agriculture technicians, and scholars. The public hearing was attended 
by 143 individuals from civil society organizations, state bureaucracy, donor community, 
political parties and scholars. With technical support from the SUNY/USAID project the 
Committee of Agriculture conducted, through the database of civil society organizations, a 
survey of organizations associated with land issues (Shenga 2002:32).130 The Committee of 
Agriculture also requested technical assistance from the legislature technical support unit 
(known as Gabinete Técnico - GTAR).  But due to lack of internal expertise the request was 
directed and conducted by an extra parliamentary expert (Shenga 2002:32-33).  
 
The existing data on public hearings in Table 8.2 show that the legislature conducted 85 public 
hearings in the Fourth Assembly while 18 were conducted in the two first years of the Fifth 
Assembly.131 The higher number of public hearings in the Fourth Assembly reflects the 
existence of the “Relationship with Constituent” SUNY/USAID parliamentary programme that 
supported the legislature to conduct public hearings. 
 
The Ad hoc Committee for Review of the Constitution led (with 37 public hearings) in 
representing citizens and interest groups in law-making followed by the Committee of Social 
Affairs, Gender and Environment (with 18 public hearings). Subsequently follow the 
Committee of Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local 
Government (with 11 public hearings) and the Committee of Economic Activities and Services 
(with 10 public hearings). The Committee of Planning and Budget and Committee of 









                                                 
130 ORAM represents peasant associations in 7 provinces: Niassa, Nampula, Zambézia, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza 
and Maputo. 
131 There is no comprehensive data on later years of the Fifth Assembly and the Sixth. The available data misleads 
as committee staff have been mixing executive and public hearings together and report them as public hearing. 
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Table 8.2: Number of Public Hearings by Committee, 1995-2001 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Committee of Planning and 
Budget 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Committee of Social Affairs, 
Gender and Environment 
0 0 4 7 0 0 7 18 
Committee of Agriculture, 
Regional Development, 
Public Administration and 
Local Government 
0 3 3 2 3 0 0 11 
Committee of Economic 
Activities and Services 
0 2 2 0 6 0 3 10 
Committee of Defence and 
Public Order 
0 3 0 2 0 0 0 5 
Committee of Legal Affairs, 
Human Rights and Legality 
0 1 2 2 0 0 0 5 
Ad hoc Committee for 
Review of the Constitution 
0 0 0 11 28 0 0 37 
Ad hoc Committee for 
Review of the National 
Anthem 
0 0 2 0 0 0 3 5 
Total 0 10 14 24 37 5 13 103 
Source: Shenga. 2002. O Papel da Assembleia da República na Representação dos Interesses da Sociedade Civil, 
1995-2001. O Caso da Proposta de Lei de Terras e Proposta da Lei do Trabalho. Honours Dissertation in Public 
Administration, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo.  
Note: The shaded area corresponds to the Fourth Assembly and the last two years correspond to the first two years 
of the Fifth Assembly. 
 
The frequency of citizens and civil society organizations engaging with committees in law-
making through public hearings reflects to some extent the nature of issues dealt with 
committees. As the Ad hoc Committee for Review of the Constitution touches core citizens’ 
rights and freedom, this committee had to organize more public debates and to engage more 
citizens and civil society agencies at sub national level. The same applies with vulnerable 
groups. As the Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and Environment deal with marginalized 
groups and they are majority within the country, this committee also organized more public 
hearings to make sure that the views of the underrepresented are taken into consideration in 
law-making. Also there are more NGOs in the country that focus on this committee’s issues.  
 
On the other hand, although the issues that the Committee of Planning and Budget deal with 
affect all bills to be enacted into law, this issue is still far away from the public domain in 
Mozambique. First, the State budget is a very complex and a long bill which is only mainly 
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understood by executive experts. Second, the civil society vibrancy on budgeting has only come 
from one civil society organization: Debt Mozambican Group (GMD).       
Effectiveness of Civil Society Attendance at Public Hearings 
When civil society agencies attend public hearings, to what extent are they effective? The 
effectiveness of civil society attendance at public hearings is measured by civil society’s input 
into the bill reviewed and scrutinized by committee. By input this study considers substantive 
input rather than grammatical or typographical changes.  
The Mozambique bill tracker data shows that of the 285 bills referred to committees, out of 308 
bills that were directed to the legislature, 244 (85 percent) were reviewed by committees. And 
of the 244 bills reviewed by committees the civil society managed to have their inputs 
incorporated in 58 (24 percent).Comparing assemblies, the data shows a decrease of civil 
society input to bills reviewed by committees. The percentage of civil society to bills reviewed 
by committees declined from the Fourth Assembly (29 percent) to the Fifth (24 percent) and 
Sixth (18 percent) assemblies (Tables 8.3 and 8.4). The higher percentage of civil society input 
to bills reviewed by committees may reflect the existence of SUNY/USAID parliamentary 
programme that supported the legislature to engage with civil society. With the end of the 
programme in the Fifth Assembly especially 2000/2001 the engagement of the legislature with 
civil society declined.  











# % # % # % # % 
Civil society input to bills 
reviewed by committee 
No 62 71% 53 76% 71 82% 186 76% 
Yes 25 29% 17 24% 16 18% 58 24% 
Total 87 70 87 244 
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% # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # 
Civil 
society  





No 86% 55 81% 21 52% 13 73% 8 78% 7 68% 44 100% 13 33% 1 100% 22 20% 1 76% 186 
Yes 14% 9 19% 5 48% 12 27% 3 22% 2 32% 21 0% 0 67% 2 0% 0 80% 4 24% 58 
Total 
64 26 25 11 9 65 13 3 22 5 244 
Note: No civil society input was made to bills of the Committee of International Relations and Committee of Petitions as no bills were referred to these committees.  











Civil society organizations are more likely to incorporate their input to bills reviewed by the Ad 
hoc Committee for Review of the Constitution (80 percent); and Ad hoc Committee for Review 
of the National Anthem (67 percent). In other committees civil society success is shallow but it 
has been influencing the incorporation of their input to bills reviewed by the Committee of 
Social Affairs, Gender and Environment (48 percent), Committee of Legal Affairs, Human 
Rights and Legality (32 percent), Committee of Economic Activities and Services (27 percent), 
Committee of Defence and Public Order (22 Percent), Committee of Agriculture, Regional 
Development, Public Administration and Local Government (19 percent) and Committee of 
Planning and Budget (14 Percent). 
 
Nonetheless, some committees have not allowed any representation of civil society views. The 
Ad hoc Committee for Review of Standing Order and Ad hoc Committee for Review of 
Electoral legislation did not allow any civil society inputs to the bills referred to them. These 
committees did not organize public hearings. While perhaps there is not much for civil society 
to say about the bill of rules of procedure of the legislature, the same cannot be said with respect 
to electoral bills. Citizens, scholars, NGOs and extra parliamentary parties have been criticising 
the parliament for not organizing public hearings to consider their views.132 Electoral bills have 
only included the views and interests of the parliamentary parties.133 
 
Citizens and Organized Groups Petitions and Its Effectiveness 
 
In the Fourth Assembly the legislature prescribed that citizens and organized groups can appeal 
to the legislature through petitions, claims or complaints if their rights are violated by other 
entities.134In the Fourth Assembly and the first two years of the Fifth the legislature received 
some few amount of petitions (Shenga 2002:23:24). But the legislature had difficulty to deal 
with petitions until the standing orders were reviewed in the Fifth Assembly and the Committee 
of Petitions was established.135 
 
                                                 
132 Ideiasdebate.blogspot.com/2007/02/lei-eleitoral_08.html, searched on 31 October 2013 
133 This is the source of the current political instability now in Mozambique with the main opposition demanding 
equal representation in the National Electoral Commission and the ruling Frelimo defending the PR system 
controlling the electoral machinery including the judiciary Constitutional Council/Court – the institution that 
validates election results.  
134 Standing order, Law 1/95 of 8 May. 
135 Standing Order, Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April. 
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Effectiveness of citizens and organized groups petitions is measured by the extent to which the 
Committee of Petitions responds to the received petitions. The term ‘respond’ means that the 
Committee of Petitions investigated petition issues and reported them to the plenary. The role 
of the Committee of Petitions is to review and scrutinize petitions that the legislature receives 
and refer to it; to investigate petitions by hearing the petitioner and entities that allegedly 
violated petitioner rights; and to report to the plenary.  
 
An assessment of the Fourth Assembly plus the first two years of the Fifth shows that the 
number of petitions ‘responded’ to by the legislature increased significantly in 2001 after the 
establishment of the Committee of Petitions (Shenga 2002:23). Of the 27 petitions directed to 
the legislature in 2001, 93 percent (25) were ‘responded’ (Shenga 2002:24). Before 2001 the 
levels of the legislature response to petitions in the Fourth Assembly varied between 10 and 19 
percent. Due to a strong parliamentary commitment toward victims of the 2000 floods in the 
country, the legislature did not investigate and ‘respond’ to any petition in 2000.136 The average 
level of petitions ‘responded’ to by the legislature is about 15 percent in the Fourth Assembly 
and 47 percent in the Fifth.137 
 
Legislators’ Travel to Constituency, Duration of Their Stay and Activities 
they Perform 
 
Do legislators travel to their constituencies? In the scope of the Constituency Service 
Programme – which is a programme that provides means to MPs to contact their constituents, 
Mozambican legislators do travel to their constituencies. They receive an allowance of 35 
working days annually to do so. The ALP data shows that the overwhelming majority (90 
percent) of Mozambican legislators make at least one trip back to their constituency during a 
typical month when the legislature is out of session (Figure 8.5). In fact, after the plenary session 
is finished the legislature deploys legislators back to their constituencies. The legislature brings 
them back to the city where the parliament meets when it meets for the following plenary 
session. Exception applies however to committee members who may return to the parliament 
before the following plenary session if his or her committee meets.  
 
                                                 
136 Committee of Petition was established in 2001 by Law no. 6/2001 of 30 April. 
137 Due to unavailability of data, the average data from the Fifth Assembly is based on 2000 and 2001. 
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Figure 8.5: Number of Trips Legislators Make to Constituencies, 2008
 
ALP question: How many trips did you make to your constituency during a typical month when the Assembly was 
not in session? 
 
Once legislators travel to their constituencies, about 22 percent stay in their constituencies 30 
days - which approximately match with the days of the stipend they receive for constituency 
service - and22 percent stay 90 days (Figure 8.6). The later might correspond to those legislators 
who live in their constituencies. 
 
Figure 8.6: Average Number of Stay in Constituency (in Days), 2008
 
ALP question: On average, how many days did you stay? The response of those who don’t know (2 percent) was 
not included in the figure. 
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Once they travel to their constituencies, about 30 percent spend most of their time attending 
local party meetings but majority ‘listen to their constituents’ (26 percent) and ‘talk to groups 
and hold meetings’ (26 percent). Others have been simultaneously conducting party service, 
oversight, talking to groups and holding meetings (Figure 8.7). 
 
Figure 8.7: Activities MPs Perform in their Constituencies, 2008




The legislature has developed a structure for representation as well as created respective 
capacity. As a series of rule reforms that attempted to increase the potential for improved 
representation, Mozambique’s legislature encourages public debates and/or hearings of all bills 
referred to committee; it allowed citizens and interest groups to direct petitions appealing to the 
legislature when their rights are violated; and developed a Constituency Service Programme 
allowing legislators to contact their constituents when the legislature established the Committee 
of Petitions to ‘respond’ to petitions and report their outcome to the plenary; and provided 
allowance and vehicle to legislators to conduct constituency service. It also established a 
committee system to perform the function of representation. 
 
As a result of these institutional developments, civil society organizations have attended public 
hearings influencing law-making by airing their views. Civil society attendance to public 
hearings was high in committees that deal with issues that affect rights and freedom, and social 
aspects. But it was low in the committee dealing with financial issues where civil society 
organizations require more expertise. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of civil society attendance 
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percent of bills reviewed by committees. The incorporation of civil society input in bills 
reviewed by committees declined over time, in part, due to the closure in early Fifth Assembly 
of the donor programme engaging the legislature with civil society.     
Also as a result of the rule reforms, the legislature has received petitions from citizens and 
interest groups appealing about violation of their rights. The effectiveness of responding to 
those petitions only commenced in the Fifth Assembly when the Commission of Petitions was 
established. The legislature increased in responding to petitions from the Fourth to the Fifth 
Assembly. 
On constituency service, the overwhelming majority (90 percent) of Mozambican legislators 
make one trip to their constituency in a month; and 52 percent stay there at least 30 days. During 
their stay, more than half (52 percent) listen to constituents, talk to groups or hold meetings.  
Mozambican legislators tend more to have a constituent servant role orientation toward their 
job. But when they take a position about an issue in the legislature they are more likely to play 
a partisan role. This reflects strong party discipline and control in the legislature which is 
associated with the closed list PR system.  
Nonetheless, the Mozambican legislature does not descriptively represent the demographic 
features of its society in terms of gender and age. Exception applies to place of birth and marital 
status. But the percentage of women in the legislature has been increasing over time mainly due 
to the ruling party’s female quota combined with the PR closed list electoral system with large 
multimember districts. 
In addition, the policy preferences of legislators do not reflect those of the voters. The most 
important problem that legislators believe the government should address is poverty while for 
the voters it is unemployment. The other voters’ policy preferences include health, education, 
water supply and food shortage or famine but for legislators it includes inflation, crime and 
security, and farming. Legislators’ policy preference reflects considerably the executive policy 
preference. This might be explained by the dominance of the executive over the legislative 
institution in the Mozambican political system.  
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African multiparty legislatures emerged in most Sub-Saharan countries only in the 1990s when 
the Third Wave of democratization swept the sub-continent. “During the 1960s, [which is the 
decade of independence of most African countries], only Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius were 
democracies” (Diamond 2008:8). In the Mozambican context, even though its legislature 
existed since 1977, it was only since 1990 that the constitution endowed the legislative 
institution with law-making, oversight, representative and constituency service powers. 
 
We have now seen the extent to which the legislature has been able to carry out these new 
functions. The final question I investigate is whether the progresses in legislative development 
and performance brought a greater legitimacy to the legislature. As the legislature performed 
relatively well recruiting legislators with better qualifications, reforming, professionalizing, 
institutionalizing, making laws, conducting oversight and representing voters, I expect that 
voters support the legislature. I first evaluate whether voters see difference between the 
legislature and the president and know their representatives. Second, I analyse the patterns of 
support for the legislature. Third, I examine the factors accounting for support for the 
legislature. To respond to these questions I look at the existing evidence on public evaluation 
of the Mozambican legislature from the 2008 Afrobarometer public opinion survey. 
 
It is relevant to investigate public support for legislatures because it has consequences for the 
political system. In the same way as the democratic regimes of which they are part, legislative 
institutions depend for their survival and effective functioning on public approval (Mishler and 
Rose 1994, Kim and Loewenberg 1976). “If public orientations [toward legislatures] are 
negative, legislatures will not work as well as otherwise” (Rosenthal 2009:433). At the same 
time, there is a concern that most people do not appreciate or support legislative institutions 




Evaluations of the Legislature and the President 
 
In a presidential system citizens do not see so much difference between the legislature and the 
executive president. The assessments of legislatures are “heavily coloured by the image of the 
president” (Davidson and Parker 1972:608). Studies show that “when the public evaluates the 
president in positive light, there is a strong tendency for Congress to be popular, as well” 
(Patterson and Caldeira 1990, Parker 1977:102-4). Mozambique is not an exception: the 
approval of the legislature is strong as it is of the president.  
 
The overwhelming majority of Mozambican citizens approve or approve strongly the 
performance of the legislature (68 percent) and of the president (82 percent) (Figure 9.1). Trust 
in the legislature is also strong as it is of the president. About 71 percent of Mozambicans trust 
the legislature somewhat or a lot and 77 percent do the same with respect to the president (Figure 
9.2). In the Mozambique presidential system where the president concentrates powers138 and 
the legislature cannot hold the executive president to account, citizens strongly approve 
legislature’s performance and trust the legislature somewhat or a lot if the legislature does not 
interfere with presidential affairs.  
 
Figure 9.1: Performance of the Legislature and the President, 2008
 
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way a) the president and b) the parliament performed its job 




                                                 

















Figure 9.2: Trust in the Legislature and the President, 2008
 
Question: How much do you trust: a) the President and b) the Parliament? 
 
Knowledge about Legislators 
 
An overwhelming majority (82 percent) of Mozambicans do not know the name of their 
representatives in the legislature (Figure 9.3). This reflects the closed list PR electoral system 
with large multimember districts. Instead of voting for individuals, Mozambican voters vote for 
a party list with high magnitude that is not disclosed during the voting day or even campaign.    
 
Figure 9.3: Voters’ Knowledge about their Legislators, 2008
 






































Support for the Legislature 
 
Easton (1965) distinguishes between specific and diffuse support for political institutions. 
Specific support results from satisfaction with outputs – that is, how effectively or efficiently 
legislatures perform. This suggests that people support legislatures if they are satisfied with 
legislative achievement. In contrast, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily 
achievement. It refers to an attachment to a political object for its own sake – what the 
legislature is. Regardless of the performance evaluation people may make to legislative 
institutions, “citizens must perceive the legislature as legitimate and view its existence as 
necessary and proper, supporting the legislature more for what it is – a representative and 
deliberative body symbolizing democratic control of government – than for what it does” 
(Mishler and Rose 1994:8). Specific support is short term support while diffuse support is long 
term (Denis 1981). 
 
In this study I employ two indicators of support for legislature: the first is related to legislators 
- that is, approval of legislators’ performance. It is specific as it results from satisfaction with 
outputs. More specifically, citizens who are satisfied with the economy and the president, trust 
the president, identify with the wining party and are from the regions where the wining party 
has strongholds will tend to approve legislators’ performance. However, as they are low 
information citizens will less likely to support the legislature for what it is (Table 9.1).  
 
The second is related to the legislature – rejection that election and parliament are abolished. It 
is diffuse as it is independent from whether the legislature did a great job or not. Citizens with 
high levels of information - that is, formal education and access to news media, engage 
cognitively with others discussing politics and are interested in public affairs, have sense of 
political efficacy – that is, believe that means to influence government are available to them 
(Balch 1974) and know their representatives will likely to support the legislature regardless of 
its achievement. On the other hand, as they have ‘high information’ and are critical displaying 





Table 9.1: Expected Model of Diffuse and Specific Support for Legislature 
Reject that election and 
parliament are abolished 
Approval of legislators 
performance 
Diffuse 
   Formal education + - 
   News media (index) + - 
   Interest in public affairs + - 
   Discussion of politics + - 
   Political efficacy (make MP listen) + - 
   Knowledge about MP + - 
Specific 
   Satisfaction with economy - + 
   Approval of performance of the 
president - 
+ 
Trust president - + 
   Party ID with winner - + 
Pro-winner regions - + 
Mozambicans support less their legislative institution for what it is. The results in Figure 9.4 
show that just less than half (49 percent) of Mozambican citizens reject that election and 
parliament are abolished so that the president decides everything. Mozambicans support more 
legislators for what they do. About two-thirds of respondents expressed that approve their 
legislators’ performance (Figure 9.4). 
The high scores that Mozambican citizens offer to the performance of their legislators do not 
necessarily means that they actually perform well. Mozambican citizens have been providing 
uncritical assessments. Mattes and Shenga (2013) found that Mozambicans often uncritically 
overrate the performance of democratic institutions and leaders and that this uncritical pattern 
of Mozambican citizens is a function in part of living in low information society indicated by 
low levels of political information necessary for full citizenship. 
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Figure 9.4: Public Support for the Legislature, 2008
 
Questions for the first bar: Do you approve or disapprove of the way you representative to the National Assembly 
have performed their jobs over the past twelve months? 
Question for the second bar: There are many ways to govern a country: Would you disapprove or approve if 
elections and the Assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything? 
 
 
The Patterns of Explanatory Considerations 
 
Mozambicans are ‘low information’ people as they present low levels of formal education and 
access to news media. They “suffer from extremely low levels of formal education (the adult 
literacy rate is 46 percent, compared to an average of 61 percent across all low income 
countries),139 and extremely low levels of access to public information: the country has just 
three newspapers per 1,000 people (compared to 44 for low income countries), 14 television 
sets per 1,000 (compared to 84), and 44 radios per 1,000 (compared to 198).” (Mattes and 
Shenga 2013)140 
 
The 2008 Afrobarometer survey shows that only 5 percent of Mozambican citizens have 
completed tertiary education; 39 percent secondary and 46 percent primary education. While 
overwhelming majority (80 percent) access news media through radio, less than half does so 
through television (44 percent) and newspaper (28 percent). However, about two-thirds are 
interested in public affairs (66 percent) and discuss politics with others (68 percent). “Low rates 
of formal education, high levels of illiteracy and limited access to news media strike at the very 
                                                 
139“ICT Dialogue: Mozambique,” World Development Data. 












Approve/strongly approve MP performance Reject/strongly reject election and parliament are
abolished
 134 
core of cognitive skills and political information that enable citizens to assess social, economic 
and political developments” (Mattes and Shenga 2013). 
 
Mozambicans have low sense of (external) political efficacy - that is, “the individual’s beliefs 
that means of influence (government) are available to him” (Balch 1974). Only less than half 
(42 percent) believe that could make their MPs listen to their concerns about a matter of 
importance to the community. They also do not have knowledge about their representatives in 
the legislature. Only 13 percent were able to provide the correct name of their legislators. 
 
On the other hand, Mozambicans grant their political leaders and institutions high levels of trust 
and approval. About 82 percent approve performance of the president and 71 percent trust the 
president even though only 28 percent are satisfied with the present country and individual 
ecomic conditioins. Yet 66 percent identify with the winning party and 32 percent live in 
strongholds of the winning party. 
 
 
Explaining Support for Legislature 
 
This study employs Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression model to explain support 
for the legislature (Tables 9.2). The model incorporates diffuse factors that are expected to be 
related positively with support for the legislature (rejection that election and parliament are 
abolished) and negatively associated with approval of legislators’ performance. It also includes 
specific factors that are expected to be associated positively with approval of legislators’ 
performance and negatively with the support for legislature. 
 
Two diffuse factors appeared to have expected results while other two not. As expected the 
results in Table 9.2 show that people with high levels of formal education are more likely to 
support the legislature rejecting that election and parliament are abolished so that the president 
decides everything. Those with access to news media are less likely to approve the performance 
of legislators. As media accentuates the negative access to news media leads to negative 
attitudes toward legislatures (Rosenthal 2009). As unexpected, people who believe that the 
means of influencing government are available to them were less likely to support legislature 
and more likely to grant approval of legislators. 
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On specific factors three factors out of four appeared to have expected finding. As expected, 
people who approve presidential performance are less likely to support legislature and more 
likely to approve legislators’ performance. Those who trust the president are also more likely 
to approve the job of legislators. As unexpected, who live in the winning party strongholds are 
more likely to support legislature. The model that explain support for legislature weigh very 
little (6 percent)while the one that explains approval of legislators’ performance weigh great 
deal (37 percent).  
 
Table 9.2: Multiple Regression Model of Specific and Diffuse Support for Legislature in 
Mozambique, 2008 
 Reject that election and 
parliament are abolished 
Approval of legislators 
performance 
Diffuse    
   Formal education .163***  
   News media (index)  -.104*** 
   Interest in public affairs   
   Discussion of politics   
   Political efficacy (make MP listen) -.074* .121*** 
   Knowledge about MP   
Specific    
   Satisfaction with economy   
   Approval of performance of the 
president 
-.077* .517*** 
Trust president  .066** 
   Party ID with winner   
Pro-winner regions .079**  
Adjusted R Square .06 .37 
Not significant effects were removed from cells. 
Note: Entries are standardized beta coefficients. 









This study, using the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, revealed that Mozambicans do not see so much 
difference between the legislature and the president. When the approval or trust of the president 
is high, support for the legislature tends to be strong. This reflects in part the Mozambican 
presidential system where there is concentration of powers in the presidency and the legislature 
cannot hold the executive president to account. 
 
Second, it revealed that the approval of legislators’ performance is very high than rejection of the 
abolishment of election and parliament. This does not mean that the actual performance of 
legislators is high but it reflects that Mozambicans are uncritical citizens living in low information 
society with low levels of formal education and access to news media.  
 
Third, while some effects did not have an expected outcome, this study confirmed mostly the 
supported theory that specific support results from satisfaction with outputs while diffuse support 
depends on an attachment to a political object for its own sake – what the legislature is. 
 
Further research has to consider the effect of other factors to improve the model to account for the 
variation of diffuse support for legislature. Rosenthal (2009) posits that individual political 
heritage, political experience and political instruction account positively for variations explaining 
legislative support. The political heritage explanation assumes that people who come from 
political families where their father, mother and/or a close relative have enjoyed an involvement 
in politics tend to be more supportive of legislative institutions. They grow up hearing positive 
accounts about campaigns or governing within the family. The political experience explanation 
assumes that “high school students who work as pages in Congress or at state legislatures or 
college students who intern on campaigns or in the legislature get a different impression from 
those who do not participate at all” (Rosenthal 2009:19). People with political instruction, that is, 
those who received teaching on politics would also have a sizable difference. Public opinion 

































Chapter 10: Conclusions 
Introduction 
This study investigated legislative development and performance in Mozambique covering the 
first three multiparty assemblies – the Fourth (1995-1999), the Fifth (2000-2004) and the Sixth 
(2005-2009). Before I assessed these I tried as much as possible to provide a snapshot of these 
aspects during the one-party era. In the one-party era the Mozambican legislature only exerted 
law-making function ratifying bills initiated by the executive. The functions of oversight, 
representation and constituency service were not performed as the legislature did not have those 
powers. One-party legislators were amateurs meeting only for about 16 working days in a year. 
The legislature was endowed with oversight, representation and constituency service powers, 
besides law-making, in 1990 with the constitutional change toward multiparty politics.  
This study has revealed that, over the 15-year period 1995-2009, the Mozambican legislature has 
made progress not in all but most measures, including: 1) recruiting legislators with better 
qualifications; 2) reforming legislative rules of procedure, structures and working conditions; 3) 
professionalizing or creating capacity for legislators and the legislature; 4) institutionalizing; and 
5) performing better in law-making, oversight and representation. While there is improvement,
the levels of legislative development and performance are still shallow. Mozambican political
context factors including the electoral system and party system appear to have had a negative
effect on institutionalizing the legislature and also affected negatively legislative performance.
This study also investigated whether the progress the legislature has made has brought a greater 
legitimacy. The results reveal that Mozambicans are less likely to support the legislature for what 
it is (diffuse support) – which is more relevant for long-term commitment to the representative 
democratic institution (Denis 1981) - rather than what legislators do. Specific support for 
legislators, as indicated by approval of legislators’ performance, results from satisfaction with 
outputs, such as: approval of the performance and trust of the president. The evaluations of the 





trust of the executive president are high, there is a tendency of the approval and trust of the 
legislature and legislators to be strong. 
 
Diffuse support for legislature (rejection that election and parliament are abolished) depends on 
an attachment to the legislature. When the model accounting for specific support for legislatures 
is applied to diffuse support, this study found that it explains very little, suggesting that further 
research needs to consider others factors. Rosenthal (2009) points out three indicators accounting 
for variation of legislative support: political instruction, political heritage and political experience. 
 
This chapter summarizes and discusses the conclusions of all relevant chapters of this study. It 
draws implications for recruitment; rules of procedure, structures and working conditions reform; 
professionalization; institutionalization; law-making; oversight; and representation. It identifies 
limits for improving the levels of legislative recruitment, legislative behaviour and legislative 




The Mozambican legislature has made progress recruiting legislators with political capital. It 
increased in the legislature the levels of formal education of legislators, their occupational status, 
and experiences of working in the government, political party and the legislature before they stood 
to the legislature. But the levels of the progress are shallow.  
 
This study confirmed the theory that political, economic and social changes affect legislative 
recruitment (Matthews 1954, Le Vine 1968). In Mozambique political change came when 
ordinary citizens were allowed to participate and compete freely and equally with the adoption of 
the 1990 democratic constitution; economic and social change came when the state started 
reducing its intervention in the economy allowing privatization and free market from 1987 and 
1990. Changes in patterns of legislative recruitment result from adaptation from external factors 
of transition to democracy and economic and social liberalization. As multiparty elections started 
being carried out in the country, at least a second party emerged and more political capital was 
brought into the legislature. As liberal economic reforms commenced being implemented, 






Although Mozambican assemblies improved recruiting legislators with political capital over the 
period from 1995 to 2009, the question is whether the political capital affected the legislature 
reforming legislative rules of procedure, structures and working conditions in the same period; it 
helped the legislature professionalizing or creating capacity for itself and for its own members; or 
it impacted on legislative institutionalization. In sum, did legislator’s political capital help the 
legislature to develop institutionally and perform better its functions? The response is positive as 
it is also summarized in the following sections. 
 
Rules of Procedure, Structure and Working Conditions Reform 
 
The Mozambican legislature has made progress in reforming legislative rules of procedure. The 
Fifth and Sixth assemblies strengthened the rules of democratic process adopted by the Fourth 
Assembly. The Fifth Assembly combined rules of procedure from the Fourth Assembly for 
making petitions, claims and complaints to the legislature by establishing the Committee of 
Petitions. In addition, it strengthened accountability by adding rules to review and scrutinize 
public accounts that did not exist before.  
 
The Fifth Assembly also improved rules for reviewing and scrutinizing specific bill clauses. 
Besides reviewing the general bill principle and reporting their opinion to the plenary, which was 
the feature of the Fourth Assembly, from the Fifth Assembly committees started reviewing 
specific bill clauses, debating and voting on them and reporting their outcomes in plenary. 
Nevertheless, the Sixth Assembly reduced the law-making power of the legislature by setting up 
rules that allow the executive also to enact bills through ‘legislative authorization bills’. 
 
The legislature also made improvements on its structure. It improved its working space. By 
renovating the old building and constructing a new one from the Fourth Assembly, the legislature 
obtained a completely renewed plenary building and new office building in the Fifth Assembly. 
This reform resulted in modern and additional working space for the plenary and standing 
committees to do their job generally but it did not provide office space for legislators individually. 
Besides the speaker and deputy-speakers, only committee chairs, rapporteurs and staff were 





share their office space with their committee staff. All other committee members as well as rank-
and-file members were not provided office space. 
 
In terms of the formal legislative structure, although the legislature improved the number of 
committees from the Fourth to the Fifth Assembly, it declined in the Sixth Assembly. The 
established committee system replicated executive ministries, however most committees cover 
many ministries, reducing their prospects to specialize and specialize their members (Strøm 
1998). The Fifth Assembly also strengthened the supporting structure of the legislature by making 
it bigger as a result of the approval of the legislature strategic plan.141 
 
Implications for Reform in the Legislature 
 
Political capital had implications for rules of procedure, structures and working conditions reform 
in the Mozambican legislature. The reform of legislative rules of procedure, structures and 
working conditions that started improving from the Fifth Assembly resulted from the 
consolidation of internal factors of recruiting legislators with better qualifications or political 
capital. Legislator’s educational abilities increased in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies while 
legislator’s higher occupational status and government experience at local level improved in the 
Sixth. Legislator’s political capital helped the legislature in improving legislative reform, although 
the Sixth Assembly reduced the law-making power of the legislature and number of committees. 
Legislative reform improved as legislator’s political capital increased. This confirms Seligman 
(1964) theory that political skill is the cutting age of change. 
 
However these reforms cannot only be attributed to internal factors starting from the Fifth 
Assembly. Adaptation from external pressures of the transition to democracy is also important. 
As the country transited to democracy in 1990 with the democratic constitution and 1994 with the 
multiparty legislative election it had to adapt or reform to suit fundamentally to democratic 
principles from the Fourth Assembly (1995-1999). 
 
                                                 







This study found that legislative professionalization or capacity of the Mozambique legislature is 
very low but the legislature has improved in creating capacity for both the legislators and itself. 
The legislature improved in three of the four measures of professionalization. First, although most 
of legislators in the legislature and committees do not have staff, the legislature commenced 
improving recruiting better-qualified staff in the Fifth Assembly. Committee meetings as well as 
plenary sessions were subsequently being served by staff with university degrees from the Fifth 
Assembly. 
 
Second, the average member’s monthly compensation increased by 48 percent in the Fifth 
Assembly and about the same level in the Sixth. Third, the legislature expenditure or budget 
increased one-third in the Fifth as well as the Sixth Assembly. Fourth, however, the legislature 
did not improve on the time legislators spend for their service. Besides spending only about 146 
working days sitting in ordinary and extraordinary sessions, contacting their constituents in 
constituencies and overseeing government institutions, the time spent on their duties remained 
about the same from the Fourth to Fifth Assembly and declined in the Sixth Assembly.  
 
Of these the time spent on service, legislative expenditure and staff has a direct impact on the way 
legislature works as they are institutionally connected measures (Rosenthal 1996:175). Member 
compensation, however, is an individually connected indicator; it does not have a direct impact 
on the way the legislature work.  
 
Implications for Professionalization in the Legislature 
 
Political capital also had implications for professionalizing the Mozambican legislature. The 
capacity improvements of the legislature derived from the consolidation of internal factors of 
recruiting better-skilled legislators in the Fifth and Sixth assemblies. As the legislature started 
recruiting legislators with political capital over time, legislators commenced demanding more 






But improvement on legislative capacity also results from the consolidation of improvements in 
legislative rules of procedure, structures and working conditions. Professionalization increased as 
reform improved. Rules of procedure and structures developed from the reform that occurred in 
the Fifth and Sixth assemblies. This confirms Rosenthal’s position that one of the underlying 
objectives of legislative reform is to make legislatures more professional bodies (Rosenthal 
1996:171). Structures, working conditions and rules of procedure reform influenced the 
recruitment of professional staff to plenary and committee meetings, more legislators’ 
compensation and subsequently the increase on legislative budget. After the legislative office 
building was finished in the Fifth Assembly, the new secretary-general of the legislature 
secretariat (S-GAR) recruited in 2001 the first wave of staff with university degrees to serve 
committee meetings and plenary sessions.142 This also confirms Squire that legislative reform was 
extremely successful in building a professional legislature (Squire 1992:1031). 
 
Professionalization improvement also derives from adaptation to the transition to democracy. As 
Mozambique transited to democracy, the country created capacity to adapt to the democratic 
legislature. The multiparty legislature had to improve on measures of legislative capacity from 




In two out of five measures the Mozambican legislature has not moved toward greater 
institutionalization. The membership tends to be unstable with frequent turnover and entry of 
outsiders in the legislature tends to be relatively easy. In addition, from 1995 to 2009 there was 
no difference between the party machinery within the legislature and the party machinery outside 
of the legislature. This reduced autonomy of the party within the legislature from the outside 
intruder. 
 
In the other three measures, the legislature has moved towards greater institutionalization. Firstly, 
the legislature improved managerial autonomy approving itself its own organizational structure 
in the Fifth Assembly, even though it still has to negotiate with the executive to approve its own 
                                                 
142I was one of them. 
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budget. Secondly, leaders tended to be selected from within the organization and have substantial 
tenure in office. Thirdly, particularistic and discretionary methods tended not to be followed for 
distribution of legislative positions of power. The method for selection to positions of power in 
the legislature is driven by legislator’s political capital. Rather than selecting members based on 
favouritism and nepotism, the legislature selected those members whose level of formal education 
is high and who had served in the legislature at least one term.  
Implications for Institutionalization in the Legislature 
Political capital has affected institutionalization in the Mozambican legislature. Legislative 
institutionalization improved as political capital patterns of legislative recruitment improved. The 
legislature institutionalized as a function of consolidation of legislative recruitment pattern of 
political capital. The selection to leadership positions of power within the legislature with 
substantial tenure in office as well as legislative autonomy commenced in the Fifth Assembly 
when the legislature started recruiting better qualified legislators.  
Legislative rules, structures and working conditions reform also had implications for 
institutionalization of the legislature. The changes in rules of procedure of the organization of the 
legislature provided the legislature with managerial autonomy vis-à-vis the executive. In the Fifth 
Assembly, especially 2003, the legislature adopted its own organizational structure whereas 
before it was adopted by the executive.   
Although the signs of institutionalization appeared in the same period together with 
professionalization in the Fifth Assembly, it is difficult to state that professionalization drove 
institutionalization. First, the level of legislative professionalization was very low. Second, the 
financial incentive such as salary and benefits are too low for membership stability for the 
majority - i.e. the rank-and-file members. Only the minority, the legislators at leadership positions 
of power, adopt a long-term career in the legislature. 
Different than reform and professionalization, institutionalization does not result from immediate 
adaptation to the democratic transition. Legislative institutionalization did not occur immediately 
in the founding multiparty assembly. It only started taking place after the founding multiparty 
assembly. As “institutionalization is a process by which organizations acquire value and stability” 
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(Huntington 1968), it cannot occur immediately in the beginning of emerging multiparty 
assembly. It takes time to occur. 
Law-making 
In observing legislative law-making as a process rather than product, this study revealed that the 
Mozambican legislature committee system performed relatively well in three out of five 
dimensions of law-making. It performed relatively well in the referral of legislation as a 
substantial number of bills were referred to committees. It performed reasonably well shaping 
legislation, as it made changes in proportionately more of the bills it proposed for passage on the 
floor, but the levels of modification of bills was shallow. It performed relatively well on the 
passage of legislation. But committee choices were often the choices of party caucuses that orient 
them to follow party discipline.  
Comparing assemblies, there were significant progressive changes on measures of committee 
performance in law-making. The referral of legislation improved from the Fourth to the Fifth 
Assembly but it declined in the Sixth as the legislature authorized the executive to enact bills in 
the form of decree-law. Shaping of legislation increased from the Fourth to the Fifth and the Sixth 
Assembly; and passage of legislation improved from the Fourth to the Sixth Assembly. 
Nevertheless, screening of legislation declined from the Fourth to the Fifth and the Sixth 
Assembly. 
Based on these four dimensions of committee performance in law-making, the Mozambican 
committee system can be classified into three categories: better-performing committees including 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and Legality, and Committee of Planning and Budget. 
Average-performing committees including Committee of Agriculture, Regional Development, 
Public Administration and Local Government, Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and 
Environment, and Ad hoc Committee for Review of Electoral Legislation. Poorer-performing 
committees including Committee of Economic Activities and Services, and Committee of Defence 
and Public Order, Ad hoc Committee for Review of the Constitution, and Ad hoc Committee for 
Review of the National Anthem. Two standing committees - Committee of Petitions and 
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Committee of International Relations - did not perform any law-making function as no bills are 
referred to them. 
Implications for Law-making in the Legislature 
Committee performance in law-making depends in part on the relation between the recruitment 
of legislators with political capital and institutional development of the legislature. The 
Mozambican legislature improved recruiting legislators with political capital as well as made 
progressive changes reforming rules of procedure, structures and working conditions, creating 
capacity for the legislature and legislators and institutionalizing. The implication of the 
association of these factors had a consequence for committee performance in law-making. The 
committee system of the legislature performed relatively well in law-making because the 
recruitment of better-qualified legislators was associated with the development of legislative 
institutions. 
Oversight 
The analysis of legislator’s orientations toward legislative functions showed that the legislature 
neglects oversight. But institutional analysis revealed that oversight is being performed within the 
legislature. The problem with legislators’ orientation approach is that by focusing on the 
individuals, it counts each legislator equally. But not all legislators should be counted equally as 
oversight is performed only by the few – those affected by institutional incentives (Rosenthal 
1981, Rosenthal 2009), which in the Mozambican context were found to be mainly those who are 
members of special and standing committees.   
The Mozambican legislature performed relatively well on four out of five measures of legislative 
oversight employed. It did not establish a legislative auditor but it created a functional 
organization for oversight with special and standing committees. One special committee was 
established in the Fourth Assembly and two in the Fifth. A special standing committee, the 





The legislature established a budget and public account committee for oversight. The budget and 
public account committee conducted oversight during the budgeting and law-making process by 
hearing the executive as well as holding the executive to account on public revenues and expenses. 
Together with special committees, the budget and public account committee conduct more 
oversight than any other committee in the legislature.  
 
Oversight is an activity that also occurs during the law-making process. During law-making, 
standing committees conducted hearings with the executive to bills the executive initiated. They 
held the executive to account. However, committee performance conducting executive hearings 
varied according to the number of bills they received. Committees that received more bills from 
their parent chamber, held the executive to account more. They conducted more executive 
hearings. 
 
Lastly, the committee system developed information to conduct oversight. Committees produced 
reports of the reviews and evaluations they conducted when the legislature was out of session. 
These reports have been helpful for committee members to ask questions to the executive in 
plenary on the mid-term review of the implementation of the social and economic plan and state 
budget. 
 
Implications for Oversight in the Legislature 
 
The recruitment of legislators with political capital associated with institutional development of 
the legislature had implications for legislative oversight. The increase of legislator’s political 
capital helped those legislators with obligation of oversight to perform this function.143 
 
Regarding legislative rules of procedure and structures reform, the progressive change of the 
legislative process in the Fifth Assembly, allowing committees to review the specific clauses of 
bills and report them to plenary, led committees to hold executive ministries to account in front 
of committees on bills the executive initiated. The improvement of the legislative structure also 
                                                 
143 The percentage of standing committee members with university education increased from the Fourth (57 percent) 
to the Sixth Assembly (63 percent). Note that the special oversight committee members from the Committee of 
Petitions are also included in these figures but inquest committee members are not as most of them are also standing 





helped the legislature to develop a structure for oversight. The development of a legislative 
secretariat aided the committee system to develop information for oversight through committee 
staff. 
 
On legislative professionalization, the increase in professional staff helped committee members 
to develop information for oversight as well as to provide them with technical support during 
oversight visits. The increase in the legislative budget also enabled committees to travel to 
perform oversight visits. 
 
With regard to legislative institutionalization, the legislative boundedness indicated by managerial 
autonomy, selection of leaders within the legislature with substantial tenure in office and the use 
of universal criteria for the distribution of members to positions of power led legislatures to 
develop a structure for oversight, conduct oversight visits and develop its own information 




This study revealed that the policy preferences of legislators did not reflect those of the voters. 
Legislators expressed that the first most important problem that government should address is 
poverty or destitution while the public said unemployment. The basket of public policy 
preferences also included health, education, water supply and food shortage or famine but of 
legislators included inflation, crime and security, and farming. As a reflection of dominance of 
the executive over the legislative associated with the closed list PR and multi-member district 
electoral system, which widens the gap between voters and legislators, legislators’ policy 
preferences may have reflected considerably those of the executive, which is much more in 
contact with legislators during law-making.  
 
Legislatures exert the function of representation by organizing and carrying out public hearings. 
This study found that civil society organizations have attended public hearings organized by 
committees, thus influencing law-making by airing their view. While civil society organizations 
were effective in attending public hearings in some committees, in general they managed to 






Legislatures also represent voters when they respond to petitions voters may send to them. The 
Mozambican legislature created rules for citizens and organized groups to appeal to it by directing 
petitions, complaints and claims. It also established a committee to deal with petitions - the 
Committee of Petitions. The legislature increased its effectiveness in responding to petitions in 
the Fifth Assembly when it set up the Commission of Petitions to review and scrutinize petitions, 
investigate them and report their outcomes to the plenary.  
 
In terms of constituency service, Mozambican legislators tend to express that the role orientation 
toward their job is to be a constituent servant. But when they take a position about an issue in the 
legislature, they were likely to express that they play a partisan role. This reflects strong partisan 
discipline and control in the legislature with result from the list-PR electoral system with large 
multi-member districts. When they travel to their constituencies during the interim period, the 
majority said they stayed in their constituency at least once a month. During their stay more than 
half said that they listened to constituents, talked to groups or held meetings with constituents. 
One-third said that they worked for their party and the rest expressed that they performed both 
constituency and party services.  
 
Implications for Representation in the Legislature 
 
Such as law-making and oversight, representation performance derives in part from the relation 
between the institutional development of the legislature and recruitment of legislators with better 
qualifications. The Mozambican legislature performed relatively well in representation as it did 
the same on legislative institutional development and recruiting legislators with political capital. 
 
Legislature’s improvement in recruiting better-qualified legislators contributed for the legislature 
to perform relatively well on representation. The improvements on legislative reform allowed 
public debates and/or hearings on bills referred to committees. It allowed citizens and interest 
groups to direct complaints, claims and petitions to the legislature when they feel that their rights 
are being subverted. It assigned standing committees with the responsibility to conduct public 
debates/hearings and the Committee of Petitions the responsibility to deal with petitions. It 
allowed legislators to contact constituents in their constituencies. The improvement on legislative 





development of capacity provided allowances and a four wheel vehicle to legislators to enable 
them to travel to perform constituency service; and allowances for the committee system to 
conduct public debates/hearings. 
 
However, the strong party control inside the legislature, resulting partly from the multi-member 
district electoral system, led many legislators to express themselves that they play a partisan rather 
than constituency servant role toward their job. The relative dominance of the executive over the 
legislature led to legislator’s policy preferences to reflect those policy preferences of the executive 
rather than of the public. The rules reform influenced the decline on civil society effectiveness in 
attending public hearings. 
 
The Limits of Reform in the Legislature 
 
The reform that the Mozambican legislature has made developing institutionally has been limited. 
Although the space reform provided office space to the speaker, deputy-speakers and to some 
extent committee chairs and rapporteurs; plenary and committee meetings; and the legislature 
secretariat, it did not provide offices for committee members and rank-and-file legislators. The 
structure reform established a committee system replicating executive ministries, but it 
corresponded each standing committee to many executive ministries; and allowed multiple 
membership of standing committee members to ad hoc committees, constraining the possibility 
of standing committee members to specialize.  In addition, the committee system did not develop 
enough: The number of standing committees did not increase from eight in each assembly and Ad 
hoc and inquest committees declined to nil in the Sixth Assembly. 
 
The legislative rules of procedure reform provided powers to the legislature to do its job generally 
but it first, reduced the legislature’s power to make laws as it authorized the executive also to 
enact bills. Second, it reduced legislative representation as with legislative authorization civil 
society cannot approach standing committees to incorporate their inputs on policies; legislative 
authorization bills are not reviewed by committees. Third, it reduced the legislature’s power to 
oversee the executive president as it did not allow the head of the executive to account to the 
legislature on major policy issues. 
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Although the legislature improved in three of four measures of professionalization, the legislature 
budget; member’s compensation; professional staff; and the time that legislators spend attending 
plenary and committee sessions, controlling the executive and representing constituents and 
organized groups are low. In addition, the legislature secretariat did not recruit research staff at 
all. On legislative institutionalization, the majority of members turned over after serving their first 
term in office. While the legislature improved its autonomy vis-à-vis the executive, it did not in 
relation to political parties within the legislature. There is no difference between the party 
machinery outside the legislature and party machinery within the legislature. 
The recruitment of individuals to the legislature by political parties has been also limited. The 
legislature made progress recruiting legislators with political capital but the proportion of 
legislators with university education was low. The number of legislators with government 
experiences was also low. Whilst the majority had high occupational status – professional, 
managerial or white collar, the proportion of lawyers, economist, administrators or social 
scientists was very low.  
If the Mozambican legislature is to improve its performance more and Mozambique is to move 
from an ambiguous regime and improve to a liberal democracy, it has to develop a strong 
legislative institution of countervailing power. More specifically the legislature has to improve 
more recruiting legislators with political capital and it must develop institutionally more by 
reforming legislative rules of procedure, structures and working conditions, creating capacity for 
itself and legislators and institutionalizing. Mozambican legislative policymakers should learn 
from this first comparative effort at theorizing about the process of legislative development in 
Mozambique to make more progressive changes. Those interested in strengthening democracy in 
the country, including the international donor community, should concentrate much more their 
effort supporting legislative institutions as they are the most important institutions of 
countervailing power for democracy than civil society, media, judiciary, anti-corruption unit, etc. 
However, Mozambique may need to consider, above all, change to its electoral and party systems 







As with any other study this study did not cover everything about the process of legislative 
development in the Mozambican context. As this study approached recruitment from the 
perspective of ‘who’ obtained legislative seats (i.e. background approach), further research in 
Mozambique has to consider ‘how’ officials were recruited to become MPs (the process of 
recruitment approach) and/or ‘why’ they recruit themselves to become MPs (rational-actor 
approach) (see Matthews 1985, Moncrief 2002, Norris 1997a, Seligman et al 1974, Laswell 1948). 
 
This study approached legislative performance as an outcome that is a function of the association 
between the institutional development of the legislature and recruitment of legislators with 
political capital. However, it did not interact these two predictors of performance considering 
other factors. Further research in Mozambique on the subject may consider including data that 
can interact measures of legislative development and the recruitment pattern of political capital. 
 
Considering that this study revealed that its model explaining legislative support accounts 
relatively well for specific support but not for diffuse support, further research has to take into 
account other factors. These may be political heritage, political experience and political 
instruction. Rosenthal (2009) posits that individual political heritage, political experience and 
political instruction account positively for variations explaining legislative support.  
 
Further research has to continue to track changes over time to monitor the process and progress 
of legislative development and performance of the Mozambican legislature. As the Seventh 
Assembly (2010-2014) is about to complete, efforts have to continue comparing the process of 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
Recruitment Patterns by Caucus and Gender, 1995-2009 
 






Member of Parliament level of formal education, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
Primary educ. 12% 19% 22% 13% 22% 15% 
Secondary educ. 55% 60% 44% 58% 54% 57% 





MP occupational status before he or she was elected, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 





85% 73% 78% 77% 86% 79% 
Manual 
workers 
9% 6%  6% 10% 7% 
Others  6% 21% 22% 17% 4% 14% 
 
 
Government experience at national level 
 
MP with experience working in government as minister or deputy minister, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 91% 100% 100% 93% 100% 95% 










Government experience at provincial level 
 
MP with experience working in government as governor or provincial MP, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 87% 100% 100% 94% 91% 93% 
Yes 13%   6% 9% 7% 
 
 
Government experience at district level 
 
MP with experience working in government as mayor, district administrator or local 
councillor, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 89% 99% 100% 94% 94% 94% 
Yes 11% 1%  6% 6% 6% 
 
 
Government experience at community level 
 
MP with experience working in government as traditional ruler or ward secretary, 1995-
1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 99% 97% 100% 98% 100% 98% 
Yes 1% 3%  2%  2% 
 
Party experience at national level 
 
MP with experience working in party head-quarters, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 67% 77% 44% 73% 64% 70% 
Yes 33% 23% 56% 27% 36% 30% 
 
 
Party experience at provincial level 
 
MP with experience working in party provincial office, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 78% 69% 56% 70% 80% 73% 











Party experience at district level 
 
MP with experience working in party district office, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 83% 87% 100% 87% 80% 85% 
Yes 17% 13%  13% 20% 15% 
 
 
Party experience at community level 
 
MP with experience working in party community office, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No 86% 99% 100% 94% 87% 92% 

















MP level of formal education, 2000-2004 
 Frelimo Renamo 
UE 
Male Female Total 
Primary education 5% 6% 5% 7% 6% 
Secondary education 67% 68% 65% 74% 68% 














Male Female Total 
Managerial, 
professional 
or white collar 
84% 81% 81% 87% 83% 
Manual 
workers 
2% 4% 2% 5% 3% 
Others  14% 15% 18% 8% 15% 
 
 
Government experience at national level 
 




Male Female Total 
No  89% 100% 92% 99% 94% 
Yes  11%  8% 1% 6% 
 
 
Government experience at provincial level 
 




Male Female Total 
No  83% 99% 90% 94% 91% 




Government experience at district level 
 





Male Female Total 
No  85% 99% 93% 89% 92% 






Government experience at community level 




Male Female Total 
No 99% 99% 99% 100% 99% 
Yes 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Party experience at national level 




Male Female Total 
No 60% 57% 56% 65% 59% 
Yes 40% 43% 44% 35% 41% 
Party experience at provincial level 




Male Female Total 
No 36% 65% 53% 42% 49% 
Yes 64% 35% 47% 58% 51% 
Party experience at district level 




Male Female Total 
No 79% 82% 82% 77% 80% 
Yes 21% 18% 18% 23% 20% 
Part experience at community level 




Male Female Total 
No 82% 95% 88% 87% 88% 


















Male Female Total 
Primary education 3% 11% 5% 6% 6% 
Secondary education 62% 54% 54% 67% 59% 










Male Female Total 
Managerial, 
professional 
or white collar 
87% 83% 84% 88% 85% 
Manual 
workers 
5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 
Others  8% 13% 11% 8% 10% 
 
 
Government experience at national level 
 
 




Male Female Total 
No 95% 100% 96% 98% 97% 











Government experience at provincial level 
 




Male Female Total 
No  92% 99% 94% 96% 94% 
Yes  8% 1% 6% 4% 6% 
 
 
Government experience at district level 
 





Male Female Total 
No  81% 98% 90% 82% 87% 
Yes  19% 2% 10% 18% 13% 
 
 
Government experience at community level 
 
MP with experience working in government as traditional ruler or ward secretary, 2005-
2009 
 Frelimo Renamo 
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No  95% 98% 95% 98% 96% 
Yes  5% 2% 5% 2% 4% 
 
 
Party experience at national level 
 
MP with experience working in party headquarters, 2005-2009 
 Frelimo Renamo 
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No  67% 48% 58% 64% 60% 













Party experience at provincial level 
 




Male Female Total 
No  36% 49% 42% 39% 41% 




Party experience at district level 
 
MP party experience at local level, 2005-2009 
 Frelimo Renamo 
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No  59% 71% 67% 57% 63% 




Party experience at community level 
 
MP with experience working in party community office, 2005-2009 
 Frelimo Renamo 
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
No  76% 99% 89% 78% 84% 






















Besides monthly salary, Mozambican legislators receive allowances. According to the internal 
norms for the execution of the Assembly budget,144 all Mozambican legislators receive annually 
constituency service subsidy for a period of 35 working days. The subsidy of constituency service 
for 2002 was 799.20 Meticais (corresponding to $29.60). Likewise all Mozambican legislators 
receive per diems, for accommodation, meals and transport when the Assembly is meeting for 
plenary or committee sessions. For plenary meetings the per diem in 2002 for those members who 
live nearby or where the parliament meets was 144.30 Meticais (corresponding to $5.30) while 
those living far away from parliament it was 288.60 Meticais (matching $10.70). For committee 
meetings the per diem in 2002 for those committee members who live nearby or where the 
parliament meets was 144.30 Meticais (equivalent to $5.30); those living far away from 
parliament received per diem of 810.30 Meticais (corresponding to $30). While the per diem for 
plenary sessions is for about 90 working days a year, the maximum per diem for committee 
sessions is 60 days a year and it does not match with the duration of plenary sessions.     
 
The chairs, rapporteurs and members of an ad hoc or inquest committee receive monthly 
honorarium. In 2002 the chairs of an ad hoc or inquest committee received a monthly fee of 7,335 
Meticais (matching $271.70), while the rapporteurs and members of an ad hoc or inquest 
committee received a monthly honorarium, respectively, of 5,995 Meticais (corresponding to 
$222) and 3,780 Meticais equivalent to $140. Unlikely standing committee members, the 
members of ad hoc and inquest committees do not receive committee per diem when they meet 
in the same period as the plenary meetings.    
 
Besides these more general allowances, the deputy-speaker, caucus leader, member of the 
Steering committee, deputy-caucus leader, caucus rapporteur, committee chair, committee 
rapporteur and those legislators who rank first in the party closed list of the PR electoral system 
                                                 





for each constituency receive monthly the subsidy of representation.145 The representation subsidy 
of these members in 2002 was as follows: 
Deputy-Speaker        7,000 Meticais ($259) 
Caucus Leader       7,000 Meticais ($259) 
Member of the Steering Committee     5,000 Meticais ($185) 
Deputy-Caucus Leader      5,000 Meticais ($185) 
Caucus Rapporteur       3,000 Meticais ($111) 
Committee Chair       3,000 Meticais ($111) 
Committee Rapporteur      1,863.30 Meticais ($69) 
MPs who in each constituency rank first in the party PR closed list 1,863.30 Meticais ($69) 
 
Calculation of Member Allowances 
 
Based on this 2002 allowances data this study estimates the average of legislators’ allowances for 
the Fifth Assembly; then relying on the percentages of legislator salary for each legislature it 
estimates allowances for the other two legislatures; and then calculates legislators’ average 
compensation.  
 
First, by selecting the most and less active legislators in the Mozambican Assembly, respectively, 
the committee chair and rank-and-file member, this study calculates the allowances average for 
the Fifth Assembly. Both of these members receive annually a constituency service subsidy of 
$1,036 (that is, 35 days at $29.60) per day plus plenary session per diem. Assuming that the rank-
and-file member lives far away from where the parliament meets, as most do, he or she receives 
$963 (that is, 90 days at $10.70) annually for plenary session per diem. Because all of the 
committee chairs live where the parliament meets or nearby he or she receives annually a plenary 
session per diem of $477 (i.e. 90 days at $5.30) per day. Committee chairs also receive a maximum 
of 60 days committee session per diem of $318 and a monthly representation subsidy of $1,332. 
With these, this study estimates that the legislator annual allowance average for the Fifth 




                                                 
145‘Associated subsidy’. In Portuguese subsídio de representação. 
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1,036 477 318 1,332 3,163 
Rank-and-file 
Member 
1,036 963 NA NA 1,999 
Average 1,036 720 318 1,332 2,581 
NA means it does not apply. 
Second, the percentages of legislators salary in the Fourth ($563), Fifth ($920) and Sixth ($1650) 
legislatures are, respectively, 18 percent, 29 percent and 53 percent. Based on these figures this 
study calculates the allowance beginning from the point that the legislator’s allowance in the Fifth 
Assembly is $2,581, which is equivalent to 29 percent. This study assumes that the change in 
salary is in the same proportion as allowances because these two aspects are always discussed 
simultaneously annually in the internal norms for the execution of the Assembly budget. The 
annual legislator’s allowances vary equally as salary following the percentage of 18 ($1,579), 29 
($2,581) and 53 ($4,981) from where they were calculated. 











Average of all 
assemblies 
(1995-2009) 
Member salary 563 920 1,650 1,044 
Member allowances 1,579 2,581 4,981 3,047 
% of salary and allowances 18% 29% 53% 100% 
Member compensation 695 1,135 2,065 1,298 
Because legislator allowance data is annual it was divided by 12 to make it monthly as salary. Member compensation 
is sum of monthly salary and monthly allowances. 
Third, legislator’s monthly compensation average in the three legislatures is equivalent to $1,298. 
By comparing legislatures on compensation, the results show that legislative compensation is 
more likely to change progressively from assembly to assembly. In the Fourth Assembly the 
legislator’s compensation was $695 but it improved significantly in the Fifth Assembly to $1,135 









Enacted Bills by Assembly, 1995-2009 








Enacted bills 60% 65% 82% 70% 
Not enacted  40% 35% 19% 30% 
Total No of 
bills (N) 
100 89 119 308 
 
 













Amendments made in 
legislative process 62% 66% 74% 68% 
No amendment 0% 1% 5% 2% 
NA* 38% 33% 21% 30% 
Total No of bills (N) 100 89 119 308 
Note: amendment made in legislative process in the Mozambican Assembly were ‘simply amendments’ 
(typographical or grammatical). 



















Appendix to Chapter 7 
Political Capital of Committee and Non-Committee Members146 
Formal education by committee membership, 1995-2009 





Fourth l Assembly, 1995-1999 
Formal 
education 
Primary 24% 4% 15% 
Secondary 56% 58% 57% 
University 20% 38% 28% 
Fifth Assembly, 2000-2004 
Formal 
education 
Primary 10% 1% 6% 
Secondary 68% 67% 67% 
University 23% 33% 27% 
Sixth Assembly, 2005-2009 
Formal 
education 
Primary 10% 2% 6% 
Secondary 65% 52% 59% 
University 25% 46% 35% 
Occupational status by committee membership, 1995-2009 





Fourth Assembly, 1995-1999 
Occupational 
status  
Others 17% 9% 14% 




71% 90% 79% 
Fifth Assembly, 2000-2004 
Occupational 
status 
Others 16% 13% 15% 




81% 85% 83% 
Sixth Assembly, 2005-2009 
Occupational 
status 
Others 15% 4% 10% 




77% 94% 85% 
146This includes all 8 standing committees. As all the 8 standing committees perform oversight, this appendix is 






Government experience at national level, 1995-2009 






Fourth Assembly, 1995-1999 
Govt. experience at central level No  96% 94% 95% 
Yes  4.1% 5.7% 5% 
Fifth Assembly, 2000-2004 
Govt. experience at central level No  93% 95% 94% 
Yes  7% 5% 6% 
Sixth Assembly, 2005-2009 
Govt. experience at central level No  98% 96% 97% 
Yes  2% 4% 3% 
 
Government experience at provincial level, 1995-2009 






Fourth Assembly, 1995-1999 
Govt. experience at provincial level No  91% 96% 93% 
Yes  9% 4% 6.8% 
Fifth Assembly, 2000-2004 
Govt. experience at provincial level No  91% 90% 90.7% 
Yes  9% 10% 9.3% 
Sixth Assembly, 2005-2009 
Govt. experience at provincial level No  96% 93% 94% 
Yes  4% 8% 6% 
 
 
Government experience at local level, 1995-2009 






Fourth Assembly, 1995-1999 
Govt. experience at local level No  92% 96% 94% 
Yes  8% 4% 6% 
Fifth Assembly, 2000-2004 
Govt. experience at local level No  92% 91% 92% 
Yes  8% 9% 8% 
Sixth Assembly, 2005-2009 
Govt. experience at local level No  91% 83% 87% 
Yes  9% 18% 13% 
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Government experience at grass root level, 1995-2009 






Fourth Assembly, 1995-1999 
Govt. experience at grass root level No 98% 99% 98% 
Yes 2% 1% 2% 
Fifth Assembly, 2000-2004 
Govt. experience at grass root level No 99% 99% 99% 
Yes 1% 1% 1% 
Sixth Assembly, 2005-2009 
Govt. experience at grass root level No 99% 93% 96% 
Yes 2% 7% 4% 
Membership Stability (Legislative Experience), 1995-2009 






From previous assembly 
Membership stability in the previous 
assemblies 
No 60% 56% 58% 
Yes 40% 44% 42% 
From Fourth Assembly 
Membership stability from the 
Fourth Assembly
No 83% 78% 80% 
Yes 17% 23% 20% 
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Appendix to Chapter 8 
Committee Performance in Representation by MPs Formal Education 
Formal education Total 
Primary Secondary University 
Committee Planning and Budget 17% 17% 17% 
Committee of Agriculture, Regional Develop., 
Public Adm. and Local Government 
21% 11% 17% 
Committee of Defence and Public Order 17% 21% 8% 16% 
Committee of Economic Activities and Services 33% 17% 16% 17% 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and 
Environment 
17% 10% 29% 17% 
Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and 
Environment 
33% 15.4% 19% 17% 
Committee Performance in Representation by MPs Legislative Experience 
Legislative Experience 
from past legislature 
Total 
No Yes 
Committee Planning and Budget 20% 10% 17% 
Committee of Agriculture, Regional Develop., Public 
Adm. and Local Government 
17% 16% 17% 
Committee of Defence and Public Order 20% 11% 17% 
Committee of Economic Activities and Services 18% 15% 17% 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and 
Environment 
12% 26% 17% 
Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and 
Environment 
14% 23% 17% 
Committee Performance by Formal Education of Committee Staff 







Committee Planning and Budget 17% 16% 17% 
Committee of Agriculture, Regional Develop., 
Public Adm. and Local Government 
19% 13.6% 17% 
Committee of Defence and Public Order 20% 11% 17% 
Committee of Economic Activities and Services 17% 17% 17% 
Committee of Legal Affairs, Human Rights and 
Environment 
11% 26% 17% 
Committee of Social Affairs, Gender and 
Environment 
16% 18% 17% 
Note: These tables are based on legislative representation measure of civil society effectiveness in policy-making i.e. 
- civil society input into legislation). No civil society input was made to the bills of the Committee of International
Relations and Committee of Petitions as no bills were referred to these committees.








Fourth Assembly (1995-1999) 
 
Gender 
MP gender, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Total 
Male 57% 88% 89% 72% 




MP age, 1995-1999 
Age  Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
26-35  9% 12%  13% 1% 10% 
36-60 89% 80% 89% 81% 96% 85% 




MP marital status, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
Single 17% 33% 44% 26% 23% 25% 
Married 77% 62% 56% 70% 67% 69% 
Separated/Widow/Divorced 6% 5%  4% 10% 6% 
 
 
Place of birth 
MP place of birth, 1995-1999 
 Frelimo Renamo Democratic 
Union 
Male Female Total 
Niassa 5% 3%  4% 4% 4% 
Cabo Delgado 11% 6% 11% 9% 7% 9% 
Nampula 15% 24% 11% 18% 20% 19% 
Tete 4% 10% 11% 8% 4% 7% 
Zambezia 12% 27% 33% 20% 19% 20% 
Manica 5% 7%  7% 3% 6% 
Sofala 3% 16%  11% 4% 9% 
Inhambane 11% 3% 22% 8% 7% 8% 
Gaza 13%  11% 7% 9% 7% 
Maputo province 19% 4%  8% 20% 11% 









Fifth Assembly (2000-2004) 
 
Gender 
MP gender, 2000-2004 
 Frelimo Renamo Electoral 
Union 
Total 
Male 59% 80% 69% 
Female 41% 20% 31% 
 
Age  
MP age, 2000-2004 
Age  Frelimo Renamo-
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
27-35 9% 7% 6% 13% 8% 
 36-60 76% 79% 76% 81% 77% 
61-79 15% 14% 19% 5% 15% 
 
Marital status 
MP marital status, 2000-2004 
 Frelimo Renamo 
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
Single 23% 39% 28% 35% 30% 
Married 66% 54% 67% 48% 61% 
Separated/widow/divorced 11% 7% 5% 17% 9% 
 
Place of birth 
MP place of birth, 2000-2004 
 Frelimo Renamo 
Electoral 
Union 
Male Female Total 
Niassa 8% 4% 6% 7% 6% 
Cabo Delgado 17% 4% 11% 12% 11% 
Nampula 15% 17% 16% 16% 16% 
Tete 8% 10% 8% 9% 9% 
Zambezia 9% 32% 21% 18% 20% 
Manica 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 
Sofala 2% 14% 10% 1% 7% 
Inhambane 10% 5% 8% 8% 8% 
Gaza 12%  5% 9% 7% 
Maputo Prov 11% 4% 6% 12% 8% 
Maputo City 3% 1% 2% 3% 2% 
Foreign 
country 











MP gender, 2005-2009 
 Frelimo Renamo-Electoral 
Union 
Total 
Male 55% 76% 62% 
Female 45% 24% 38% 
 
Age 




Male Female Total 
26-25 8% 3% 5% 9% 7% 
36-60 81% 82% 80% 84% 81% 
61-89 11% 14% 15% 7% 12% 
 
Marital status 




Male Female Total 
Single 33% 39% 31% 42% 35% 
Married 50% 54% 62% 35% 52% 
Separated/widow/divorced 17% 7% 7% 23% 13% 
 
Place of birth 




Male Female Total 
Niassa 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 
C Delgado 18% 3% 13% 13% 13% 
Nampula 15% 18% 14% 18% 16% 
Tete 7% 6% 5% 9% 6% 
Zambezia 12% 33% 21% 17% 20% 
Manica 6% 7% 6% 7% 6% 
Sofala 3% 22% 15% 2% 10% 
Inhambane 14% 2% 10% 10% 10% 
Gaza 13% 1% 8% 10% 9% 
Maputo Prov. 6% 3% 3% 9% 5% 
Maputo City 1%   1% 0% 





Appendix to Chapter 9 
 
 




Specific support for legislators is measured by approval of legislator’s performance to the 
question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way your representative to the National Assembly 
has performed his/her job over the past twelve months?” 
 
Diffuse support for legislature is measured by rejecting that elections and parliament are 




Formal education is measured by the question: “What is the highest level of education you have 
completed?”  
 
News media access is measured by the questions: “How often do you get news from 1) radio, 2) 
television and 3) newspapers?”  
 
News media access index. Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor with eigenvalue 
greater than one (1.521), and common variance of 51 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s 
Alpha =.65. Factor loadings: rejection of news radio access=.776, news television access=.709 
and news newspapers access=.593. 
 
Interest in public affairs is measured by the question: “How interested would you say you are in 
public affairs?” 
 
Discussion of politics is indicated by the question: “When you get together with your friends or 
family, would you say you discuss political matters: frequently, occasionally or never?” 
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Party identification with winner is measured by the question” Do you feel close to any particular 
political party? [If yes,] Which party is that?  
Knowledge about legislator is indicated by the question: “Can you tell me the name of your 
Member of Parliament?” 
Political efficacy is measured by the following question: “In your opinion, how likely is it that 
you could get together with others and make: your Member of Parliament listen to your concerns 
about a matter of importance to the community? 
Performance of the president is measured by: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the 
president have performed his/her job over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say?” 
Trust parliament is measured by the question: “How much do you trust the parliament, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say?” 
Economic condition is measured by present, retrospective and prospective economic conditions. 
Present economic condition is measured by: “In general, how would you describe: 1) the present 
economic condition of this country; and 2) your own present living conditions?” Retrospective 
economic condition is measured by: “Looking back, how do you rate the 1) economic condition 
in this country, and 2) your living conditions compared to twelve months ago?” Prospective 
economic condition is measured by the question: “Looking ahead, do you expect the 1) economic 
condition in this country and 2) your living conditions in twelve months’ time to be better or 
worse?”  
Economic condition index. Factor analysis extracted one unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.67), 
which explains 55.6 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach Alpha=.60) is 
acceptable. Factor loadings: retrospective economic conditions evaluation =.59; present economic 
conditions evaluations=.57; and prospective economic conditions evaluation=.59. 
